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ABSTRACT
Open-minded cognition is a cognitive processing style that influences the manner in
which individuals select and process information. An open-minded cognitive style is marked by
a willingness to consider a variety of intellectual perspectives, values, attitudes, opinions, or
beliefs, even those that contradict the individual’s prior opinion. However, people also process
information and make decisions within groups, and their individual cognitive styles can
influence how the overall group processes and shares information. Therefore, the present paper
integrates the open-minded cognition and group decision making literatures, proposes and agentbased model of open-minded group cognition, and empirically tests the antecedents and
consequences of open-minded group cognition. Empirical tests were generally supportive of the
model; however, some possible boundary conditions were identified. Implications for theory
development, practical applications, and directions for future research are discussed.

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
What happens when the interests of the individual conflict with the interests of the group?
This is a question that has plagued poets, philosophers, and scientists alike since early
civilization. Some have suggested the group’s interests should supersede the individual’s. For
example, Thomas Paine argues that although society is constructive and good, individuals have
vices that can undermine society’s interests; thus, something (i.e., the government) needs to
protect society from the vices of the individual (Paine, 1776). However, the group can also
benefit from the interests of the individual. Adam Smith (1759) described a host of unintended
social benefits for society if individuals followed their own self-interested actions, a metaphor he
famously described as the invisible hand. Despite efforts by many great thinkers, there remains a
sought after balance between the interests of the individual and the interests of the group.
Perhaps part of the reason for this is due to the dynamic nature of individuals, groups, and the
tasks they work on.
This question is just as relevant in today’s information age as it was in the mid-eighteenth
century. Every day, people are faced with a near-constant stream of text messages, emails, video
conferences, social media notifications, and news headlines all fighting for their attention. To
form a judgment or make a decision, people must sift through this vast amount of information.
To be successful, people must be able to identify the important or relevant information for the
1
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task at hand. But this becomes difficult when faced with the overwhelming amount of
information we have access to. Thus, when complex or important decisions are to be made,
people commonly form groups to accomplish tasks. When people form these task groups, they
must figure out how their individual efforts should be organized and how to communicate their
abilities to other group members.
Although there are many ways group members can combine their knowledge, skills, and
abilities, the extent of information processing is limited by the way the group makes its decision.
Many group decision-making methods aggregate member preferences to produce a final
judgment or decision (Larrick & Soll, 2006). Although these methods tend to be accurate, they
also tend to limit processing opportunities. Other methods allow some feedback to members
during the group decision-making process, but they still limit the amount of interaction (and thus,
processing) that can occur. For example, prediction markets (situations in which decision-makers
only have access to summarized information from the crowd) can be accurate and allow for
deeper processing under some conditions (e.g., Gürçay, Mellers, & Baron, 2015; Mellers et al.,
2014). In other cases, groups can hold face-to-face discussions to make their decisions, which
tend to allow for the most information processing. However, even under optimal circumstances,
deliberate or unbiased processing is not guaranteed (Baumann & Bonner, 2013).
One of the most common findings in group information processing research is that
groups often fail to exchange unshared information held among individual group members
(Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987; Steiner,
1972). Instead, groups tend to focus on the shared information held among all group members,
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which can lead to suboptimal group decisions. There have been many proposed explanations for
this effect (e.g., negotiation bias, evaluation bias, discussion bias); however, the distributed
cognitive styles of individual group members are another likely candidate for biased group
processing. Although there are many conceptualizations of cognitive styles, at its core, a
cognitive style is simply “an individual’s characteristic and consistent approach to organizing
and processing information” (Tennant, 1988).
One promising cognitive style of interest is open-minded cognition. A defining
characteristic of an open-minded cognitive style is a willingness to consider a variety of
perspectives and tendency to process information in an unbiased manner (Price, Ottati, Wilson,
& Kim, 2015). Previous research on open-minded cognition in inter-group contexts has shown
that individuals tend to use their group’s norm to guide their level of open-mindedness. For
example, individuals are more open-minded to threatening information about their group when
the information was presented by a fellow ingroup member compared to an outgroup member
(Winget, Tindale, & Ottati, 2019). In a second study, the researchers showed groups tended to be
more open-minded to new ideas when there was an open (versus closed) norm held by the group
(Winget et al., 2019).
However, open-minded cognition has yet to be assessed at the intra-group level. Given
that cognitive styles shape the way one organizes and processes information (Tennant, 1988), it
follows an open-minded cognitive style may be particularly relevant to consider in these
situations. To date, there has been little research on the effect of distributed cognitive styles on
group information processing. The research that has been conducted has primarily focused on the
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effects of cognitive diversity on group information processing and performance (e.g., Mello &
Rentsch, 2015).
Research has, however, focused on the role of motivated information processing in
groups. Motivation in groups has been a topic of interest in social psychology since its earliest
days as a field of inquiry and is an important topic in individual and group decision making.
Depending on the motivations present, groups can be better or worse information processors.
The motivated information processing in groups (MIP-G) model suggests processing is best
understood by two motives: (1) epistemic motivation and (2) social motivation (de Dreu, Nijstad,
& van Knippenberg, 2008). According to the model, social motivation drives the kind of
information group members attend to, encode, and retrieve. At the same time, epistemic
motivation drives the degree to which new information is sought and attended to, encoded, and
retrieved (de Dreu et al., 2008).
The influence of task type on group information processing and performance has also
received quite a bit of research attention (e.g., Hollingshead, 1996; Laughlin, 1980). The most
common distinction of task type is that of intellective and judgmental tasks. Intellective tasks are
ones where the task has a demonstrability correct solution (e.g., an algebra problem), whereas
judgmental tasks are ones where the task does not have a demonstrability correct solution (e.g.,
moral dilemma). Studies have found when groups work on intellective tasks, they are likely to
pool information more thoroughly than when they work on a judgmental task (e.g., Stasser &
Stewart, 1992; Stewart & Stasser, 1998). Also, information sharing has been shown to predict
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group decision quality for intellective tasks more strongly than for judgmental tasks (MesmerMagnus & DeChurch, 2009).
Despite the benefits of group decision making (see Laughlin, 2011 for a review),
promoting optimal processing in groups remains a challenge. Therefore, the present paper
investigates a promising new line of research in group information processing via open-minded
group cognition. I begin by reviewing the research surrounding both individual- and group-level
information processing. I then introduce the concept of open-minded group cognition and
propose a theory regarding the antecedents and consequences of open-minded group cognition.
In Study 1, this theory is formalized in a computational model of open-minded group cognition,
which is then validated using results from the relevant published literature. Study 2 uses an
empirical experiment to test the results from the computation model in Study 1 and provide a test
of the formal theory.
Knowing how open-mindedness operates at the group level is central to many important
topics facing the world today (e.g., group polarization, workplace teams, criminal justice
decisions, etc.). By understanding the conditions under which open-minded group cognition is
more (and less) likely to occur, we may be able to glean insight into biased group decisionmaking strategies, ways to improve group decision making, and better understand group
performance.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
In today’s information age, we are constantly bombarded with information. Every day,
we have a near-constant stream of text messages, emails, video conferences, social media
notifications, and news headlines all fighting for our attention. Even in more controlled
environments where these distractions are kept to a minimum (e.g., library), one might hear an
air conditioner humming, a cell phone vibrating, or someone dropping a book onto a carpeted
floor in another part of the room. People tend to monitor the events that occur in their external
environments, and they focus on the “events” in their internal environments as well (e.g.,
thoughts). With the vast amount of information people must attend to and process in order to
navigate their environments, it is a wonder they can sift through and find relevant information at
all.
Today, we often use computers to help with part of this process. For example, algorithms
select and filter relevant information, and in some cases, make recommendations for future
decisions. However, people are almost always monitoring the process and outcomes, and in some
sense, they are overseeing the decision-making process. It is more common, however, to see
humans compile the summary and recommendations from the computers to make the final
decision themselves. Indeed, even with the help of computers, for the most part, humans are the
final decision-makers. And when they are tasked with making complex or important decisions,
6
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people often form groups to help with the process. After forming these task groups, group
members must figure out how to organize their individual efforts and communicate their abilities
to other members.
Although there are many ways group members can do this, they are limited by the ways
they interact with others in the group. Some group decision-making approaches simply combine
member preferences for their final decision (Larrick & Soll, 2006). Although these methods can
produce accurate outcomes, they also tend to limit information exchange (Tindale, Winget, &
Hinsz, 2020). Other approaches allow for information exchange among group members, but
these approaches may still limit the amount of interaction and processing that can occur. For
example, prediction markets (situations in which decision-makers only have access to
summarized information from the crowd) can be accurate, but decision makers do not directly
interact with each other in these contexts (Gürçay, Mellers, & Baron, 2015; Mellers et al., 2014).
In other cases, groups can hold face-to-face discussions to make decisions, and these conditions
tend to allow for the most information processing. However, even under optimal circumstances,
deliberate or unbiased processing is not guaranteed (Baumann & Bonner, 2013).
The purpose of the present chapter is to summarize the current state of the research
surrounding information processing and open-minded cognition. I begin by summarizing the
information processing literature at the individual level and discuss the role of an open-minded
cognitive style within it. Next, I extend this review to the group information processing literature
and the role that group cognitive styles play within it. After summarizing the information
processing literatures, I introduce the theoretical concept of open-minded group cognition
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(OMGC) as well as the antecedents and consequences of OMGC. Throughout these sections, I
also discuss the role of an important moderator, task type, that has been shown to influence many
of these concepts.
Individual-Level Information Processing
People process information in different ways and in different situations. For instance,
when presented with a stimulus, a person could automatically react based on previous
associations or reason systematically if they have the capacity and motivation to do so. In an
attempt to account for these different responses, researchers have proposed dual-processing
models that suggest people use two different processing styles to perform tasks.
Typically, dual-process models assume there is an associative, reflexive processing style
and a rule-based, reflective processing style. The associative processing style is often described
as drawing on previous associations that are structured by similarity and learned over many
experiences. These associations occur automatically and preconsciously, with only an awareness
of the result of processing. On the other hand, the rule-based processing style is often described
as drawing on symbolically represented rules that are structured by logic and learned in a short
period of time. Processing in this manner occurs only when the capacity and motivation to do so
are present, and it often occurs consciously, with an awareness of the steps involved with
processing (Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
Although researchers have developed the general concept of the dual-processing model,
there are several specific dual-process models. While they all share some similarities, there are
many differences among them as well. Here, I briefly outline the core features of four distinct
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dual-process models: (1) the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & Wegner, 1998), (2) the
heuristic/systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989), (3) the
model of attitude access (Fazio, 1986), and (4) the MODE model (Fazio & Olson, 2014).
A defining feature of the ELM is the elaboration likelihood continuum. It is defined by
how motivated and able people are to assess the essential qualities of a particular stimulus (Petty
& Wegner, 1998). The more motivated and able the individual is to assess these merits, the more
likely the person will be to scrutinize all of the available attitude-relevant information. Hence,
when elaboration likelihood is high, people will assess stimulus-relevant information and arrive
at a systematic attitude. This process is termed the central route to persuasion (Petty & Wegner,
1998). However, people do not form judgments based solely on their understanding and
evaluation of persuasive argumentation. The elaboration ELM incorporates this notion by
including a peripheral route to persuasion. The peripheral route consists of persuasion occurring
in the absence of argument scrutiny (Petty & Wegner, 1998). Individuals will likely follow the
peripheral route to persuasion when elaboration likelihood is low.
Like the ELM, the HSM considers multiple processes of persuasion. Importantly, the
HSM proposes many persuasion cues are simply more likely to be evaluated using cognitive
heuristics than more systematic processes (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989).
According to the HSM, the likelihood of systematic processing increases whenever confidence in
one’s attitude drops below the desired level of confidence (i.e., the sufficiency threshold).
Whenever a person’s actual and desired confidence levels are equal, heuristic processing is more
likely (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989).
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Like any good model, both the ELM and HSM attempt to account for boundary
conditions. Research has identified several variables that impact information processing, all of
which are often organized into source, message, recipient, and context categories (Petty &
Wegner, 1998). For example, one variable that has received a lot of research attention is the
physical attractiveness of the communication source. Research has shown the influence of source
attractiveness depends on the level of mental effort that occurs in a particular context. According
to the ELM, under high cognitive effort, an attractive source should have little or no persuasive
impact on information processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). However, both the ELM and HSM
argue source attractiveness should function as a peripheral cue under conditions of low cognitive
effort. In these circumstances, physical attractiveness should act as a simple acceptance or
rejection cue (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Wegner, 1998).
The model of attitude accessibility defines an attitude as an association in memory
between an object and one’s evaluation of that object (Fazio, 1986). Every attitude exists along a
strength dimension or continuum. Strong attitudes are stable, resistant to persuasive appeals, and
more reliably predict behavior when compared to weak attitudes. Nonattitudes fall on the other
(weak) end of the continuum (Fazio, 1986). The absence of an object-evaluation association
constitutes a nonattitude. Under such circumstances, when an individual is asked about one’s
attitude towards such an attitude object, the attitude must be created on the spot. As the strength
of the object-evaluation association increases, attitudes will become more accessible such that
the mere perception of the attitude object should automatically induce an evaluative response
(Fazio, 1986).
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Fazio (1986)’s model of attitude access also distinguishes between two classes of
processing: (1) associative access and (2) construct attitude. In associative access processing, the
model of attitude access suggests individuals use their evaluation of an attitude object through
repeated pairings. So, when encountering a particular attitude object, the attitude is likely to be
automatically activated from memory. This automatically activated attitude can influence how
the individual construes the object in the immediate situation (Fazio, 1986). In contrast, construct
attitude processing requires the individual to search for and summarize attitudinal-relevant
information. Both of these processes are characterized by the exertion of effort.
With such a model, it is important to know the conditions in which one attitude-behavior
orientation supersedes the other and how they interact. The model of attitude access accounts for
this by proposing motivation and opportunity as moderators of whether a person uses the
associative access process or the construct attitude process (Fazio, 1986). Since the latter
requires effortful reflection, different motivations encourage people to engage in more or less
deliberative scrutiny of attitude-relevant information. One specific motive is the accuracy
motivation (i.e., the desire to be accurate and reach valid conclusions; c.f., de Dreu, Nijstad, &
van Knippenberg, 2008's epistemic motivation described in the Group-Level Information
Processing section of this chapter). Other motives may also be capable of urging a person to be
more deliberative (Fazio, 1986). For example, a need to belong motive may lead one to a
behavioral decision to ingratiate others (c.f., de Dreu et al., 2008's social motivation described in
the Group-Level Information Processing section of this chapter).
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Similarly, a motivation to avoid prejudice against a group may prompt more positive
behavioral responses to its members. However, an opportunity to overcome the influence of an
associative accessed attitude must be available in order for the motive to exert its influence.
Opportunities, as conceptual variables, can occur in many ways. For example, they can be
variables related to time since people cannot carefully consider information quickly (Fazio,
1986). However, they can also be psychological variables. For example, both cognitive fatigue
and general attention limitations can interfere with a person’s ability to process information.
The MODE model also distinguishes between two classes of attitude-behavior processes:
(1) spontaneous attitude-behavior processes and (2) deliberate attitude-behavior processes. The
distinction focuses on the degree to which a particular course of action involves a spontaneous
reaction to an individual’s perception of the immediate situation compared to deliberation
regarding behavioral alternatives (Fazio & Olson, 2014). In spontaneous attitude-behavior
processing, the model suggests attitudes guide behavior in a top-down fashion without the
individual’s awareness. Upon encountering a particular attitude object, the attitude may be
automatically activated from memory. This automatically activated attitude can influence how
the individual construes the object in the immediate situation (Fazio & Olson, 2014). In
deliberate attitude-behavior processing, a person engages in a bottom-up process of scrutiny and
deliberation to guide behavior (Fazio & Olson, 2014). Individuals consciously reflect on the
attitudes relevant to their decision and derive a behavioral plan.
According to the MODE model, motivation and opportunity determine the extent to
which the attitude-behavior process is spontaneous or deliberative (Fazio & Olson, 2014). A
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more deliberative mode of processing requires both motivation and opportunity, but the model
also allows for the possibility of mixed processes (i.e., processes that are neither purely
spontaneous nor purely deliberative). However, any controlled component of a mixed process
requires the individual to be both motivated to engage in cognitive effort and have the
opportunity to do so. The MODE model assumes the automatically activated attitude acts as a
starting point for judgment and behavior (Fazio & Olson, 2014). However, the downstream
consequences of the automatically activated attitude can be moderated by motivation and
opportunity. The model views the opportunity factor as a filtering mechanism that determines the
degree to which motivational factors can impact overt judgment. When the gate is open,
motivational goals can have a strong influence on overt judgments and may attenuate the
influence of the automatically activated attitude. However, such efforts will be diminished when
the opportunity to deliberate is minimal.
Individual Cognitive Styles
One of the most widely-used definitions of cognitive style comes from Tennant (1988):
“An individual’s characteristic and consistent approach to organizing and processing
information.” However, cognitive styles have also been conceptualized as general consistencies
in a person’s manner of cognitive functioning, with particular focus on how a person processes
information (Ausburn & Ausburn, 1978). Others have viewed cognitive styles as stable attitudes,
preferences, or strategies and influence a person’s method of perception, recall, and reasoning
(Messick, 1976). The general theme across these conceptual definitions is that cognitive styles
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influence information processing at the individual level. Open-minded cognition is a specific
cognitive style that is concerned with the extent of bias during information processing.
Price, Ottati, Wilson, & Kim (2015) conceptualize open-minded cognition as a bipolar
psychological continuum ranging from closed-mindedness to open-mindedness. An open-minded
cognitive style “is marked by a willingness to consider a variety of intellectual perspectives,
values, attitudes, opinions, or beliefs, even those that contradict the individual’s prior opinion”
(p. 1). Open-minded individuals attend to a variety of viewpoints, consider numerous competing
perspectives, and elaborate upon information in an unbiased manner. In contrast, a closedminded cognitive style is characterized by confirmatory bias: A tendency to process information
in a manner that reinforces the individual’s prior opinion or expectation and a lack of attention
paid to competing perspectives and viewpoints (e.g., Eagly, Chen, Chaiken, & Shaw-Barnes,
1999; Nickerson, 1998). Thus, closed-minded cognition reflects a directionally biased tendency
to select, interpret, and elaborate upon information in a manner that reinforces the individual’s
prior opinion or expectation, whereas open-minded cognition reflects a tendency to process
information in a manner that is not biased in the direction of the individual’s prior opinion or
expectation.
As Ottati, Wilson, and Price (2015) point out, by focusing on directional bias in cognitive
processing (i.e., attention, encoding, interpretation, elaboration), open-minded cognition can be
distinguished from other cognitive styles that reflect the amount of cognitive deliberation (e.g.,
need for cognition) and measures reflect a broader range of content (e.g., need for closure, active
open-minded thinking, dogmatism). Price and colleagues (2015) developed concise measures of
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general open-minded cognition (OMC-G), political open-minded cognition (OMC-P), and
religious open-minded cognition (OMC-R). These scales are balanced, possessing an equal
number of survey items worded in the open (e.g., “I am open to considering other viewpoints”)
and closed directions (e.g., “I often tune out arguments I disagree with”), and they were
developed using a statistical procedure that controls for acquiescence bias. Each scale possesses
a one-factor structure, adequate statistical fit, and corresponding items. This enables meaningful
comparisons between the three scales while controlling for item wording and syntax.
General and Domain-Specific Open-Minded Cognition
Price and colleagues (2015) conceptualize open-minded cognition as possessing both
dispositional and situational components. Individuals vary in terms of their chronic level of
open-mindedness (i.e., dispositional variation). Also, open-minded cognition may vary across
situations. For example, people may be open-minded toward arguments that advocate helping the
community, but closed-minded toward arguments that encourage segregation. An individual’s
dispositional level of open-mindedness can be conceptualized as the individual’s average level of
open-mindedness across situations (Price et al., 2015). In contrast, the temporary component of
open-mindedness captures malleability in open-minded cognition across situations. This
produces higher levels of open-mindedness in situations that merit such a reaction and lower
levels of open-mindedness in situations that do not merit such a reaction (e.g., see Conway,
Schaller, Tweed, & Hallett, 2001; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; and Samuelson &
Church, 2015).
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Domain-specific open-mindedness is an individual’s level of open-minded cognition
within a category of situations (e.g., politics, religion). In their initial investigation of openminded cognition, Price and colleagues (2015) found OMC-G, OMC-P, and OMC-R were
correlated (but still distinct) constructs that exhibited unique associations with other cognitive
dispositions (e.g., humility). The researchers also found mean levels of OMC-G can exceed
mean levels of domain-specific open-mindedness in some situations. These findings are
compatible with research that suggests citizens tolerate freedom of expression in general but are
less likely to tolerate freedom of expression for members of specific social groups (e.g., Sullivan,
Piereson, & Marcus, 1979).
Although, other psychological scales include items that assess open-minded cognition
(e.g., actively open-minded thinking, Stanovich & West, 2007; dogmatism, Troldahl & Powell,
1965; closed-minded subscale of need for closure, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), these scales
also include items that do not specifically assess directionally biased versus unbiased information
processing (e.g., “I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else believes”).
The same is true of pre-existing religious and political scales (e.g., spiritual openness Genia,
1997; QUEST Batson & Schoenrade, 1991; religious fundamentalism Altemeyer, 2003;
dogmatism, Troldahl & Powell, 1965). Thus, the measures of open-minded cognition Price and
colleagues (2015) developed are associated with these related measures, but they are not the
same construct.
Many of the previously described scales also exceed ten items, and for that reason, they
cannot be easily used in research requiring concise forms of measurement (e.g., actively open-
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minded thinking has 42 items). Also, many of these measures are composed of unbalanced scales
that are potentially confounded with acquiescence bias (Price et al., 2015). This makes it difficult
to isolate the effect of open-minded cognition when predicting other individual difference
variables (e.g., confidence, political tolerance). Finally, none of the pre-existing measures
provide correspondent measures of general and domain-specific open-minded cognition that
enable researchers to perform cross-domain comparisons while controlling for item content (i.e.,
holding it constant; Ottati, Wilson, & Price, 2015; Price et al., 2015).
Although conceptually distinct, open-minded cognition may be related to a variety of
psychological orientations (Ottati, Wilson, & Price, 2015; Price et al., 2015). An open-minded
cognitive style may cause (or be caused by) openness to experience or agreeableness, the need
for cognition, or personal humility (Price et al., 2015). Open-minded cognition should also be
negatively associated with cognitive style variables that reflect rigid or biased processing (e.g.,
need for closure, intolerance of ambiguity).
Because it entails an unbiased consideration of alternatives, open-minded cognition may
increase skepticism toward traditional or hierarchical social arrangements (e.g., dogmatism;
Troldahl & Powell, 1965). OMC-P may be positively associated with support for democratic
values, political tolerance, and attention to political news. Related research suggests OMC-P is
positively associated with a politically liberal or democratic orientation and negatively associated
with support for the status quo (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b; Kay & Jost,
2003). The direction of the relation between OMC-P and political knowledge (i.e., political
expertise) is difficult to ascertain a priori but worthy of exploration. OMC-R is positively
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associated with religious orientations that emphasize exploration and learning (e.g., QUEST,
Batson & Schoenrade, 1991; spiritual openness, Genia, 1997), but negatively associated with
dogmatic, fundamentalist religious orientations (e.g., religious fundamentalism; Altemeyer,
2003).
The Flexible Merit Standard Model
According to Ottati, Wilson, and Price (2015), the flexible merit standard model was
inspired by theory and research regarding attitudes and persuasion, social information
processing, and priming, political cognition, and cognitive rigidity. The flexible merit standard
model presumes when individuals think about an issue, they initially activate and select an
appropriate “merit standard.” Once this injunctive norm is activated, it determines the degree to
which the individual adopts a closed- or open-minded cognitive orientation. In other words,
people consider the degree to which a closed- versus open-minded orientation is normatively
appropriate or merited and then try to adopt a cognitive orientation that is suggested by that merit
standard.
According to the flexible merit standard model, the activated injunctive norm is
determined by both dispositional and situational forces. Thus, a core assumption of the model is
that open-minded cognition possesses dispositional and situational components that produce
meaningful variation across individuals and situations. The dispositional component is based on
culturally shared values and the individual’s unique individual difference characteristics. So,
although cultural values may generally prescribe open-mindedness, some individuals may be
predisposed to value open-mindedness, whereas others may be predisposed to value closed-
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mindedness. Consistent with this dispositional merit standard hypothesis, research suggests
closed-mindedness is associated with a predisposition to experience psychological insecurity,
endorsement of hierarchical social arrangements, and political conservatism (Ottati, Wilson, &
Price, 2015). Conversely, research suggests open-mindedness may be positively associated with
collectivism: A predisposition that involves sharing resources, cooperation, and susceptibility to
social influence. Collectivism is sometimes viewed as a proxy of prosocial motivation, which
would suggest that prosocial motivation should increase open-minded cognition.
According to the situational merit standard hypothesis, the normative standard is also
determined by the nature of the situation or judgment task. The situation activates an openminded injunctive norm when the individual encounters reasonable and unobjectionable
viewpoints (e.g., a discussion regarding the protection of human rights). In these situations,
closed-mindedness tends to be negatively characterized (e.g., narrow-minded, arrogant) whereas
open-mindedness is positively characterized (e.g., impartial, fair). In contrast, the situation
activates a closed-minded injunctive norm when the individual encounters viewpoints that are
morally objectionable or blatantly inconsistent with objective reality (e.g., a speech advocating
the restriction of human rights; c.f., Skitka, 2010). In these situations, a dogmatic response (e.g.,
“I refuse to consider these arguments”) may be viewed as virtuous and desirable (e.g., steadfast,
unwavering, firm, strong) whereas open-mindedness may be construed in negative terms (e.g.,
spineless, diffident, naive; Samuelson & Church, 2015). According to the situational merit
standard hypothesis, individuals typically adopt a cognitive orientation congruent with the
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situationally activated norm (Ottati, Wilson, & Price, 2015). Thus, the effect of the situation on
situation-specific open-minded cognition is mediated by the activated normative standard.
Individual differences in OMC-G reflect dispositional variation in the chronic component
of open-mindedness that is relatively stable across situations. In contrast, the situation-specific
component of open-minded cognition varies across specific situations (Conway et al., 2001;
Ottati, Wilson, & Price, 2015; Price et al., 2015). Domain-specific open-mindedness, which falls
between these two extremes, refers to an individual’s level of open-minded cognition within a
category of situations or issues (e.g., politics). The flexible merit standard model presumes openminded cognition can also vary across situational domains (e.g., politics, religion).
Earned Dogmatism
People who are led to believe they are experts tend to over-estimate the accuracy of their
beliefs (Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994). The earned dogmatism hypothesis proposes this finding
arises, in part, because social norms entitle experts to adopt a more dogmatic cognitive
orientation. Because experts have already given extensive thought to issues within a domain,
they have “earned” the privilege of harboring more dogmatic opinions and beliefs (Ottati, Price,
Wilson, & Sumaktoyo, 2015). In contrast, social norms discourage individuals from being
dogmatic when they possess a limited amount of knowledge. The expression of dogmatic
convictions can be viewed as appropriate or justified when the communicator possesses high
expertise. This is less likely to be true when the communicator knows little about a topic. Social
norms dictate novices should adopt a more open-minded orientations (Ottati et al., 2015).
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The earned dogmatism hypothesis is derived based on the flexible merit standard model
(Ottati, Wilson, & Price, 2015). The flexible merit standard model presumes, when thinking
about an issue, individuals initially activate and select an appropriate “merit standard.” A
cognitive orientation may be viewed as appropriate in one situation, but inappropriate in another
situation (Leary et al., 2017; Ottati, Wilson, & Price, 2015). Individuals typically adopt a
cognitive style congruent with the activated normative standard (Ottati, Wilson, & Price, 2015).
The earned dogmatism hypothesis extends this logic. It starts with the presumption social
norms differ for individuals who occupy distinct roles within a situation (Ottati et al., 2015). For
instance, consider a seminar on quantum physics. Within the seminar, some individuals may be
novices (e.g., a layperson) on quantum physics, whereas others may be experts (e.g., an actual
physicist). Because novices possess limited knowledge, social norms dictate they listen and learn
in an open-minded fashion. The expert possesses extensive knowledge and is entitled to adopt a
more dogmatic orientation (Ottati et al., 2015). On the other hand, novices possess limited
knowledge and are expected to adopt a more humble orientation (Kruglanski & Mayseless,
1987).
The earned dogmatism hypothesis applies this logic to situations in which individuals
perceive themselves as an expert. Individuals who perceive themselves to be relatively low in
expertise should adopt an open-minded cognitive orientation, whereas individuals who perceive
themselves to be an expert should adopt a more closed-minded orientation (Fernbach, Rogers,
Fox, & Sloman, 2013). This hypothesis has been tested by providing individuals with success
versus failure feedback (Ottati et al., 2015). Failure feedback heightens awareness of knowledge
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limitations, causing self-perceptions of low expertise. This was shown to activate norms
prescribing an open-minded cognitive style, which individuals tended to follow on average.
Success feedback reduces awareness of knowledge limitations and engenders self-perceptions of
high expertise. This was shown to activate norms entitling individuals to adopt a more dogmatic
orientation.
Replications of Open-Minded Cognition
Calin-Jageman (2018) reports direct replications of three key experiments reported by
Ottati and colleagues (2015) in support of the earned dogmatism hypothesis. Consistent with the
original findings, dogmatic behavior was considered more appropriate for experts relative to
novices across all replications and the original study. Results also showed when participants
envisioned themselves as experts, they predicted they would be more close-minded. However,
replications involving manipulation of expertise through task difficulty showed little to no effect
on open-minded cognition. These replications provide evidence the earned dogmatism
hypothesis is well-supported only for prospective manipulations of expertise that require
participants to predict their social behaviors.
Two hypotheses can account for this divergent replication pattern (Ottati, Wilson, Osteen,
& Distefano, 2018). The “restrictive condition” hypothesis predicts the earned dogmatism effect
is limited to highly restrictive and unrealistic conditions (i.e., switching roles experiments that
entail projective judgments in hypothetical situations) and fails to replicate under less restrictive
conditions (e.g., conditions that evoke success versus failure, real-world situations). The
“optimal manipulation” hypothesis predicts the earned dogmatism effect is easily replicated in
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experiments that employ optimal manipulations of relative expertise but less easily replicated in
experiments that employ suboptimal manipulations. According to this view, optimal expertise
manipulations elicit the earned dogmatism effect, even under non-restrictive conditions.
Ottati and colleagues (2018) found evidence for the “optimal manipulation” hypothesis in
three experiments. In these experiments, the earned dogmatism effect was obtained using an
optimal manipulation that is explicitly relative, an optimal manipulation that prompts participants
to remember real-world situations, and an optimal manipulation of success versus failure. When
predicting the earned dogmatism effect size across studies (Calin-Jageman, 2018; Ottati et al.,
2015; Ottati et al., 2018), the “optimal manipulation” hypothesis was favored over the
“restrictive condition” hypothesis.
Taken together, the current literature suggests the higher an individual’s level of openminded cognition, the less directionally biased information processing they tend to engage in.
Findings also demonstrate the situational context a person is in often influences their level of
open-minded cognition. Research on information processing at the group level also shows that
individual-level processing is often influenced by the group context.
Group-Level Information Processing
In the 1970s, Steiner’s seminal synthesis of early group performance research across a
variety of contexts and conditions was published. In essence, he concluded that groups rarely
perform to their full potential and their performance is heavily influenced by the task they
worked on (Steiner, 1972). Nearly half a century has passed, and Steiner’s conclusions continue
to be as relevant to theory and research on group performance as when they were initially
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published. Steiner (1972) also focused on issues of coordination and motivation in explaining
group performance, which are still active lines of research (e.g., de Dreu et al., 2008).
Since Steiner’s (1972) review, researchers have conceptualized groups much like they
have individuals: as cognitive information processors. This conceptualization has its roots in the
cognitive revolution, and research has focused on the complex processes associated with the
performance of various cognitive tasks (e.g., judgment, decision making, problem-solving) at
both the individual and group levels. Much of this research focused on how information
distributed among the group members was processed or used by the group (Stasser & Titus,
1985, 1987). Consistent with one of Steiner's (1972) main conclusions, groups rarely performed
to their potential as information processors. However, it took roughly an additional 20 years
before researchers incorporated motivation and coordination into formalized models of group
information processing (e.g., de Dreu et al., 2008).
Group information processing involves activities occurring within and among the minds
of group members (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). At the group level, information processing
involves the degree to which information, ideas, or cognitive processes are shared among the
group members and how this exchange of information affects both individual- and group-level
outcomes. Shared information in the group can relate to the task, characteristics of the group,
aspects of group members, the pattern of group interaction, or the context within which the task,
group, and its members exist (Hinsz et al., 1997). Importantly, some basic level of shared or
common knowledge is necessary for the group to operate. However, just because there is a high
degree of shared background knowledge does not mean the group will be effective. Rather,
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group effectiveness varies as a function of the information shared and the degree of information
exchange (Hinsz et al., 1997).
Thus, group-level information processing includes the specific information and processes
shared among group members and the exchange and transfer of the information and processes
(i.e., exchanged and transferred; Hinsz et al., 1997). For example, individual group members
have resources (i.e., knowledge, skills, abilities) available to them, which are used to develop
preferences, judgments, and ideas. Group members can share these preferences, judgments, and
ideas to the group information-processing workspace during discussion (c.f., Hinsz et al., 1997).
Afterward, the information is available to other group members and is added to their respective
knowledge bases. The new information can then be processed and potentially lead to a shift in
judgments or ideas. The information shared during group discussion and the way the different
contributions are combined both influence the group’s response (c.f., Davis, 1982). The
contributions of individuals need to be combined to produce a coherent group judgment or
decision, which reflects group-level information processing.
The exchange and transfer of information within the group can be verbal or nonverbal,
take place in face-to-face situations or over long distances through the use of technology, and
refer to the task, group members, or aspects of the group. These shared and sharing aspects of
group information processing are interdependent of each other (Hinsz et al., 1997). Also, grouplevel processing is dependent on various aspects of individual-level processing, and individuallevel processing is also affected by group-level processes (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, &
Schulz-Hardt, 2007; de Dreu et al., 2008; Hinsz et al., 1997).
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Group members may differ in the information they possess, the ideas most accessible,
and their preferences for decision alternatives. An important aspect of group decision making is
how group members combine these various resources to come up with a collective decision.
Group interaction is how information, resources, norms, and goals are exchanged. For this
reason, the present paper will focus on fully interacting groups. Although there are other levels
of group interaction which influence the amount of information processing groups experience
(e.g., simple aggregation, aggregation with limited interaction, judge-advisor systems), fully
interacting groups provide idealized group information processing situations. Moreover, many of
the principles here should generalize to other levels of group interaction as well.
Fully Interacting Groups
Much of the research on group decision making has focused on groups in which members
meet face-to-face and discuss the decision task until they reach consensus. Early research in this
area focused on the influence of member preferences on group decision outcomes (e.g., Davis,
1982). Research then began to investigate on how groups process information (Hinsz et al.,
1997) and the degree to which they use available information (Brodbeck et al., 2007; Lu, Yuan,
& McLeod, 2012). Only later did the motivational aspects of groups and group members receive
more focused research attention (de Dreu et al., 2008).
A popular approach to studying information exchange in interacting groups is the hidden
profile paradigm (Stasser & Titus, 1985). This paradigm deliberately biases the distribution of
information before group discussion such that some information is shared or common to all
group members and other information is unshared or unique to each individual member. The
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information fully shared among the group leads to a suboptimal decision, whereas combining all
of the unshared information reveals the optimal decision. Ultimately, this hides the optimal
choice from the group as a whole: It can only be discovered when each member exchanges their
unshared information and the group uses this information to make its decision.
Research on hidden profile tasks has shown groups generally do not exchange
information efficiently and decision quality suffers as a result. A meta-analysis of the hidden
profile paradigm showed (1) groups mention more pieces of shared information than unshared
information; (2) hidden profile groups are less likely to find the solution than are groups having
full information; and (3) information pooling (i.e., percentage of unshared information
mentioned out of total available information, percentage of unshared information out of total
discussion) is positively related to decision quality. Moreover, communication medium (i.e.,
computer-mediated communication vs. face-to-face) does not affect (4) unshared information
pooling or (5) group decision quality (Lu et al., 2012). However, group size, total information
load, the proportion of unshared information, task demonstrability, and hidden profile strength
moderated these effects.
Most of the current research findings have been integrated by Brodbeck and colleagues
(2007) in their information asymmetries model of group decision making. The model categorizes
the various conditions that lead to poor information sharing into three basic categories. The first
category, negotiation focus, includes issues about initial member preferences. If groups view the
decision-making task mainly as a negotiation, members negotiating which choice alternative
should be chosen tend to focus on the specific choices rather than the information underlying
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them. The second category, discussion bias, includes aspects the discussion that tend to favor
shared versus unshared information (e.g., items shared by many members are more likely to be
discussed). The third category, evaluation bias, includes the positive perceptions about shared
information (e.g., shared information is perceived more valid, sharing shared information leads
to positive evaluations by other group members). All three categories are good descriptions of
typical group decision making and can lead to biased group decisions (Brodbeck et al., 2007).
The information asymmetries model group information processing only leads to negative
outcomes when information is distributed asymmetrically across group members (e.g., when a
hidden profile is present). Although such situations do occur, and groups can make disastrous
decisions under such circumstances (Tindale & Kluwe, 2015), they are not typical of most group
decision environments. In situations where members have independently gained their
information through experience, the shared information they have is likely valid and more useful
than unshared information or beliefs held by only one member. Therefore, the fact members
share preferences and information in many group decision contexts is probably adaptive and has
generally served human survival well (Tindale & Kluwe, 2015).
Although minority factions are not often influential in groups, if minority members have
information that others do not suggesting the initial group consensus may be wrong, other group
members will pay attention to them. However, such minority effects may only occur when
groups are (or think they are) working on intellective tasks (Laughlin, 1980, 2011). Several
studies have shown moderation effects of tasks having a demonstrably correct solution. Lu and
colleagues (2012) found the likelihood of a group finding the optimal task solution increased
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when working on tasks with high versus low solution demonstrability. Their results suggest
hidden profile tasks without a clear preferred solution are most detrimental to information
sharing and decision quality, whereas highly demonstrable tasks actually increase information
sharing (Lu et al., 2012). These findings are consistent with other research showing information
pooling is more predictive of decision quality (Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009).
According to the theory of combinations of contributions, the outcomes of group
interaction on a task can be predicted by two components: the contributions and the
combinations (Hinsz & Ladbury, 2012). The contributions refer to the inputs group members
bring with them to the task situation (e.g., cognitive skills, processing goals). The combinations
refer to the aggregation principle by which the contributions are combined to lead to the group
outcomes (e.g., strategies to pool, share, and integrate information). Importantly, contributions
and combinations directly relate to the cognitive processes involved in how group inputs result in
group outcomes on a task (Hinsz & Ladbury, 2012).
Groups always exist in a context, and they are sensitive to this context (Hinsz & Ladbury,
2012). Thus, the combinatorial rule that summarizes the processes by which inputs are
transformed into outcomes is dependent on the context as well. One of the key findings
concerning how groups process information is the common knowledge effect: Information that is
shared by many group members plays a larger role in group processes and performance than
unshared information (Stasser & Titus, 1985). Given this finding, it seems that in order to
increase the amount of information sharing within a group, all group members should have
access to all the information available. However, despite the benefits of such manifest profile
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groups (e.g., Lu et al., 2012), assigning all information to all members may overload each
member’s cognitive capabilities in information-rich environments.
de Dreu and colleagues (2008) developed a model of group judgment and decisionmaking based on the combination of epistemic and social motives. Called the motivated
information processing in groups (MIP-G) model, it argues information processing in groups is
better understood by incorporating two somewhat orthogonal motives: high vs. low epistemic
motivation and prosocial vs. proself motivation. Earlier work on negotiation had shown
negotiators that share both high epistemic motivation and a prosocial orientation are better able
to find mutually beneficial tradeoffs and reach better integrative agreements compared to
negotiators with any other combination of motives (de Dreu et al., 2008). Recent research now
shows the same is true for groups working cooperatively to solve a problem or make a decision.
According to the model, high epistemic motivation involves a goal to be accurate or
correct, which should lead to deeper and more thorough information search and analysis
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Work on the information sharing effects has consistently
demonstrated instilling a goal of accuracy or defining the task in terms of solving a problem both
increase information sharing (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001; Stasser & Stewart, 1992).
Members high in prosocial motivation help to ensure all types of information held by each
member are likely to be disseminated, rather than just information supporting the position held
by an individual member. The model predicts information processing in groups will only
approach optimal levels when all group members have both prosocial and high epistemic
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motivations. This is the only combination of motivations that produces both systematic and
thorough processing of information in an unbiased manner.
Computer-Mediated Group Communication
The groups and teams we form to make complex or important decisions in today’s world
are increasingly working in virtual environments. For example, during the 2020-2021 COVID-19
Pandemic, Gallup found the average number of days people worked from home more than
doubled in the United States (Jones, 2020). It stands to reason that many of these people were
collaborating with their co-workers through virtual technologies (e.g., Zoom, Microsoft Teams,
Slack, etc.) to achieve the same goals they were working towards when they were face to face in
the workplace. This raises the question if the face-to-face, fully-interacting group information
processes outlined above also hold in situations were group members are interacting and
communicating via computer (i.e., computer-mediated group communication). For about as long
as businesses have been using email to communicate important messages to its employees,
researchers have investigated how computer-mediated group communication affects group
processes and performance. Indeed, one of the most frequently explored contextual input factors
in the hidden profile literature has been communication technology (Wittenbaum, Hollingshead,
& Botero, 2004). While the research findings have been clear in some context (e.g., computermediated groups take longer to make a decision), inconsistent results remain.
In one meta-analysis of computer-mediated communication and group decision making,
Baltes, Dickson, Sherman, Bauer, and LaGanke (2002) found computer-mediated groups were
rarely more effective than face-to-face groups, that computer-mediated groups’ members were
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rarely more satisfied than members of face-to-face groups, and that computer-mediated groups
rarely take less time than face-to-face groups. They concluded that, at best, computer-mediated
groups groups were not significantly worse than face-to-face groups. Similar results were found
in a second meta-analysis that investigated moderators of group support systems. Group support
systems are software tools that help the group coordinate and complete a task. Consistent with
Baltes and colleagues (2002), Dennis and Wixom (2002) found virtual teams take longer to
complete a task compared to face-to-face teams and that satisfaction was lower in the virtual
teams compared to the face-to-face teams. However, group size was an important moderator
when measuring decision time and satisfaction. Decision time was shorter for larger groups, and
satisfaction was higher for larger groups (Dennis & Wixom, 2002). They also found that decision
quality was lower for virtual teams, but there was no difference in the number of ideas generated
between virtual teams and face-to-face teams (Dennis & Wixom, 2002).
Other research on computer-mediated groups has found the effectiveness of group’s
ability to solve a task problem is largely determined by how well the group’s members
communicate with each other. In one study, Jonassen and Kwon (2001) compared perceptions,
message content, and interactions between groups working on well-structured and ill-structured
problem-solving tasks. Departing from previous research, they found computer-mediated groups
had a more satisfying experience and thought they had a higher quality discussion than did faceto-face groups. They also found computer-mediated groups used more task-directed
communications and showed patterns of communications that better reflected the problemsolving nature of the task than face-to-face groups (Jonassen & Kwon, 2001). This is consistent
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with evidence from other research that has shown computer-mediated groups who are attempting
to solve a task tend to focus their discussions on more task-relevant information. When this is
coupled with a reduction in cognitive time restraints, computer-mediated groups tend to make
higher quality decisions (Campbell & Stasser, 2006).
Because group members are influencing one another when they interact, group
communication processes are among the most important variables that influence the
effectiveness and efficiency of any group decisions or problem solutions (Hirokawa & Pace,
1983). Thus, one way to improve group performance is by identifying situational factors that are
particularly likely increase the likelihood group members communicate with each other. Indeed,
one could argue that the ubiquity of virtual communication in our everyday lives has lead us to
communicate more efficiently through technologies such as text communication. For example,
research has found face-to-face groups often outperform computer-mediated groups that
communicate via text messaging (Baltes et al., 2002; Dennis & Wixom, 2002); however in a
more recent study, Robert, Dennis, and Ahuja (2018) found this difference was not significant.
Another possible explanation for these contradictory findings comes from the initial
meta-analyses themselves. Recall both Baltes and colleagues (2002) and Dennis and Wixom
(2002) found computer-mediated groups performed worse than face-to-face groups (though
Dennis and Wixom (2002) did identify boundary conditions). In addition to these boundary
conditions, the inconsistent evidence of computer-mediated group performance might be
explained by the difference in the types of tasks the groups were working on. Although both
meta-analyses reviewed an array of tasks, most of the studies reviewed use very similar task
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types. McGrath (1984) introduced a useful framework for considering the effect task types have
on group processes and performance. In the model, task type is organized into four broad
quadrants: (1) generating, (2) choosing, (3) negotiating, and (4) executing. Generating quadrant
tasks involve collaborating to develop plans and ideas. Choosing quadrant tasks involve problem
solving in situations with and without demonstrable answers. Negotiating quadrant tasks involve
resolving conflicts. Lastly, execution quadrant tasks involve competition or performance
measured against some standard of comparison.
The vast majority of tasks reviewed in the studies by Baltes and colleagues (2002) and
Dennis and Wixom (2002) fall within the choosing quadrant of the model. Although their
findings suggest a clear pattern of outcomes, they can only speak to a limited number of tasks
groups may work on. For example, tasks that fall within the execution quadrant of McGrath
(1984)’s model involve situations in which two different groups may be competing with one
another (e.g., competitive sports, war, etc.) or those in which group performance is measured by
a standard of comparison (e.g., building a home). McGrath (1984) argued a potential reason for
the task type representation disparity is that success on tasks within the choosing quadrant may
be evaluated solely on dimensions of group performance. On the other hand, performance on
execution tasks depends on the performance of the the group in addition to the performance of
another group (often a competing outgroup) or a performance standard.
In addition, the task used by Jonassen and Kwon (2001) falls within the generate
quadrant of the circumplex because of the collaborative nature of the task (i.e., members
independently contribute ideas and each original idea increases productivity). It may be the

35
negative performance effects found in previous studies are mitigated by the collaborative nature
required to be successful with this specific task. Since there is little to no coordination and
consensus required of the members for generative tasks, there are minimal requirements for
member interdependence. This might thereby diminish the negative effects of computermediated groups previously reported. Thus, Jonassen and Kwon (2001) provide evidence that
computer-mediated communication appears to support problem solving by promoting more
focused and purposeful communication for generative quadrant tasks.
Given the inconsistent results of computer-mediated groups, this may explain the lack of
evidence for the effect of communication medium on group processes and performance in a
meta-analysis of 25 years of research on the hidden profile paradigm. Lu and colleagues (2012)
found no evidence computer-mediated groups and face-to-face groups significantly differed in
the amount of unshared information they pooled during discussions. They also found no
evidence for a difference in groups’ abilities to solve hidden profile tasks between computermediated groups and face-to-face groups. Taken together, it seems the research on the effects of
computer-mediated communication on group outcomes is highly dependent on the structure of
the tasks groups work on.
Group Cognitive Styles
Whatever task groups are working on, they must consider and process task-relevant
information to reach a judgment or decision. Since cognitive processing styles shape how
information is organized and processed, a review about how group cognitive processing styles
influence group information processing is needed. A group-level cognitive style involves the
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ways in which cognitive structures and processing emerge in groups (Schneider & Angelmar,
1993). Leonard, Beauvais, and Scholl (2005) present a framework that organizes the ways in
which a cognitive style may emerge in the group. They argue groups may have cognitive
approaches along four pairs of dimensions: (1) introverted (discuss with group members) versus
extroverted (discuss with people outside group); (2) sensing (gather detailed information to
frame problems in operational terms) versus intuitive (gather abstract information to frame
problems in strategic terms); (3) thinking (use logic evaluate information) versus feeling (use
relative merits to evaluate information); and (4) perceptive (gathering and evaluating
information) versus judging (seek closure based on available information).
Other researchers have focused more on the composition of individual-level
characteristics that might give rise to group-level cognitive styles. Much of the work in this area
has focused on the effects of cognitive diversity within groups. However, there are numerous
definitions of cognitive diversity in the literature, and they tend to be rather inconsistent. Also,
many of the research methods, groups, task types, and participant characteristics substantially
vary across studies. In an effort to synthesize the literature, Mello and Rentsch (2015) put forth a
stability heuristic in which they argue the conceptualizations of cognitive diversity can be
differentiated as highly stable individual differences, as developing over time, or as highly
malleable. In this context, stability refers to the degree to which the characteristics may be
influenced or changed by outside forces such as context and time.
Mello and Rentsch (2015) then identified four levels of stability: (1) trait-like, (2)
developmental, (3) acquired, and (4) exposed. The trait-like level includes cognitive variables
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that are innate characteristics or characteristics that become consistent by adulthood. These
characteristics persevere over time and remain steady regardless of environmental or contextual
influences. The developmental level includes individual differences developed over the course of
a person’s life that are relatively enduring across time and contexts (e.g., personal values and
worldviews). The acquired level includes context-specific variables that are relatively easy to
change or control (e.g., knowledge, skills, abilities, attitudes, etc.). The exposed level includes
the least stable and most context dependent variables (e.g., expectations about the group task,
role assignments, etc.)
Results from Mello and Rentsch’s (2015) review suggest trait-like conceptualizations of
cognitive diversity are predictive of a variety of group outcomes (e.g., objective and subjective
performance, cohesion, social integration, satisfaction, information elaboration, process
efficiency and focus, etc.), but they did identify more studies that investigated task/behavioral
process criteria (e.g., decision making processes) and less of cognitive criteria (e.g., mental
model similarity and accuracy). These results suggest trait-like cognitive diversity has broad
explanatory power, but the nature of the effects on team criteria is mixed. Trait-like cognitive
diversity seems to have some positive relationship to objective and subjective performance, and
at times, a negative relationship to affect. Cognitive style and learning style research yield the
most consistent results, but overall there is more work needed to draw solid conclusions.
Of the remaining levels, it appears developmental cognitive diversity has shown some of
the clearest results. Developmental cognitive diversity has been shown to increase conflict, but it
does not appear to have a clear relationship with subjective or objective performance (Mello &
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Rentsch, 2015). However, compared to trait-level conceptions, little research has been done at
this level. Similarly, the results at the acquired and exposed levels are currently unclear due to a
lack of research. Research on acquired cognitive diversity has yielded mixed and complex results
with respect to predicting objective and subjective performance outcomes (Mello & Rentsch,
2015). Research on exposed cognitive diversity has generally shown team member cognitions
can be successfully manipulated and that manipulation in certain types of cognitions (e.g.,
perspectives, expectations) affects task process/behavior criteria (Mello & Rentsch, 2015).
Outside of research on cognitive diversity, others have investigated specific forms of
team cognitive styles. Some studies have shown intuitive cognitive styles can benefit creativity
in both individuals and groups (e.g., Sagiv, Arieli, Goldenberg, & Goldschmidt, 2010; Taggar,
2001). For example, Taggar (2001) showed group performance tended to improve exponentially
as more creative group members comprised the group. However, this only occurred when
intuitive cognitive styles were relatively high within the group. When intuitive cognitive styles
were low within the group, group performance decreased exponentially with the number of
highly creative members within it. When intuitive cognitive styles were about average for the,
group performance increased only linearly with the number of highly creative members within a
group (Taggar, 2001).
Findings from applied research contexts are consistent with this previous work as well. de
Visser, Faems, Visscher, and de Weerd-Nederhof (2014) collected data about team’ cognitive
styles and performance from members of new product development (NPD) teams (i.e., groups
formed with personnel from different organizational departments to develop a new product) in
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Dutch manufacturing companies. Some of these teams worked on radical NPD projects (i.e.,
teams work on creating new products), whereas others worked on incremental NPD projects (i.e.,
teams work on enhancing a current product). Results showed the level of intuitive thinking
within teams was positively related to team performance on radical NPD projects. This is likely
because the task required the team to explore original ideas and plans in order to be successful.
However, this was not the case for incremental NPD projects, again undermining the
importance of considering the moderating effect of task type. Previous cognitive style research
has not examined the impact of intuitive thinking on more exploitative tasks However, de Visser
and colleagues (2014) provide evidence that for incremental NPD projects, stronger intuitive
thinking negatively influences team performance. This suggests that suggesting that, in addition
to demographic and functional characteristics, cognitive styles and the type of task teams work
on influence performance.
Open-Minded Group Cognition
In a similar manner as Price and colleagues (2015), I conceptualize OMGC as a bipolar
psychological continuum ranging from closed-mindedness to open-mindedness. However,
because it is occurring at the group level, an open-minded cognitive style for the group not only
involves the unbiased cognitive processing in the minds of the group members, it also involves
the unbiased cognitive processing (i.e., exchange of information) within the group (c.f., Hinsz et
al., 1997). In other words, OMGC includes unbiased sharing of information within the group,
open-minded cognitive styles among the group members, and this unbiased information and
cognitive processes are continuing to be exchanged and transferred within the group.
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In contrast, a closed-minded group cognitive style is characterized by directionally biased
information processing. At the individual level, this may be a confirmatory bias: A tendency to
process information in a manner that reinforces the individual’s prior opinion or expectation and
a lack of attention paid to competing perspectives and viewpoints (e.g., Eagly et al., 1999;
Nickerson, 1998; Price et al., 2015). However, at the group level, this bias may emerge as a lack
of information sharing among group members. Thus, low OMGC (i.e., closed-minded group
cognition, CMGC) reflects a directionally biased tendency to select, interpret, elaborate upon,
and share information in a manner that reinforces the individuals’ and/or group’s prior opinion or
expectation, whereas high OMGC reflects a tendency to process information in a manner not
biased in the direction of the individuals’ or group’s prior opinion or expectation.
OMGC can arise as a consequence of group member motivations or exist as a processing
objective of the group in itself. Just as individuals process information as objectives derived from
the context, groups also process information based on objectives, tasks, missions, or goals that
offer a frame of reference for what information should be attended to, encoded, processed, and
retrieved (Hinsz et al., 1997). To some extent, processing objectives form the basis of the social
reality group members share for the tasks they confront. Unless the group members have a
common or shared frame of reference for the processing objective, each may treat the
information differently (Tindale, Smith, Thomas, Filkins, & Sheffey, 1996). Additionally, the
extent to which the group members treat the information in the same or different ways has
important consequences for other phases of information processing.
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Processing objectives for group tasks can arise from various sources (e.g., task type,
norms, member perspectives/preferences). Thibaut and Strickland (1956) instructed groups to
follow either a task or group set while they evaluated ambiguous stimuli in a conformity
paradigm. Task set instructions asked group members to focus on the task features of the group
interaction, whereas group set instructions led members to focus on their willingness to be part of
the group. Kaplan and Miller (1987) considered a similar group-relations versus task-processing
objective. They found a group-relations processing objective (e.g., social relations, mutual
consideration, and harmony among members) led to more normative influence than task-oriented
processing. Research has also shown task characteristics may influence processing objectives.
Using Laughlin (1980)’s intellective-judgmental task distinction, Kaplan and Miller (1987)
argued intellective tasks promote informational influence and that judgmental tasks promote
normative influence. The group’s norms may also establish or alter its processing objectives
(Hinsz et al., 1997; Tindale et al., 1996).
The different perspectives members bring to the group can also influence processing
objectives. Research on reference groups suggests group members with different backgrounds,
cultures, or identities may process information differently (Hinsz et al., 1997). Similarly, work
on the composition of work teams suggests that demographic characteristics may lead members
to approach the same cognitive task in different ways. Negotiating teams and consensus groups
are often formed so that the perspectives from various groups are represented (Hinsz et al.,
1997). Representatives of these various constituencies generally have different objectives for the

42
group interaction, so they may view information differently based on their preexisting objectives.
Therefore, the processing objectives used by task groups can arise from various sources.
In the group decision making literature, the effects of group composition on group
dynamics and performance is well documented. In some contexts, heterogeneity can reduce the
quality and quantity of group communication, and these negative effects have been shown to
influence actual group performance (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Maznevski, 1994), which is
problematic because homogeneous groups run the risk of narrow mindedness and groupthink
(i.e., premature consensus) through misplaced comfort and overconfidence (Galinsky et al.,
2015).
While these effects are worrisome, research has demonstrated when diversity leads to
more or less open-mindedness. For example, when different dimensions of diversity converge
(e.g., when all team members with technical expertise are male and those with knowledge about
marketing and sales are female), so-called diversity faultlines emerge that may disrupt group
processes (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Accordingly, diversity faultlines are generally believed to
harm group processes and performance (for a review, see van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007).
However, group members’ beliefs about diversity have been shown to influence how groups with
diversity faultlines may effectively use their information diversity when group members believe
in the value of diversity.
Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, and de Dreu (2007) persuaded heterogeneous
groups either of the value of diversity or the value of similarity for group performance and then
provided groups with either homogeneous or heterogeneous information. Results showed that
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informationally diverse groups performed better when they held pro-diversity rather than prosimilarity beliefs, whereas the performance of informationally homogeneous groups was
unaffected by diversity beliefs.
Therefore, the processing objectives used by task groups can arise from various sources.
Group interaction may also create processing objectives unique to the group and its situation.
Also, multiple objectives often arise when groups process information (Hinsz et al., 1997).
Group members can have different processing objectives, which dilute or complicate the grouplevel objectives.
If group members encode the information they receive into their mental representations,
one question is how groups combine these individual mental representations into a shared view
of the information. The information presented may produce different meanings to different group
members, so the members would not share a representation of the information. Differences
among members’ mental representations may lead to a host of conflicts, which may be noticed
until members begin discussing the problem (Hinsz et al., 1997). For the group to attain the
processing objectives and function effectively, it may be necessary to make these implicit
differences of opinion apparent and explicit in the group.
Processing objectives also influence encoding in groups. If the group aims to process the
available information thoroughly before selecting a response, then representations common to all
the members might develop. Taking the time to deliberately and effortfully process the
information in a group discussion can help to create common knowledge among each group
member. This common knowledge could then serve as a shared task representation that each
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member shares when working on the task at hand. If, however, the group’s objective emphasizes
processing information simply to make a response (rather than to fully integrate information),
then members may not develop shared representations. For example, Tindale, Sheffey, and Scott
(1993) found groups could reach a consensus without sharing their diverse perspectives about a
problem. To do so, group members simply changed their preferences. Similarly, research on
information sampling suggests group members are more likely to express shared perspectives
during discussion than unique perspectives (e.g., Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stasser & Titus,
1985).
Antecedents of OMGC
In examining the determinants of OMGC, I draw from previous work on open-minded
cognition and group information processing. OMGC can arise from various sources, including
(but not limited to) individual motivations, norms, and shared task representations. As described
in de Dreu and colleagues (2008)’s MIP-G model, a variety of cognitive processes are driven by
two global motivations: Social motivation and epistemic motivation. Social motivation can be
proself (i.e., the individual is concerned with their outcomes only) or prosocial (i.e., the
individual is concerned with joint outcomes and fairness). Epistemic motivation refers to the
willingness to expend effort to achieve an accurate understanding of the task at hand.
Although some groups have members whose goal is to reach consensus on high-quality
decisions, members often have other incentives as well. They may be driven by personal motives
(e.g., attain and maintain a high-status position, impress others, avoid exploitation, or prevail in a
conflict; de Dreu et al., 2008; Wittenbaum et al., 2004). In other words, group members must
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deal with a mixture of cooperative group incentives and competitive individual incentives. Group
decision-making situations may differ in terms of how much cooperative versus competitive
incentives are present, and some situations might be primarily cooperative, whereas others might
be primarily competitive.
Although group members may face the same mixture of cooperative and competitive
incentives, one may act in the interests of the group, and the other may act in their personal selfinterest. The incentives emphasized depend on the individual’s social motivation (i.e., the
individual’s preference for a particular outcome distribution between self and others). There are a
variety of social motives (e.g., altruistic, competitive, individualistic, and cooperative), but most
research has used a global distinction between proself and prosocial motivation (e.g., de Dreu et
al., 2008). Proself motivation comprises competitive, individualistic goals, and prosocial
motivation comprises cooperative, group goals. In the case of proself motivation, individuals try
to maximize their own outcomes and have no regard for the outcomes obtained by other group
members. Individuals with a proself motive tend to see the decision-making process as an
opportunity for personal success. Individuals with a prosocial motive try to establish a decision
to value and incorporate all group members’ contributions and see the decision-making process
as a collaborative situation.
Social motivations should influence OMGC. If group members have a proself motivation,
they will prioritize their individual goals over the group’s goals. This means they are likely
looking for confirmation of their competitive beliefs (c.f., confirmation bias). This is a hallmark
of a closed-minded cognitive orientation; therefore, those with proself motivations will likely
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lead to CMGC (or at least lower levels of OMGC compared to prosocial motivations). In
contrast, those with a prosocial motivation will be more sensitive to the group’s needs and goals.
Thus, they will search for and process information in a style that, at times, resembles higher
levels of OMGC than proself motivation. However, having a prosocial motivation does not
guarantee high OMGC; under certain circumstance, prosocial motivation can also lead to biased
information processing. For example, if one is concerned with maintaining harmony in the
group, they might not divulge or seek out information that upsets the peace within the group.
Thus, it is likely prosocial motivation is only a necessary, rather than sufficient, condition of high
OMGC. However, prosocial motivation alone should lead to at least moderate levels of OMGC.
Social motivation appears to influence the type of information searched, encoded,
retrieved, and shared. Thus, social motivation provides a direction and leads to a bias in
information processing. However, much like individuals may enter the group with different
social motivations, individuals and groups may differ in the depth with which information is
searched and processed due to different epistemic motivations. Individuals may solve logical
problems, evaluate information, and make judgments through a quick, heuristic processing of
information that rests on prior associations. Alternatively, individuals may engage in more
deliberate, systematic processing that involves rule-based inferences (e.g., Fazio, 1986; Fazio &
Olson, 2014; Petty & Wegner, 1998).
Heuristic processing is more likely with low levels of epistemic motivation, whereas deep
and deliberate processing is more likely with high levels of epistemic motivation. In terms of
dual-process models, epistemic motivation depends on the perceived sufficiency of the
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information already available to the decision-maker (i.e., the sufficiency principle; Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993). The more decision-makers perceive their current state of knowledge and
information as insufficient to make a decision (i.e., when actual confidence is less than the
sufficiency threshold), the more they are motivated to engage in systematic processing of
decision-relevant information. In contrast, when people already have the information they need
to make a decision (i.e., when actual confidence is greater than or equal to the sufficiency
threshold), epistemic needs are satisfied, and there will be no additional search for or processing
of new information.
In terms of lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), epistemic motivation is
nondirectional (i.e., what is looked for is an accurate understanding of the world, not evidence
for a predetermined conclusion). As such, epistemic motivation is inversely related to an
individual’s need for nonspecific closure, which leads to a tendency to “seize and freeze”:
Coming to quick (rather than rich, well-developed, and accurate) conclusions, and once closure
is reached, sticking to them (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Although the need for nonspecific
closure initially implies that one is open to new ideas and information, this information will be
processed relatively shallow to speed up the process. Furthermore, once a conclusion is reached
(after it has “crystallized”), no further information is processed. Thus, a high need for
nonspecific cognitive closure is similar to low epistemic motivation, particularly after an initial
opinion or conclusion has been reached.
Because social motivations and epistemic motivations are orthogonal to one another,
neither are likely to lead to high OMGC on their own (although they individually may lead to
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moderate levels of OMGC). Rather, the interactions of the two motivations are likely to lead to
different cognitive orientations for the group. When individuals or groups have a proself
motivation, they will likely have a CMGC or moderate OMGC processing style regardless of
their/its level of epistemic motivation. This will likely manifest in different ways. For example,
proself high epistemic groups should be more likely to experience stalemates (indecision), ignore
other group members, argue, disagree, and disregard one another, whereas low epistemic proself
groups will be more likely to experience social loafing, inaction, and have group members
withhold effort or investment in the group.
In contrast, prosocial groups will experience more cooperation than proself groups.
However, even though more cooperation is occurring, prosocial low epistemic groups will still
exhibit moderate levels of OMGC. In prosocial low epistemic groups, some group members may
have individual-level open-minded cognition, but because the group is not willing to expend
effort to achieve a thorough, accurate understanding of the task, the group is more likely to
display biased information processing. Therefore, it takes the combination of both prosocial and
high epistemic motivations to reach high OMGC.
Many other factors that could influence OMGC. However, these variables are likely to
have their influence on OMGC through a mediated relationship with the motivations outlined
above. It is also possible many other factors influence these motivations (and subsequently,
OMGC). For example, social motives are related to individual differences in social value
orientation, need for affiliation, and agreeableness (de Dreu et al., 2008). There is some evidence
a collectivist culture makes prosocial motivation more chronically accessible than individualistic
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culture. Also, prosocial versus proself motivation may be cued by providing group or individual
incentives for performance, by referring in instructions to others as a partner versus opponent, or
by subliminal priming of “I” versus “we” (de Dreu et al., 2008). More indirect ways to
manipulate social motives are to have individuals anticipate future interaction (or not) as well as
emphasizing shared versus different group membership.
Epistemic motivation is not only related to the need for closure, it is likely to be higher
for those with a high need for cognition and high openness to experience as well. Furthermore,
situational cues may influence epistemic motivation. Research suggests that epistemic
motivation increases when the stakes are raised or when there is process accountability (de Dreu
et al., 2008). Under process accountability, individuals expect to be observed and evaluated by
others with unknown views about the process of judgment and decision making. Epistemic
motivation is also reduced when there is a high level of ambient noise or when individuals
become fatigued (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
Many of these factors occur predominantly at the individual level. However, group-level
factors may also affect epistemic motivation. In particular, preference homogeneity within
groups has been shown to lead to higher levels of confidence of group members in the
correctness of their judgments and ideas (de Dreu et al., 2008). Groups with high agreement
among their members will therefore often feel sufficiently confident in their judgments (i.e., high
actual confidence), which undermines epistemic motivation. On the other hand, preference
heterogeneity (i.e., group members have different initial preferences) may decrease the
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confidence of individual members and therefore increase epistemic motivation (de Dreu et al.,
2008).
Although majority factions often prevail in group decision making (e.g., Davis, 1982),
sometimes minority factions succeed in convincing a majority, particularly for intellective tasks
(e.g., Brodbeck et al., 2007; Stewart & Stasser, 1995). Even if they do not succeed in actually
converting the majority to adopt their position, minority dissent has been found to stimulate
divergent thinking and innovation, reduce confirmatory information search, reduce group
polarization, prevent groupthink, and reduce conformity. de Dreu and colleagues (2008) suggest
minority dissent can have these effects because it raises epistemic motivation and therefore
causes group members to abandon low-effort decision heuristics (such as “consensus implies
correctness”) and instead switch to elaborate and deep information processing.
A group-level factor that may influence group members’ epistemic motivation is the
approach taken by the group leader. Specifically, some studies suggest transformational
leadership (i.e., leadership through an inspiring vision and intellectual stimulation of followers)
enhances group creativity and stimulates group members to contribute ideas to the group (de
Dreu et al., 2008). Other research suggests autocratic and highly directive leadership approaches
undermine the degree to which followers think independently and deliberately about their tasks
(de Dreu et al., 2008). Although systematic research is lacking, it seems reasonable specific
group leader approaches influence group-level epistemic motivation.
Finally, shared task representations at the group-level might influence both (or either)
motivation. A shared task representation is “any task/situation relevant concept, norm,
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perspective, or cognitive process that is shared by most or all of the group members” (Tindale et
al., 1996, p. 84). Task/situation relevant means the representation has implications for the choice
alternatives involved. In the context of open-minded cognition, the cultural norm to be openminded, the greed/fear motivations to protect the group from other groups (prompting closedmindedness), or any other shared information among group members that might influence their
cognitive processing styles.
Consequences of OMGC
OMGC should have distinct consequences on group information processing. de Dreu and
colleagues (2008) argue group members have a specific level of epistemic motivation and are apt
to engage in deliberate information processing for that particular level. Research demonstrates
group members think in a more divergent and flexible way when they have high, compared to
low, epistemic motivation. Thus, the first consequence is that groups with high levels of OMGC
will share more information, engage in more divergent ways of thinking, are information driven,
and are unlikely to be influenced by inaccurate heuristics and reasoning errors compared to
groups with low levels of OMGC
Work on the need for cognitive closure and group centeredness suggests groups with high
levels of epistemic motivation have a greater tolerance for deviants, are more open to minority
dissent, develop more egalitarian interaction patterns, and are less likely to endorse autocratic
leaders (de Dreu, Nijstad, Baas, & Bechtoldt, 2008). Since high epistemic motivation is present
in OMGC, high OMGC groups should stimulate creative ideation and dissemination of unshared
information. In other words, high OMGC leads to creative ideas, problem solutions, and more
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thorough dissemination of information held by group members. For similar reasons, high OMGC
should reduce the intolerance of deviance, the pressure toward conformity, and the desire for
hierarchical decision making. It should also lead to more divergent thinking, undermine rigidity
of thought, and stimulate creativity.
Studies on information processing suggest social motives steer toward goal-consistent
information processing, both at the individual level (encoding and retrieval) and at the group
level (information exchange; de Dreu et al., 2008). Prosocial individuals seek, encode, retrieve,
and exchange more cooperative information, whereas proself individuals seek, encode, retrieve,
and exchange more competitive information. Because proself motivation can only lead to CMGC
or moderate OMGC, advocacy (i.e., only mentioning information consistent with one’s
preference), lying, deception, and spinning information may emerge. Thus, a closed-minded
group orientation will likely reduce attention to others’ ideas and lead to derogation or criticism
of novel or conflicting ideas. The more members who have CMGC, the less likely it will be for
the group to form a consensus and integrate perspectives, emphasize the value of shared
information, and tolerate dissent and independence. In some cases, this may promote divergent
thinking and the exchange of unique, unshared information; however, the more members who
have CMGC, the less likely others’ ideas and viewpoints will be considered and integrated into a
single members’ thinking and idea production. Therefore, groups with high OMGC should be
better at reaching agreements that integrate all members’ input, but they may be worse at coming
up with truly novel and creative decisions.
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Groups with high OMGC may seek high-quality decisions because this fosters collective
goals and welfare, and they will continue to do this to the extent this search process does not
compromise harmony. Much in line with the notion epistemic motivation may or may not lead to
high-quality decisions depending on members’ social motivation and task requirements, whether
social motivation leads to high-quality decisions depends on members’ epistemic motivations
and specific features of the group task (de Dreu et al., 2008).
In total, there are four combinations of social motivation and epistemic motivation that
ultimately influence OMGC. Note, these dimensions (each motivation and OMGC) are
continuous rather than dichotomous. For example, concerning social motivations, a situation may
have both competitive and cooperative features. Furthermore, OMGC is conceptualized as a
continuum between a closed-minded group cognitive orientation and an open-minded group
orientation. Therefore, much like de Dreu and colleagues (2008)’s categories, these four
combinations should be considered idealized situations that lead to more or less OMGC, and as a
consequence, influence information processing.
Proself low epistemic motivation should lead to CMGC. In this situation, group members
are unwilling to invest much cognitive effort and are motivated by personal interests. This may
lead to inaction and a tendency to withhold effort or investment in the group’s task. Group
members will be unmotivated and may freeride or engage in social loafing. When group
members hold different opinions, they may be unwilling to give in and understand others’
positions. Instead, they may engage in inflexible positioning and vetoing, which can lead to
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stalemates and indecision. Members might also avoid change or conflict, which could also
promote the intentional withholding of information (Wittenbaum et al., 2004).
Proself high epistemic motivation should lead to moderate levels of OMGC. In this
situation, group members are motivated by selfish goals and are willing to exert cognitive effort
to gain a better understanding of the situation. Group members are likely to use flexible methods
to get their way and forcefully argue and counterargue their individual points. Furthermore, they
are likely to engage in advocacy, lying, deception, and put their spin on the information. Because
of the amount of effort these strategies use, they are more likely to be used under high (rather
than low) levels of epistemic motivation. Also, group members might be content taking a
minority position and should be somewhat independent in their thinking. To the extent they do
not disregard others’ ideas, group creativity may benefit from a combination of selfish
motivation and high epistemic needs (de Dreu et al., 2008). In general, however, group members
high in proself motivation, regardless of their level of epistemic motivation, may choose to
withhold some unshared information or communicate with a goal-biased spin in the interest of
satisfying their goals (Wittenbaum et al., 2004).
Despite the cooperative nature of prosocial motivations, prosocial low epistemic
motivation should also lead to moderate levels of OMGC. In this situation, group members value
their own as well as other group members’ outcomes. However, they are unwilling to invest
much effort to attain a good understanding of the situation. Group members place a high value
on maintaining group harmony and consensus, which may lead to collective bolstering, selfcensoring, and mutual enhancement. Group members may reinforce the exchange of commonly
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held (i.e., shared) information. Group centeredness may emerge (i.e., situations in which
members pressure the group to have uniform opinions, to have a similar knowledge base and
perspective, and group enhancement), leading to group interactions characterized by the pooling
of preferences rather than of information and the acceptance of lazy, middle-of-the-road
compromises (c.f., de Dreu et al., 2008).
Unlike the previous three combinations, prosocial high epistemic motivation is the only
route to high OMGC in this model. With high levels of OMGC, group members have prosocial
goals and are willing to invest the effort to reach a better understanding of the situation and the
group task. In service of this, self-censorship should be reduced, and preferences for accuracy
and harmony will drive the group toward the task in a way that satisfies all members’ needs. The
interaction is likely to be information driven rather than preference driven. Group members pay
attention to each others’ ideas, try to build on them, and may reach high levels of creativity. In
short, high OMGC is most likely to lead to constructive group processes.
Initial support for the effect of these motivations on OMGC come from the few studies
investigating advice-taking in group contexts. In one study, researchers directly compared the
extent to which groups and individuals discount advice (Minson & Mueller, 2012). Individuals
and two-person teams were asked to estimate percentages for a variety of general knowledge
questions (e.g., US geography, demographics). After providing an initial estimate, participants
were given advice, which consisted of answers provided by another individual or two-person
group that had ostensibly participated in the study. Participants were then given a chance to
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revise their initial evidence in light of this new information. Results showed that the two-person
teams discounted the advice more than individuals.
In the Minson and Mueller (2012) experiment, teams were required to reach a consensus
judgment about each question before receiving the advice. However, Larson, Tindale, and Yoon
(2020) argue if groups had not been required to reach a consensus judgment before receiving
advice, they might have exhibited less advice discounting than individuals, particularly if
members had conflicting prediscussion opinions about the judgment. To test this, Larson and
colleagues (2020) had two-person teams receive advice on general knowledge questions. Half of
the teams were required to reach consensus before receiving any advice, and the other half were
prevented from reaching an initial consensus before receiving advice. Results showed advice
discounting by groups varied as a function of the degree to which prediscussion judgments
diverged, with less discounting taking place as prediscussion opinion diversity increased (Larson
et al., 2020).
In other words, Larson and colleagues (2020) found that groups with high opinion
diversity were more open to advice than those with low opinion diversity, but this was only true
when advice was given before groups reached consensus. Since both opinion diversity and the
extent of group consensus influence epistemic motivations within groups, groups in Larson and
colleagues (2020)’s pre-consensus advice and high opinion diversity condition should have
higher levels of epistemic motivation than the other conditions. This suggests that epistemic
motivation alone can potentially lead to open mindedness.
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Other factors may also be driving the effect of advice discounting in groups compared to
individuals. For example, social factors may also have an influence here (e.g., desire to preserve
harmony and avoid conflict, pressure toward conformity). Both Minson and Mueller (2012) and
Larson and colleagues (2020) gave participants group-based incentives in their studies. Since
groups were asked to reach a consensus, group members must make a joint decision with other
group members, which often involves at least some cooperation with others in the group. Thus, it
seems reasonable groups in both of these studies were prosocially motivated since there were no
proself conditions. If this is true, the findings from Larson and colleagues (2020) could be
interpreted as the joint effect of prosocial motivation (i.e., team-based incentive) and high
epistemic motivation (i.e., opinion diversity plus consensus blocked).
Taken together, groups may be composed of members with varying motives; some
members may be more cooperative or competitive than others. Also, some groups may be more
cooperative or competitive than others depending on the composition of members. The kind of
information that a group member selects for discussion likely depends not only on individual
member goals but also on the distribution of incentives among other members in the group
(Wittenbaum et al., 2004). Generally speaking, high OMGC should lead to more nondirectional,
unbiased processing and dissemination of task-relevant information. It should also produce
judgments and decisions that are of better quality. Thus, high OMGC should result in higher
quality decisions, more integrative agreements, and greater team effectiveness compared to
CMGC. Nevertheless, there may be situations in which CMGC could lead to better quality
decisions and greater team performance (e.g., emergency/urgent situations).

CHAPTER III
GENERAL METHOD
Much of the work discussed so far relies on observational methods, quasi-experiments,
and true experiments, and the majority of the research appears to have been conducted before the
so-called replication crisis was identified in the psychological literature (e.g., Asendorpf et al.,
2013; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; Yong, 2012). An alternative research strategy that
can both increase transparency and specificity (and by extension, presumably reproducibility and
replicability) while simultaneously driving theory building involves the use of computational
models.
Computational models of complex behavior (e.g., group discussions) offer a variety of
benefits. First, computational models (e.g., computer simulations) let researchers assess whether
their understanding of the components of complex behavior is enough to produce a
representation of the actual behavior they are interested in. While building the model, a
researcher might realize they do not have a sufficient understanding of the behavior, which could
lead to new insights (Larson, 1997, 2007; Stasser, 1988). If we are able to build a working
computational model, we can adjust the parameters to explore their effects on the behavior of
interest and perhaps learn something unexpected. Also, computational modeling allows
researchers to understand how processes at one level can lead to changes at a higher level
(Stasser, 1988). This last point is particularly relevant to group decision making. It is often
58
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difficult to link what individuals do within a group to what the group actually ends up doing. For
example, although we may understand an individual’s behavior in a given situation, it can be
difficult to predict how a group of individuals may behave in the same situation because the
same group processes can often lead to different outcomes (e.g., Tindale, Smith, DykemaEngblade, & Kluwe, 2012).
Computational models have been used to better understand many domains of human
behavior (e.g., perception, memory, reasoning, decision-making, communicating), and one
particular form of computational modeling is an agent-based model (ABM). In an ABM, each
agent is an autonomous entity (e.g., a group member) who makes decisions based on rules and
parameters of the environment (Grimm & Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). This
allows ABMs to simulate the activities of individuals, their interactions with one another, and
their interactions with the environment. ABMs also let researchers to control factors they might
normally study empirically (e.g., motivation, cognitive styles, information processing) and study
the effects of these variables by changing parameter values during iterations of the simulation
(c.f., manipulating a variable across conditions in a true experiment). Results from such virtual
experiments are often useful in determining the conditions under which information exchange
leads to improved group performance.
Although computational models have not commonly been used as a theoretical tool in
social psychology, their use in the group decision making literature is not new. For example, in
the 1980s, Penrod and Hastie (1980) developed the DICE model of jury deliberation (which later
became the JUS model; Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983) and Stasser and Davis (1981)
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developed the social interaction sequence (SIS) model of group decision making, both of which
are computer simulation models of collective choice. However, these models start with group
members’ prediscussion preferences and then model group discussion by specifying a
relationship between the probability of opinion change and the existing sentiment within the
group. As Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington (1983) note, this approach does not model discussion
but rather the results of the discussion. In other words, these models do not account for how
information gets into the discussion and how group members use information to revise their
preferences. Stasser (1988) overcame this limitation with the DISCUSS model. The DISCUSS
model views opinion formation and revision during discussion as a product of information
exchange. Development of the model was motivated by recent work addressing how information
distribution among members before discussion affects the outcomes of group discussion.
Since then, Larson (1997) developed a model of shared and unshared information entry in
group discussions, and Larson (2007) developed the ValSeek model of group problem-solving
performance. Crowder, Robinson, Hughes, and Sim (2012) used ABM to explore how
individual-level, team-level, and task-level variables influenced team performance in an
engineering environment. Other recent ABMs related to group information processing and
performance include Dionne, Sayama, Hao, and Bush’s (2010) simulation of the development of
shared mental models in teams and Zhang, Li, Zhang, and Schlick’s (2013) simulation of the
process of collaborative product development and design in organizations. More recently,
Luhmann and Rajaram (2015) developed an ABM of memory transmission in small groups and
large social networks. Using theoretical knowledge from small-group experiments, the
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researchers were able to replicate collaborative inhibition and memory convergence from small
groups in large-scale, realistic social networks.
Give the benefits of computational modeling and its increasing use as a research tool, this
chapter begins with a deeper discussion of what computational modeling is broadly, what agentbased modeling is specifically, and how these tools can be used to drive theory in an open,
reproducible way. I then provide a general discussion of the methods used in the present paper. I
begin with a broad overview of the research approaches used, the key variables of interest, and
the general procedures used. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the general hypotheses
that the studies described in Chapters IV and V test.
Computational Modeling
Before getting into the specifics of computational modeling, it is useful to start by
considering what a model is. Generally, a model is a purposeful representation of some real
system (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). As researchers, we often want to understand how things
work, explain observed findings, and predict behavior. Building models is one effect method of
accomplishing these goals. Real systems can sometimes be too complex or slow to develop to be
studied using an experiment (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). For example, it would be difficult
understand the development of cities using experimental methods. Therefore, we try to specify
(i.e., describe assumptions, design algorithms, etc.) a simplified representation of the system
using equations or computer programs that we can manipulate and analyze. Thus, computational
modeling is the process by which a verbal description or verbal theory is formalized to remove
ambiguity (Guest & Martin, 2021).
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However, it can sometimes be difficult to represent a real system (e.g., a city or a group
of people) in a simplified way. Which components of the system should be included in the model
and which can be ignored? As with most scientific questions, it depends. Distinguishing between
the crucial aspects of the system and irrelevant ones depends on the question the researcher is
trying to answer with the model (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). Only the aspects of the real system
that are considered unimportant for answering the current research question are filtered out. In
other words, the components of the system that are irrelevant to the current research question
should either be ignored in the model or only represented in a very simplified way (Railsback &
Grimm, 2012).
For example, consider a hiker in the wilderness. After awhile of walking in the woods,
this hiker notices she has dropped some belongings. In fact, it turns out she had a hole in their
bag and is now missing, among other things, her cell phone. But the hiker is unsure where she
lost these items. She might think of several search strategies to locate her lost phone. She might
start by retracing her steps and scanning the area in large sweeps. She also might recall some
particularly rough stretches of the path she hiked or notice some of her other personal items (e.g.,
piece of fabric, snacks) laying near a part of the path. In these cases, she might decide to spend
more focused, smaller sweeps in those areas. However, what constitutes a “sweep” in these
strategies? Does it matter if the sweep is “large” or “small?” How long should the hiker search in
smaller sweeps before returning to a large sweep? A computational model could help answer
these questions and identify the most successful search strategy.
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Although this is a contrived situation, many animals face similar conceptual problems.
For example, tigers must locate prey like antelope, albatross must locate food like mushrooms in
the forest, and this is probably even true of human organizations searching for prizes such as
profit (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). Therefore, it is likely evolution has equipped many animals
with adaptive search strategies. The common feature between the imaginary hiker and these
more real-world examples is that their sensing radius is limited: They can only detect what they
seek when they are close to the item, so they must move to detect new stimuli. Another common
feature among these situations is that the items searched for are distributed in clusters (e.g., the
hiker’s items are in a cluster, mushrooms grow in clusters, antelope travel in herds).
Even a situation as simple as looking for a lost cell phone can be difficult to solve.
Initially, the searcher might find a search strategy that works well. However, other searchers
might use different strategies that appear to be more effective. Are these other searchers simply
more lucky or are they using better search strategies? These questions become even more
interesting when we think about how searching strategies might be similar across other realworld contexts.
To build a cell phone search model, the modeler must start by stating the research
question of interest. This question identifies the purpose of the model and will be the filter the
modeler uses to include model-relevant information and exclude irrelevant information. In this
case, the modeler might ask, “What search strategy maximizes the likelihood of finding the items
within a certain time?” Using this question to guide the model, the modeler can ignore modeling
the trees and vegetation in the forest. What does need to be included in the model is that the
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items being searched for are distributed in clusters in the wilderness. This also means the
modeler ignore other differences in the forest environment (e.g., soil type, weather, etc.). These
factors might affect searching, but they should not affect it so much to influence the answer to
the research question. Lastly, the modeler must represent the searcher in a simplified way. The
searcher just needs to be a moving object (e.g., a dot) that has a certain sensing radius, monitors
how many items it finds, and keeps track of how long it has been since it found the last item.
With this information, a modeler can implement a model that includes cluster(s) of items
and an individual agent that searches for the items in the model world. If the agent finds an item,
it switches to a smaller-scale movement. However, if the time since it found the last item exceeds
a certain threshold, the agent switches back to more straightforward movement to increase the
chance of detecting another cluster of items. This system is simple enough that a researcher
could likely develop an idea of the processes and behaviors important for the model from
intuition alone. But, how can a researcher determine if a particular factor is relevant to the
model’s research question, especially if the processes being modeled are novel? Unfortunately,
there is no definitive answer to this question. However, this is precisely why we must specify,
implement, and analyze a model: Once we have done so, we can use mathematics and computer
logic to rigorously explore the consequences of our simplified assumptions (Guest & Martin,
2021; Railsback & Grimm, 2012).
A common objection to computational modeling in the social sciences is that they are
grossly unrealistic (i.e., they demonstrate low realism). And technically speaking, this is correct.
Computational models often ignore large portions of reality by excluding certain environmental
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and behavioral complexities (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). However, this is actually an advantage
of computational models rather than a limitation, especially if the alternative involves relying on
a verbal model. Verbal models sometimes appear superior to computational models because they
employ strategic ambiguity, giving the illusion of understanding at the cost of actual
understanding (Smaldino, 2017). It is often only by formalizing a complex system that we can
make progress in understanding it. Specification of a formal model delineates the parts of a
system and the relationships between those parts, allows us to examine the logical conclusions of
our assumptions, and helps us examine the appropriateness of those assumptions in the first place
(Smaldino, 2017).
When developing a computational model, the first formation of the model should be
based on a preliminary understanding of how the system works, what the important elements and
processes are, and other important information. Preliminary ideas might be based on empirical
observation, previous research, earlier models addressing similar questions, or even simply
imagination (as in the cell phone search example above). However, if we have no idea how a
system works, we cannot specify a model of it (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). This is why, for
example, there does not currently seem to be a formal model of human consciousness despite
scientists’ eagerness to develop one.
Because the assumptions in the first version of a model are experimental, researchers
must test whether the assumptions are appropriate and useful. To do this, researchers need
criteria for whether the model can be considered a good representation of the real system or not
(Guest & Martin, 2021; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). These criteria are based on patterns that let
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researchers identify and characterize the system in the first place. Often, the first version of a
model is too simple, lacks important processes, or is simply inconsistent with the established
criteria. In these cases, researchers must go back and revise their simplifying assumptions so the
model better meets the established criteria for whether it is a good representation of the system.
The Modeling Cycle
When thinking about a model, we intuitively go through a series of tasks. Scientific
modeling means to go through these tasks in a systematic way and to use mathematics and
computer algorithms to rigorously determine the consequences of the simplifying assumptions
that make up the model. Being scientific always means iterating through the tasks of modeling
several times because first models can always be improved in some way. This process has
generally been described by many researchers in much the same way.
One example of viewing modeling as iterative process is called the modeling cycle
(Grimm & Railsback, 2005). There are five tasks in the modeling: (1) formulate the question; (2)
assemble hypotheses for essential processes and structures; (3) choose scales entities, state
variables, processes, and parameters; (4) implement the model; and (5) analyze, test, and revise
the model. When formulating the question, a researcher needs to begin with a very clear research
question. As described above, the research question will serve as a guide and filter for
developing the model.
The second task in the modeling cycle is to assemble hypotheses for the essential
processes and structures in the model (Grimm & Railsback, 2005). Often, the researcher must
formulate many hypotheses for what processes and structures are important to the research
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question, especially if little research has been conducted on the topic. The goal here is to
combine existing knowledge, a brainstorming phase that consists of hypothesized processes or
structures, and a simplification phase (Grimm & Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012).
The modeling cycle must start with simplest model possible because the researcher’s goal is to
develop a gradual understanding while iterating through the modeling cycle. Although it is
tempting to include all well-known factors of the research question into the model, it is better
only include the absolute minimum at first and gradually add others in later (Grimm &
Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). A preliminary understanding of a system is not
sufficient for deciding whether things are important for a model or not. The very purpose of a
model is to teach use what is important (c.f., Lewin, 1943), so it is better to implement a simple
model early and use it as a tool during the iterative process.
The third task in the modeling cycle is to choose the scales, entities, state variables,
processes, and parameters to be included in the model (Grimm & Railsback, 2005; Railsback &
Grimm, 2012). Here, the researcher creates a written formulation of the model. Producing and
updating this formulation is essential for the entire modeling process, including dissemination to
the broader scientific community and public. The fourth task in the modeling cycle in when the
researcher implements the model (Grimm & Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). This
is the most technical step since this is where mathematics and computer program translate the
verbal model description into a computer simulation. At this point, the program has its own,
independent dynamics driven by the internal logic of the model. The assumptions may be wrong
or incomplete, but the implementation itself is correct; it allows us to explore, in a logical and
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rigorous way, the consequences of the researcher’s assumptions and see whether he initial model
looks useful. The fifth task involves analyzing, testing, and revising the model (Grimm &
Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). At this point, the researcher is figuring out what
insights can be learned from the model.
In a second example to viewing modeling as an iterative process, van Rooij and Baggio
(2021) proposed the idea of the theoretical cycle: Before theories are even put to an empirical
test, they can be assessed for their plausibility on formal, computational grounds. They
distinguish the theoretical cycle from the empirical cycle. The empirical cycle is what most
psychological researchers are familiar with: A researcher poses a hypothesis, empirically tests it,
and revises their understanding of the phenomena in the process. However, explanatory
hypotheses often remain verbal in psychological research (van Rooij & Baggio, 2021).
Therefore, the first steps of formal theory building include making these verbal theories formally
explicit.
However, this requires that there is something to formally assess. In other words, it
requires a computational model of the phenomenon of interest (van Rooij & Baggio, 2021). In
the process of formalization, the verbal theory may be revised and refined (c.f. Railsback &
Grimm, 2012). van Rooij and Baggio (2021) argue theory building does not need to proceed with
empirical testing right away. Instead, theories can be subjected to rigorous theoretical tests in
what they refer to as the theoretical cycle. The goal of the theoretical cycle is to provide the
revised theory with greater a priori plausibility before assessing the theory’s empirical adequacy
in the empirical cycle.
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In the theoretical cycle, a researcher iteratively addresses research questions concerning
the phenomena of interest as formalized in the theory (e.g., questions about tractability,
learnability, etc.). However, van Rooij and Baggio (2021) state the theoretical cycle and the
empirical cycles will always need to be interconnected, much as Grimm and Railsback (2005)
have argued in their modeling cycle.
A third example to viewing modeling as iterative process is put forth by Guest and
Martin (2021) in which they propose a unified account demonstrating how computational
modeling can play a significant role in psychological research. They argue scientific inference
resembles path function, where each step in the path shapes the next. They outline six specific
levels in their path model of scientific inference: (1) framework, (2) theory, (3) specification, (4)
implementation, (5) hypothesis, and (6) data. Guest and Martin (2021) argue the theory,
specification, and implementation levels are largely implicit in psychology research and have
partially contributed to the so-called replication crisis the field has faced in recent years.
In their path model of scientific inference, researchers begin at the framework level. A
framework is a conceptual system of building blocks for creating facsimiles of complex
psychological systems (Guest & Martin, 2021). A framework is typically described using natural
language and figures. Researchers then develop a theory from this framework and move to the
second level in the path model. A theory is a scientific proposition that introduces causal
relations with the aim of describing, explaining, or predicting a set of phenomena (Guest &
Martin, 2021; Lakatos, 1976). Theories are often described by a collection of natural language
sentences, mathematics, logic, and figures. To move to the next level and produce a specification
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for a theory, researchers must posit a plausible mechanism for the specification model to define
(Guest & Martin, 2021). However, not all psychological models can be evaluated against data
directly. If a theory cannot lead to coherent specifications, it is our responsibility as scientists to
revise it or use another theory that does (Guest & Martin, 2021).
The third level, specification, involves a formal description of a system to be
implemented based on a theory (Guest & Martin, 2021). This provides a way of discriminating
between theory-relevant assumptions (i.e., those closer to the core claims of the theory) and
theory-irrelevant assumptions (Cooper & Guest, 2014; Lakatos, 1976). Specifications provide a
way to check if a computational model representing the theory and a way to create a model even
if the theory is not clear enough (Guest & Martin, 2021). Specifications can be expressed in
natural language sentences, mathematics, logic, and diagrams. Moving from specification to
implementation typically involves translating these verbal specifications into computer code. For
example, in psychology, creating an implementation might consist of taking the specification
implicitly mentioned in a published article and writing code that captures its general idea.
However, without specifications researchers cannot debug their implementations nor can they
properly test their theories (Cooper & Guest, 2014; Guest & Martin, 2021).
An implementation is an instance of a model created using anything from physical
materials to software. However, a computational implementation is code written in a
programming language (Guest & Martin, 2021). Running the computational model’s code allows
researchers to generate hypotheses and move to the fifth level. For example, if the model
behaves in a unexpected or interesting certain way, the researcher can formulate a hypothesis to
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test why this might be occurring. Alternatively, if the already knows a phenomenon occurs in a
certain way, computational modeling is a useful way to check that a researcher’s understanding
does indeed match their observations.
In the last level, data, researcher are concerned with observations collected from the “real
world” or from a computational model (Guest & Martin, 2021). Data can take on many forms in
psychology, the most common being numerical values that represent variables in an
experimental design. If the data do not support the hypothesis, this allows the researcher to reject
the experimental hypothesize with a certain level of confidence. This does not, however, allow
the researcher to reject a theory with the same amount of confidence. The same is true in the
inverse situation (Meehl, 1967). To escape these problems and understand how data and
hypothesis relate to working theory, researchers must contextualize their findings using
computational modeling. These violations cannot be addressed by inventing new hypotheses that
conveniently fit data (i.e., HARKing; Kerr, 1998) but by asking what needs to change in the
theoretical understanding.
Agent-Based Modeling
ABMs are models in which individuals or agents are described as unique and
autonomous entities that usually interact with each other and their local environment (Grimm &
Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). Agents can be humans, groups, institutions, and
any other entity that pursues a certain goal. Being unique implies agents are usually different
from each other in some respect (e.g., size, location, resources, etc.). Interacting locally means
that agents usually do not interaction with all agents at the same time (Railsback & Grimm,
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2012). Rather, they tend to interact with agents that are nearby (e.g., their neighbors). This
proximity to other agents can be geographical space or some other kind of space (e.g., in a
network). Being autonomous implies agents act independently of each other and pursue their
own objectives. Therefore, agents use adaptive behavior: They adjust their behavior to the
current states of themselves, of other agents, and of their environment.
By using computer simulation, researchers can develop models that are less simplified
and include more characteristics of real systems. ABMs are less simplified in one specific, but
very important, way: They represent a system’s individual components and their behaviors
(Railsback & Grimm, 2012). So, instead of describing a system only with variables that represent
the state of the whole system, researchers model its individual agents. Using ABMs lets us
address problems about emergence. Emergence is the system dynamics that arise from how the
system’s individual components interact with and respond to each other and their environment
(Grimm & Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). Hence, with ABMs, we can study
questions of how a system’s behavior arises from, and is linked to, the characteristics and
behaviors of its individual components.
ABMs are useful for problems of emergence because they are across-level models
(Grimm & Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). Traditionally, some scientists have
studied only systems and modeled them using approaches such as differential equations that
represent how the whole system changes. Others have studied only agents. For example, some
only study how people (or plants, animals, etc.) change and adapt to external conditions. ABMs
are different than both of these approaches in that they are concerned with two (and potentially
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more) levels and their interactions: (1) What happens to the system because of what the
individuals do and (2) what happens to the individuals because of what the system does
(Railsback & Grimm, 2012).
When developing a model of a real system, the researcher needs to keep the model as
simple as possible (Grimm & Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). To do this, the
researcher uses the research question to filter what should be included and excluded from the
model. Aspects of the real system should only be included if they are considered absolutely
essential for answering a particular question. The problem with ABMs is that the question a
model addresses is often inadequate to act as a filter for deciding what should be in the model.
By itself, the question does not contain enough information to ensure the model is structurally
realistic and captures the essence of the systems internal organization. Therefore, the researcher
uses patterns observed in the real system as additional information to make ABMs structurally
realistic and more accurate, a process known as pattern-oriented modeling (Grimm & Railsback,
2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012).
The basic idea of pattern-oriented modeling is to use multiple patterns to design and
analyze models (Grimm & Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). Each pattern serves as a
filter of possible explanations so that after using multiple patterns, the researcher is more likely
to have achieved structural realism. An unrealistic model might pass one filter, but it is less
likely to pass three or more filters. Therefore, pattern-oriented modeling uses multiple criteria
assessment of models using multiple patterns that have been observed in the real system, often at
both the agent and system levels (Grimm & Railsback, 2005; Railsback & Grimm, 2012).
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Pattern-oriented modeling is not a new idea. In fact, it is the same method scientists engage in all
the time: Look for explanations of phenomena by seeking models that can reproduce patterns
produced by the phenomena (c.f., Guest & Martin, 2021). In essence, the researcher is simply
using multiple patterns as indicators of a system’s internal organization. By trying to reproduce
these patterns simultaneously, the researcher tries to decode this internal organization.
Theory Development
In addition to the benefits discussed above, a major advantage of computational modeling
is its ability to drive theory development. In the last decade, psychology and the broader social
sciences have been faced with a harsh reality: Many findings, some even considered to be wellestablished, are not replicable (Collaboration, 2015). Researchers have since tried to fix this
problem. Most of these recommendations were centered around improving design and statistical
procedures in the research process, mostly due to high rates of questionable research practices
(Simmons et al., 2011) and evidence that most published research findings were false (Button et
al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2005). More recently, however, researchers have argued the so-called
replication crisis is also related to many empirically tested hypotheses are only weakly related to
the theories they are derived from (Guest & Martin, 2021; Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019;
Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019; van Rooij & Baggio, 2021).
Scientific reasoning relies on inferences on two levels: (1) the empirical level and the (2)
theory level (Guest & Martin, 2021; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019; van Rooij & Baggio,
2021). At the empirical level, researchers link hypotheses to data. This is the purpose of many
inferential statistics; they formalize the researcher’s inductive inference from data to hypothesis.
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To the extent an effect observed in a sample is significant, the researcher gains confidence the
effect holds in the population from which the sample was drawn. At the theoretical level of
inference, researchers use theories to derive hypotheses, which claim some supported hypotheses
(which can be thought of as empirical generalizations since the relationships are thought to hold
in the population) are real (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019). In turn, these empirical
generalizations let researchers to make inferences about theories, supporting the theories if they
match their derived hypotheses and questioning them if not (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019).
Much of the discussion surrounding the replication crisis and the reform movement that
has grown out of it has focused on the causes of non-replicable findings at the empirical level
(e.g., Button et al., 2013; Collaboration, 2015; Ioannidis, 2005; Simmons et al., 2011). Although
issues such as underpowered research designs, p-hacking, HARKing, publication bias, and other
questionable research practices are certainly critical to improving replication attempts, there has
been less attention given to theory-related weaknesses, which have also likely contributed to the
replication crisis (Guest & Martin, 2021; Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019; Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2019; van Rooij & Baggio, 2021).
A partial solution to this problem is to implement computational models, which is
harmonious with many of the other recommendations put forth for the replication crisis.
Computational modeling is open science: It comprises a verbal descriptions of scientific
questions, includes specifications and implementations of models that are transparent, and is
open to be replicated and modified (Guest & Martin, 2021). If a researcher disagrees with any of
the specifications or implementations of the model (e.g., any of the assumptions or causal
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mechanisms), they can plug in whatever aspect of the model it is they want to change and
reevaluate the results in light of their own hypotheses (Guest & Martin, 2021). Computational
modeling allows open theorizing to go along with open data, open source code, and the other
recommendations of transparency advocated in the replication reform movement. Through
writing code, much like through writing manuscripts, we debug our scientific thinking (Guest &
Martin, 2021).
Another advantage of including computational modeling in psychological research is that
it can change the way the research process is structured. It changes the focus from testing
hypotheses generated from an unclear idea, vague description, or simple intuition (e.g., a theory
that has never been written down or one not well-developed) to testing a formal model of the
theory and continuing to be able to generate and test hypotheses using empirical data (Navarro,
2021). It does this by forcing researchers to explicitly document an instance of what their theory
assumes (Guest & Martin, 2021). This is not to say there is no place for verbal theories in
research. On the contrary, there are many rich and insightful verbal theories in the literature that
can be used to specify and implement a computational model. The value of formal theories (e.g.,
computational models) is that they equip researchers with tools to better develop, evaluate, and
integrate verbal theories in a systematic manner (Robinaugh, Haslbeck, Ryan, Fried, & Waldorp,
2021).
Ideally, modeling forces researchers think deeply about what they are going to model in
addition to any data both before and during the creation of the model. By thinking through how
to represent the data and model the experiment, researchers gain insight into the impact of their
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ideas in a much deeper and explicit way than simply collecting data (Guest & Martin, 2021;
Navarro, 2021). By providing a transparent connection for where predictions, explanations, and
ideas for experiments come from, the process of modeling stops researchers from atheoretically
testing hypotheses. Open theorizing (i.e., explicitly stating and formalizing theoretical
commitments) is done by default as a function of the process (Guest & Martin, 2021).
Theoretical advances using computational models also have something in common.
When theoretical knowledge is represented in formal models of psychological processes, the
underlying theoretical models become more than mere summaries of empirical results and more
substantive than a mere statistical model (Navarro, 2021). The models can be used to generate
novel predictions in experimental paradigms that differ markedly from the experimental contexts
used to develop the model. By using a combination of abstraction and formalism, mathematical
psychologists have been able to develop a toolkit that allows researchers in other areas to derive
theoretical predictions in completely novel paradigms (Navarro, 2021). The advancement of
scientific knowledge depends on the development of scientific theories. As psychologists, we
should be striving for well-developed theories that are sufficiently good representations of a
target system that they support the explanation, prediction, and control of psychological
phenomena (Robinaugh et al. 2021).
Overview
The purpose of the current project is to extend our understanding of motivation and task
type on open-minded group cognition (OMGC), information exchange, and performance in
problem-solving groups. As described in Chapter II, there are four combinations of social and
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epistemic motivations that should ultimately influence OMGC. Proself and low epistemic
motivations should lead to CMGC. In this situation, group members are unwilling to invest much
cognitive effort and are motivated by personal interests. Proself and high epistemic motivations
should lead to moderate levels of OMGC. In this situation, group members are motivated by
selfish goals and are willing to exert cognitive effort to gain a better understanding of the
situation. Despite the cooperative nature of prosocial motivations, prosocial and low epistemic
motivations should also lead to moderate levels of OMGC. In this situation, group members
value their own as well as other group members’ outcomes. However, they are unwilling to
invest much effort to attain a good understanding of the situation. The combination of prosocial
and high epistemic motivations is the only route to high OMGC in this model. With high levels
of OMGC, group members have prosocial goals and are willing to invest the effort to reach a
better understanding of the situation and the group task.
Group discussions, the primary means of exchanging information among group members,
are commonly viewed as a sampling process in which the content of the discussion is obtained
by sampling from the collective pool of information among individual members (Larson, 1997;
Stasser, 1988; Stasser & Titus, 1985). During the discussion, members independently recall and
share pieces of information. Some of this information is common knowledge to all members of
the group (i.e., shared information), but other pieces of information are unique to the members
that hold them (i.e., unshared information) due to differences in training, experiences, and the
like. However, for reasons outlined above, this unshared information is less likely to be brought
up during group discussion (e.g., Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007; Lu,
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Yuan, & McLeod, 2012; Stasser & Titus, 1985). However, OMGC may provide an explanation
for this discussion bias and offer a potential means by which to reduce it.
ABMs seem particularly well-suited for modeling OMGC and group decision making
because they represent a system’s individual components (i.e., individual group members) and
their behaviors. In ABMs, individuals (also called agents) are unique and autonomous entities
that interact with each other and their environment (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). Using ABMs
also addresses a concept known as emergence: System dynamics that arise from how the
system’s individual components interact with and respond to each other and their environment.
Therefore, using an ABM in the proposed study allows for the study of how the group’s behavior
arises from–and is linked to–the characteristics and behaviors of the individual group members
(Railsback & Grimm, 2012).
Across two studies, I developed a computational model of OMGC and tested it using an
empirical experiment. Considering the benefits ABMs specifically, and computational models
more generally, I modeled OMGC as an ABM and conducted a series of virtual experiments to
validate the core tenets of the model in Study 1. In Study 2, I conducted an interactive online
experiment to test the ABM from Study 1. Both studies examined motivation and task type as
antecedents of OMGC, their effects on information sharing, and Study 2 also gathered data on
remarks group members made while discussing the information they were given.
Hypotheses
This dissertation tests the extension of the open-minded cognition literature to a domain
of group-level information processing using the MIP-G model. To do this, I propose an ABM of
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OMGC in Study 1 and empirically test the model in Study 2. Across these pre-registered studies,
I test five core hypotheses. First, I predict social and epistemic motivations will influence OMGC
(Hypothesis 1). Second, I predict social motivation will have a direct effect on the group
outcome variables (Hypothesis 2). Third, I predict epistemic motivation will have a direct effect
on the group outcome variables (Hypothesis 3). Fourth, I predict task type will moderate the
effects of epistemic motivation on the group outcome variables (Hypothesis 4). Finally, I predict
social and epistemic motivations will have an indirect effect on the group outcome variables
through OMGC (Hypothesis 5).
Hypothesis 1
Both social and epistemic motivations are predicted to influence OMGC. Because group
members are likely to value their own interests over the group’s interests with proself
motivation, they should have a tendency to withhold information from the rest of the group and
exchange less information with other group members. Therefore, mean OMGC should be higher
in the prosocial conditions compared to the proself conditions (Hypothesis 1a).
Because group members should be unwilling to invest much cognitive effort under
conditions of low epistemic motivation, groups should be less likely to exchange information
with other group members in this situations. Groups with low epistemic motivation should also
be likely to avoid conflict because that would require more effort; instead, group members my
simply withhold task-relevant information from the rest of the group. Therefore, mean OMGC
should be higher in the high epistemic conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions
(Hypothesis 1b).
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Additionally, the effects of social and epistemic motivations on OMGC are hypothesized
to be additive (Hypothesis 1c). Specifically, prosocial and high epistemic motivations are
predicted to lead to the highest levels of OMGC; prosocial and low epistemic motivations, as
well as proself and high epistemic motivations, are predicted to lead to moderate levels of
OMGC; and proself and low epistemic motivations are predicted to lead to the lowest levels of
OMGC.
Hypothesis 2
Social motivation is predicted to influence the group outcome variables. Group members
with prosocial motivation are expected to value their own interests as well as the interests of
other group members, which should increase some information exchange compared to group
members with proself motivation. Therefore, the mean proportion of shared information
exchanged (Hypothesis 2a), the mean proportion of unshared information exchanged
(Hypothesis 2b), the mean group performance (Hypothesis 2c in Study 1), and the mean solve
rate (Hypothesis 2c in Study 2) should be higher in the prosocial conditions compared to the
proself conditions.
Hypothesis 3
Epistemic motivation is predicted to influence the group outcome variables. Group
members should be willing to invest a lot of cognitive effort in the task in high epistemic
conditions, which should increase information exchange compared to group members with low
epistemic motivation. High epistemic groups should also be less concerned with self-censorship
because they are interested in arriving at an accurate conclusion of the task at hand. Therefore,
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the mean proportion of shared information exchanged (Hypothesis 3a), the mean proportion of
unshared information exchanged (Hypothesis 3b), the mean group performance (Hypothesis 3c
in Study 1), and the mean solve rate (Hypothesis 3c in Study 2) should be higher in the high
epistemic conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions.
Hypothesis 4
Task type is predicted to moderate the effects of epistemic motivation. In the intellective
task conditions, participants will be led to believe there is an objectively correct solution for the
task and that they have sufficient information to solve it. In the judgmental task conditions,
participants will be told they have insufficient information to solve the task and asked to use their
best judgment to solve it (c.f., Stasser & Stewart, 1992). By their nature, intellective tasks
suggest there is an objectively correct solution to the task, which may increase epistemic
motivation. In these cases, groups may not be satisfied with their answer until they believe they
have found this solution. Therefore, mean OMGC should be higher in the high epistemic
conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions during judgmental tasks, but OMGC will
not differ between high and low epistemic conditions for intellective tasks (Hypothesis 4a).
Similarly, then the mean proportion of shared information exchanged (Hypothesis 4b), the mean
proportion of unshared information exchanged (Hypothesis 4c), the mean group performance
(Hypothesis 4d in Study 1), and the mean solve rate (Hypothesis 4d in Study 2) will be higher in
the high epistemic conditions compared to low epistemic conditions during judgmental tasks, but
these means will not significantly differ between high epistemic and low epistemic conditions for
intellective tasks.
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Hypothesis 5
Since social and epistemic motivations are expected to influence both OMGC and group
outcome variables, I predict a causal mechanism of group information processing and final group
decisions is OMGC. Social and epistemic motivations should influence OMGC (i.e., prosocial
motivation should increase OMGC compared to proself motivation and high epistemic
motivation should increase OMGC compared to low epistemic motivation), which in turn should
affect the exchange of shared and unshared information as well as group performance (i.e.,
higher levels of OMGC should increase information exchange and performance compared to
lower levels of OMGC).
Therefore, I predict epistemic motivation will have an indirect effect on the proportion of
shared information exchanged (Hypothesis 5a), the proportion of unshared information
exchanged (Hypothesis 5b), group performance (Hypothesis 5c in Study 1), and solve rates
(Hypothesis 5c in Study 2) through OMGC. Similarly, I predict that social motivation will have
an indirect effect on the proportion of shared information exchanged (Hypothesis 5d), the
proportion of unshared information exchanged (Hypothesis 5e), group performance (Hypothesis
5f in Study 1), and solve rates (Hypothesis 5f in Study 2) through OMGC.

CHAPTER IV
STUDY 1
Overview
The ABM is based on an information processing view of judgment and decision making.
Group members are viewed as information processors and are presumed to keep track of the
supporting and opposing information about each decision alternative (e.g., optimal choice
vs. suboptimal choice). Members’ preferences are based on the valence of the currently salient
information. From this perspective, the function of group discussion is to update members’
preferences by reminding the group members of the information they have perhaps forgotten or
by giving them information they never had (c.f., Stasser, 1988). As members receive new
information or are reminded of old information, they reevaluate their preferences by considering
the valence of the information received. A group decision is reached and the discussion is
terminated when a sufficient number of members satisfy the operative decision rule (i.e.,
majority or truth wins) or if no contributions are made to the discussion after a certain number of
turns.
Table 1 summarizes he major steps of the ABM and the primary input and output
variables. The ABM treats group discussion as a sampling process in which the content of the
discussion is determined by sampling from the pool of information that agents collectively hold
(c.f., Larson, 1997). This is done by having agents independently recall and mention information
items during the discussion. A central feature of the model is that because only a single agent
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Table 1. OMGC model steps
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needs to mention a piece of information to bring it to the group’s attention, the more agents that
can mention a specific item, the more likely it is that item will be brought into the group
discussion. Therefore, an item of shared information should have a higher probability of being
discussed than an item of unshared information. This is simply due to the fact more agents have
access to shared items, which increases the chances any one agent can mention them. In contrast,
because only individual agents have access to their individually unique items of information,
unshared items have a lower probability of being discussed by the group. Taken together, and as
shown by Larson (1997), this implies that at the outset of discussion, the probability of sampling
an item of shared information is
P ( s h a r e d )=

n∗ k s

[ (n ∗ ks )+ ku ]

,

whereas the probability of sampling an item of unshared information is
P ( u n s h a r e d )=

ku

[(n ∗ ks )+ ku ]

,

where n refers to the number of members in the group, k s refers to the number of shared
information items, and k u refers to the number of unshared information items. However, once
group members begin to exchange information, these probabilities start to change, and they do so
at different rates.
Once the sampling process begins, the opportunities to sample information that has not
been discussed change. When shared information is discussed, the opportunities to sample
information that has not been discussed is reduced by n , referred to by Larson (1997) as the
shared sampling opportunity reduction value ( S O R V s h a r e d ). This is because all group members
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held the shared information that has just been discussed. On the other hand, each time unshared
information is mentioned, the number of opportunities to sample additional unshared information
that has not been discussed is reduced by just one because only one member originally held the
information, referred to by Larson (1997) as the unshared sampling opportunity reduction value

( S O R V u n s h a r ed ). Therefore, the following inequality holds in the model:
S O R V s h ar ed >S O R V u n s h a r e d

This implies the opportunities to sample shared information drop at a faster rate than the
opportunities to sample unshared information. This in turn causes the probability of discussing
additional items of shared information to decrease over time and the probability of discussing
additional items of unshared information to increase over time.
Method
To construct a suitable hidden profile task that could be later be tested by an empirical
experiment, I used the logic puzzle developed by Ohtsubo (2005) (see the Method section of
Chapter V for more details on the empirical version of this modified task). I modeled a similar
task, essentially a consisting of a logic puzzle matrix, using an ABM. The successful outcome of
the task (i.e., identifying all the correct solutions to the logic puzzle) depends on individual-level
motivations and cognitive styles as well as the perception of the type of task the individuals are
working on.
The logic puzzle task was modeled to maintain realism in the simulation design.
However, the ABM can be more generally viewed as a generative model of group dynamics that
includes individual (i.e., rule-based representations of epistemic and social motivations and
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open-minded cognition) and situational (i.e., rule-based representations of task type and
information type) variables. In the ABM, agent motivations and task type manifest in rules that
determine how agents adjust their level of open-minded cognition (i.e., a probability agents will
engage in information exchange with other agents). Agents’ levels of open-minded cognition, in
turn, manifest in rules that determine the likelihood agents will engage in information exchange
with other agents during the group discussion.
Simulation Environment
The ABM simulation in this study was implemented using NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999,
version 6.1.1), which is free and open source software developed and maintained by the Center
for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling at Northwestern University. NetLogo is
flexible enough to permit programming any agent-based systems within its syntax. It also
provides an interactive graphical user interface (GUI), making it easy to test different simulation
settings quickly.
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Figure 1. Screenshot of NetLogo graphical interface at the end of a single run
A screenshot of the GUI for the current ABM is shown in Figure 1. Use of the GUI is not
required to run the simulation, but it does provide some visualization features. Simulation
parameters can be entered via the sliders on the left side of the screenshot and the and dropdown
menus on the top of the screenshot. These include global parameters such as the number of
columns and rows in the logic puzzle matrix, group size, probability of information recall,
number of shared and information items in the group, motivations, and task type. With the
simulation running in real time, the updating procedure may be visualized in the NetLogo
“world” (logic puzzle matrix) on the right side of the screenshot. There, the particular agent trait
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values (fixed once drawn at the beginning of each discussion) and current process outcomes
(dynamically changing) are shown.
A plot of final group decisions is shown in the center of the screenshot in Figure 1. The
average percent of decisions that were optimal (cyan line) and suboptimal (orange line) are
updates as the model runs. The monitors above the plot also display running group-level
statistics: The average amount of shared items exchanged within a group, the average amount of
unshared information exchanged within a group, the average number of logic puzzle solutions
solved, and the number of group discussions that have taken place. In addition to the outputs
displayed in the GUI, each run of the simulation produces a process data file containing the input
parameters, the agent traits, and the outcome measures. This data file is the typical data file most
empirical researchers are familiar with and is the source of the data on which the analyses were
be conducted.
Input
Task parameters define the structural features of the decision the group must make.
Research on group decision-making has shown the distinction between intellective and
judgmental tasks is important moderating variable of group processes and performance. Thus,
task type was modeled as an input parameter that varies whether the task groups are working on
is an intellective versus judgmental task. For intellective tasks, the final group decision was
based on a truth wins combinatorial model. This can be conceptualized using the binomial
probability distribution and represented as the following formula:
P=1 − ( 1 − p )

r
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where p is the probability of any given agent solving the problem correctly and r is the size of
the group (Lorge & Solomon, 1955). In other words, the probability, P , of a group solving the
problem is the probability that the group of size r contains at least one agent who can solve the
problem. In the model, this was operationalzationed as the group choosing the optimal choice
alternative as long as one agent was able to identify the optimal choice.
For judgmental tasks, the final group decision was based on a majority rules
combinatorial model (Davis, 1973, 1982). This can be conceptualized as each group member
voting on a choice alternative and then the group deciding the choice with the highest number of
votes. In the ABM, this was operationalized as the group choosing the alternative with the most
votes after each agent assigned one vote to the alternative with the highest estimated value.
The number of rows and columns for the logic puzzle matrix can be independently
specified. For example, in Ohtsubo (2005) had groups work on a logic puzzle in which four
students took three exams. Groups were then given some information and asked to figure out
which grade each student received for each of their exams. To create this task matrix in the
ABM, the number of rows would be equal to the number of students in the puzzle (i.e., 4) and
the number of columns would be equal to the number of exams each student took in the puzzle
(i.e., 3). This matrix is then displayed as a grid in the NetLogo GUI (e.g., see Figure 1).
The discussion parameters define features of the group and its interaction. Currently, the
ABM can model group size from 2 to 10. Larger numbers are possible for this parameter, and it
is only bounded by the processing capabilities of the machine running the simulation. The
information recall parameter dictates the probability of recalling an item during discussion. For
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some experimental tasks, group members retain a copy of their individual information profile
during discussion. However, other experimental tasks require group members to recall the
information they were given from memory. Therefore, I chose to model this as an input
parameter so the researcher has control over this for flexibility for intentional retrospective
simulations of the published literature and prospective simulations of virtual experiments.
Individual group member motivations are also included in the ABM. In the model, each
agent (i.e., group member) has an epistemic motivation and social motivation which is
manipulated by an input parameter that varies the influence the respective motivation has on
agents’ open-minded cognition. When epistemic motivation is high, an agent’s individual-level
open-minded cognition increases. However, when epistemic motivation is low, an agent’s
individual-level open-minded cognition decreases. Much like epistemic motivation, social
motivation also varies along a continuum in the model and influences an agent’s open-minded
cognition. However, when social motivation is high, this models prosocial motivation by
increasing the agent’s individual-level open-minded cognition. However, when social motivation
is low, this models proself motivation by decreasing the agent’s individual-level open-minded
cognition.
Task Simulation
Currently, the model restricts the decision alternatives to two choices: optimal and
suboptimal (labeled for clarity and generalizabilty rather than realistic options in a task). The
number of items for each alternative and the item valences define the informational
characteristics of the choices. The sign of an item valence determines whether the information
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item supports or opposes an alternative. Given group performance tends to increase as unshared
information is mentioned in discussion, unshared information has a valence of 1. On the other
hand, since focusing on shared information in group discussions tends to decrease group
performance, shared information has a valence of −1 .
Although there are certainly cases where discussing shared information can increase
group performance and where discussing unshared information can decrease group performance,
most of the research on group information processing shows the more groups tend to share their
unshared information, the higher their performance in the long-run. Thus, measures of
performance in this simulation are considered in terms of long-run averages.
The ABM treats the item valences as constant across group members: Every agent is
presumed to value and weight the items in the same way. However, for many kinds of social
judgments, assuming equal weights or valuations across members is probably unrealistic. This is
one current limitation of the ABM, but future iterations will seek to account for this by treating
item valences as average valuations for the population of agents. Agents’ valuations could then
deviate from these averages, and the degree of deviation could be determined by a valence
variability parameter. If the parameter is zero, this iteration would run the same way as the
current ABM does. However, if the valence variability parameter is non-zero, then agents’ item
valences would be distributed normally around the input valences with a standard deviation
equal to this parameter.
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Prediscussion Phase
Once the input parameters have been initialized, they will have their influence each
agent’s open-minded cognition. Thus, each agent’s individual level of open-minded cognition is
held constant during the discussion. When an agent’s open-minded cognition is high, the agent
will be more likely to thoroughly search the information it has available and contribute
unmentioned information to the group discussion. However, when an agent’s open-minded
cognition is low, the agent will be unlikely to contribute anything new to the group discussion.
During the discussion, an agent examines their individual information profile to
determine if they have any information they have not previously discussed with the group
remaining. If the agent does not have this information, they are not eligible to contribute to the
discussion and another agent is selected. However, if the agent does have information they have
not contributed to the discussion, and if they are willing to exchange information with other
agents, the valence of one of the agents information items becomes available to the rest of the
agents in the group and all of the agents update their choice preferences accordingly. Once all of
the information agents can recall is sampled, the discussion is terminated (however, there are
other conditions that can terminate the discussion before this, as explained below).
The ABM uses a summative submodel for computing members’ evaluation of choice
alternatives. The choice submodel presumes agents form an evaluation of the alternatives based
on the recalled information mentioned in the discussion and their individual information profile.
Their preference is the alternative with the highest estimated value. The summative submodel
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uses the simple sum of item valences to obtain a summary evaluation for an alternative. In other
words, the evaluation, E , is defined as
N

E=∑
j=1

vj
,
m

where v j is the valence for the j th item of information an agent recalls and m is the number of
items a member remembers.
There are many other ways that information could be used to form evaluations and
determine preferences. For example, I could have averaged the item valences instead of
summing them (c.f., Davis, 1973; Stasser, 1988). In principle, any model that specifies how
information is integrated to produce a preference could be added as a submodel. Therefore,
adding findings from the social decision scheme (SDS) literature would be a useful extension to
the model. Nevertheless, linear models (like the summative submodel) are known for their ability
to approximate many nonlinear integration processes (Dawes, 1979).
Discussion Phase
During each period of the discussion phase, an agent makes a contribution to the
discussion. For each period, the ABM determines who talks, what is said, and the effect (if any)
on agents’ preferences. The determination of who talks is based on a random selection of agents
who have any remaining information they have not already discussed with the group.
Once the contributing agent is identified, their participation in the discussion is
determined by the agent’s individual level of open-mined cognition. If the agent’s level of openminded cognition is high enough such that they are willing to engage in the discussion, the
information item that gets exchanged depends on what that agent has in memory. The model
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presumes, when an item is discussed, all agents recall that item and revise their evaluations of–
and preferences for–the decision alternatives accordingly. It is also assumed an agent will
contribute something new unless everything the agent remembers has already been discussed.
If there are changes of preferences as a result of an item being discussed, the ABM
checks the updated distribution of preferences and changes the group decision accordingly.
During intellective tasks, the group decision is based on a truths wins SDS (Davis, 1973, 1982;
Lorge & Solomon, 1955). Therefore, if preferences change as a result of the discussion during
intellective tasks, the group decision is updated by choosing the optimal choice as long as at least
one group agent identifies the optimal choice for their individual choice preference.
During judgmental tasks, the group decision is based on a majority SDS (Davis, 1973,
1982). Therefore, if preferences change as a result of the discussion during judgmental tasks, the
group decision is updated by counting the number of votes with a positive valence and
comparing that to the minimum size of a minimum majority faction within the group. If the
number of positive votes is greater than the minimum size of a majority faction within the group,
then the group makes an optimal decision. However, if the number of positive votes does not
exceed this value, the group makes a suboptimal choice. If nothing new has been contributed
over m consecutive contributions, where m is group size, the ABM assumes a stalemate exists
and terminates discussion with a suboptimal decision.
Output
The primary output from the model is the distribution of agent open-minded cognition,
proportions of shared and unshared information exchanged, the predicted group performance,
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and the final group decision (i.e., optimal versus suboptimal choice). Other output that can also
be extracted from the model includes group member pre- and post-discussion preferences and
discussion length (i.e., number of contributions).
Using such generative models, a researcher can account for existing data (e.g., results in
the published literature). This process is sometimes referred to as retrospective simulation
(Stasser, 1988) and can be contrasted from prospective simulation, which entails generating new
data to test hypotheses. Often times, researchers will conduct retrospective simulations to test the
validity of a model on established, empirical data. Therefore, I ran six retrospective simulations
to test the validity of various components of the current ABM. These retrospective simulations
were run using the patterns of parameters that defined their experimental conditions.
Retrospective Simulation Validation
After constructing the ABM, I validated the results from the model with results previous
empirical studies in the literature. The primary objective of these retrospective simulations was
to determine whether the ABM could reproduce the patterns of group processes obtained in the
literature. To begin, I focused on validating the information exchange rates in a group decision
making context. Therefore, the first retrospective simulation virtual experiment was designed to
reflect the procedures used by Larson, Christensen, Abbott, and Franz (1996) as closely as
possible.
General Group Processes
Larson and colleagues (1996) had three-person teams of physicians diagnose two
different hypothetical medical cases. Some of the information about each case was given to all
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the team members before discussion (i.e., shared information), whereas other information was
divided among them (i.e., unshared information). Both cases were created specifically for the
research task but involved common cases physicians may encounter. The nature of the cases
were such that when considered alone they had numerous potential causes, were moderately
common, and did not have scripted diagnostic routines that every physician is taught (Larson et
al., 1996). In total, 22 pieces of information were included in one case and 21 were included in
the other case. Roughly half of the information for each case was shared. The rest was unshared
and was approximately evenly divided among the team members.
In the virtual experiment, the group size was set to 3, the task was set to judgmental,
epistemic motivation was set to high, recall was set to 0.82, the number of columns was set to 2,
the number of rows was set to 11, the number of shared items was set to 10, and the number of
unshared items was set to 12. All remaining inputs (i.e., social motivation and number of
individual puzzle solutions) were allowed to randomly vary. Although epistemic motivation was
not specified in Larson and colleagues (1996), since the participants were physicians and medical
students from a large teaching hospital and medical school complex and the task involved
diagnosing a medical case, it is likely the participants in this study were motivated to make a
correct decision (i.e., an accurate diagnosis). Therefore, epistemic motivation was held high in
this virtual validation experiment. The proportion of shared and unshared information items that
were exchanged within the group were used as the primary dependent variables in the virtual
experiment. I simulated 1,000 separate three-person groups since this sample size provides a
more precise parameter estimate than the sample size used in Larson and colleagues (1996).
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Consistent with results from Larson and colleagues (1996), descriptive statistics from this
virtual experiment showed groups did indeed exchange more shared information (M = .70, SD
= .25) compared to unshared information (M = .61, SD = .33). Moreover, the means for the
shared information items (.70 vs. .74/.77, respectively) and unshared information items (.61
vs. .60/.67, respectively) were comparable between the present results and the results from
Larson and colleagues (1996). See Table 2. Taken together, this suggests the exchange of shared
and unshared information in the ABM is comparable to the exchange of information in real taskperforming groups.

Table 2. Means of OMGC model validation results
Next, I focused on validating the group performance metric in the ABM. To do this, I
conducted a second retrospective simulation virtual experiment using group decisions from
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Stasser and Titus (1985). Stasser and Titus (1985) had college students read descriptions of three
hypothetical candidates for student body president and meet in four-person groups to decide
which candidate was best suited for the position. The profile of Candidate A contained more
positive attributes than the profiles of Candidates B and C and was considered to be the best
candidate of the three. Stasser and Titus (1985) manipulated the distribution of information
group members had across three conditions: (1) shared, (2) unshared-consensus, and (3)
unshared-conflict. In the shared condition, each member had access to all of the information. In
the unshared-consensus condition, positive information about Candidate A and negative
information about B were unshared information items to bias member preferences towards
Candidate B. Finally, in the unshared-conflict condition, positive information about Candidate A
and negative information about B and C were unshared information items to shift preferences
away from Candidate A but to also avoid strong initial consensus for B or C.
In the virtual experiment, the group size was set to 4, the task was set to judgmental,
recall was set to 0.82, the number of columns was set to 4, the number of rows was set to 4, the
number of shared items was set to 8, and the number of unshared items was set to 8. All
remaining inputs (i.e., social and epistemic motivations and number of individual puzzle
solutions) were allowed to randomly vary. With these inputs, I attempted to replicate the findings
from the unshared-conflict condition in Stasser and Titus (1985). Since there will be a hidden
profile present in the virtual experiment, the Stasser and Titus’s (1985) shared information
condition is not relevant for the present replication. Also, since there is not clear preference for a
suboptimal choice configuration (i.e., there are no preferences biased towards one logic puzzle
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configuration), the unshared-consensus condition also does not apply to the current virtual
experiment replication. The proportion of optimal decisions made by the group was used as the
primary dependent variable in the virtual experiment. I simulated 1,000 separate four-person
groups since this sample size provides a more precise parameter estimate than the sample size
used in Stasser and Titus (1985).
Descriptive statistics from this virtual experiment showed groups, on average, made the
optimal decision 12.4% (SD = 33%) of the time, which is also what Stasser and Titus (1985)
found in their unshared information conflict condition. Specifically, in Stasser and Titus (1985),
the optimal candidate was only selected 12%, whereas the remaining candidates were selected
53% and 35% of the time, respectively. This suggests the group’s final decision quality in the
ABM is comparable to the final decision quality of real task-performing groups.
Epistemic Motivation
Next, I validated the influence of epistemic motivation on the group discussion processes
in the ABM. So, the third retrospective simulation virtual experiment was designed to reflect the
procedures used by Scholten, van Knippenberg, Nijstad, and De Dreu (2007) as closely as
possible. Scholten and colleagues (2007) placed college students into three-person groups and
had them read information about three candidates who supposedly had applied for an assistant
professorship at their university. Each profile contained of 12 items of information, with
Candidate A having more positive attributes than Candidates B or C. Of the total 36 items across
the profiles, 18 were shared and 18 were unshared. They randomly assigned groups to either a
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high or low epistemic condition by making group process accountable (via follow-up interview)
or not.
In the virtual experiment, the group size was set to 3, the task was set to judgmental,
recall was set to 1, the number of columns was set to 6, the number of rows was set to 6, the
number of shared items was set to 18, and the number of unshared items was set to 18. Epistemic
motivation was manipulated to be low or high, and all remaining inputs (i.e., social motivation
and the number of individual puzzle solutions) were allowed to randomly vary. The proportion
of shared and unshared information items that were exchanged within the group were used as the
primary dependent variables in the virtual experiment. I simulated 2,000 separate three-person
groups (i.e., 1,000 per condition in the virtual experiment) since this sample size provides a more
precise parameter estimate than the sample size used in Scholten and colleagues (2007) and
substantially increases the statistical power to detect an effect of epistemic motivation if one is
actually produced by the model.
Consistent with results from Scholten and colleagues (2007), descriptive statistics from
this virtual experiment showed groups did indeed exchange more shared information (M = .62,
SD = .36) compared to unshared information (M = .47, SD = .41). Moreover, the means for the
shared information items (.62 vs. .53, respectively) and unshared information items (.47 vs. .41,
respectively) were comparable between the present results and the results from Scholten and
colleagues (2007). I then broke down the means and standard deviations produced by the ABM
by the experimental conditions: low versus high epistemic motivation.

103
Somewhat consistent with results from Scholten and colleagues (2007), descriptive
statistics showed groups exchanged more shared information in the high epistemic condition (M
= .78, SD = .32) compared to the low epistemic condition (M = .47, SD = .34). Although
Scholten and colleagues (2007) did not find high epistemic groups exchanged significantly
higher rates of shared information compared to low epistemic group, the descriptive statistics
they report suggest a similar pattern as the current virtual experiment results. They did not find
that high epistemic groups exchanged more shared information (M = .52, SD = .16) compared to
low epistemic groups (M = .52, SD = .16). However, due to Scholten and colleagues’s (2007)
small sample size of heterogeneous groups (N = 25), it could be they were underpowered to
detect the effect whereas the results from the virtual experiment do not suffer from this
limitation.
A similar pattern holds for the unshared information results. Descriptive statistics showed
groups exchanged more unshared information in the high epistemic condition (M = .66, SD
= .41) compared to the low epistemic condition (M = .28, SD = .32). Again, Scholten and
colleagues (2007) did not demonstrate high epistemic groups exchanged significantly higher
rates of shared information. However, they did find high epistemic groups exchanged slightly
more unshared information (M = .40, SD = .13) than low epistemic groups (M = .39, SD = .16).
And because of Scholten and colleagues’s (2007) small sample size of heterogeneous groups (N
= 25), it could be they were underpowered to detect the effect here as well.
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Taken together, the results from these validation experiments suggest the influence of
epistemic motivation on group discussion processes in the ABM is comparable to the influence
of epistemic motivation on ad-hoc group discussions in laboratory settings.
Social Motivation
Next, I validated the influence of social motivation on the discussion processes in the
ABM. So, the fourth retrospective simulation virtual experiment was designed to reflect the
procedures used by Toma and Butera (2009) as closely as possible. In Study 1, Toma and Butera
(2009) asked college students to read a hypothetical case study about a motorvehicle accident
individually and to identify the person guilty of the collision. Participants were given 19 shared
information items and three unshared items that were designed to shift their preferences towards
specific suspects. They were then assigned to three-person groups and instructed to discuss the
case. There were also allowed to keep their sheets during discussion. Groups in the cooperation
conditions were told their goal was to jointly decide about the best solution regarding the guilty
person in the accident. Participants in competition were told although in group decision
situations generally members make a joint decision, it is often important to be the first in the
group to propose a solution, so their goal was to outperform the others by being the first in the
group to offer the best solution.
In the virtual experiment, the group size was set to 3, the task was set to intellective,
recall was set to 1, the number of columns was set to 7, the number of rows was set to 4, the
number of shared items was set to 19, and the number of unshared items was set to 9. Social
motivation was manipulated to be proself or prosocial, and all remaining inputs (i.e., epistemic
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motivation and the number of individual puzzle solutions) were allowed to randomly vary. The
proportion of shared and unshared information items that were exchanged within the group were
used as the primary dependent variables in the virtual experiment. I simulated 2,000 separate
three-person groups (i.e., 1,000 per condition in the virtual experiment) since this sample size
provides a more precise parameter estimate than the sample size used in Toma and Butera (2009)
and substantially increases the statistical power to detect an effect of social motivation if one is
actually produced by the model.
Results showed groups exchanged more shared information (M = .75, SD = .34)
compared to unshared information (M = .65, SD = .42), which is consistent with results from
Toma and Butera (2009) as well as Larson and colleagues (1996) and Scholten and colleagues
(2007). This main effect was qualified by an interaction with motivation in Toma and Butera’s
(2009) study, such that competitive groups exchanged significantly less unshared information
than cooperative groups whereas there was no difference in the amount of shared information
exchanged between the groups. Results from the virtual experiment do not demonstrate this
interaction. Prosocial groups exchanged more shared (M = .94, SD = .21) and unshared (M = .89,
SD = .28) information compared to proself groups (M = .58, SD = .36; M = .40, SD = .39,
respectively). However, Toma and Butera (2009) used a measure of information exchange that
consisted of dividing the amount of shared and unshared information items (counted separately)
by the total amount of information that was mentioned by each group. This is a different measure
than the current ABM uses, which consists of dividing the number of unshared items mentioned
by the total number of unshared items available and by dividing the number of mentioned shared
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items by the total number of shared items available. Therefore, results from Toma and Butera
(2009) only partially validate the model.
However, Toma and Butera (2009) also deviated from the traditional hidden profile
paradigm in two notable ways. First, the task is transparent in that participants knew what items
were shared and what items were unshared. This was done so that participants could strategically
withhold or disseminate information to test one of the core hypotheses in the study. One potential
consequence of this is that groups spend less time talking about shared information in the
cooperative conditions and focus more on the unshared information than they would have if they
did not know the common information held by everyone in the group.
A second difference in the hidden profile used by Toma and Butera (2009) is that the task
requires the use of unshared information in the form of initial preference disconfirmation. In
Stasser and Stewart (1992), members had to discover the hidden profile by adding and
subtracting exonerating and incriminating information. In Toma and Butera (2009), each group
member was oriented to a different initial preference and had the opportunity to use their
unshared information to disconfirm another member’s initial preference. This seems to introduce
a second form of bias into the discussion (albeit one that heavily relies on interdependence,
which is what the hidden profile is designed to create), which may also explain the discrepancy
between the results from Toma and Butera (2009) and the virtual experiment.
Despite these differences, I used the results from Toma and Butera’s (2009) measure of
group decision quality to further validate the group performance metric. Toma and Butera (2009)
measured decision quality (c.f., performance) as a a dichotomous measure of whether groups
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identified the correct decision or not. The researchers used two measures of decision quality
since members reported their decisions equally, but I report the results from their
operationalization in which they considered a correct decision as one where all members
indicated the correct decision since the ABM requires group members to make a joint decision.
Consistent with Toma and Butera (2009), results showed prosocial groups (M = .73, SD = .44)
identified the correct decision more often compared to proself groups (M = .34, SD = .47).
Results for the proself groups were identical to those demonstrated by Toma and Butera (2009)
(M = .33); however, results for the proself groups suggested a lower performance rate than
cooperative groups (M = .93) in Toma and Butera’s (2009) study. Nevertheless, the pattern of
findings observed from the ABM appear to be consistent with the results reported by Toma and
Butera (2009).
However, given the divergent results between the ABM and Toma and Butera (2009) on
the information exchange variables, I wanted to further validate the social motivation processes
being modeled. To do this, I conducted a fifth retrospective simulation virtual experiment using
group decisions from Steinel, Utz, and Koning (2010). Steinel and colleagues (2010) randomly
assigned college students to form three-person groups and had them imagine a situation in which
they were paparazzi celebrity photographers. They all had information about which celebrity
would appear and when, but the information they individually held was not sufficient to take
many pictures, so they were told they could exchange information with their colleagues (group
members). Shared information came from a news ticker, so all members could see the
information, and unshared information came from personal contacts, so it was unknown to other
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members. Steinel and colleagues (2010) manipulated social motivations by telling participants in
the prosocial conditions the team with the most pictures would receive a bonus monetary award,
whereas those in the proself conditions were told the individual photographer who took the most
pictures would be rewarded with the bonus monetary award.
In the virtual experiment, the group size was set to 3, the task was set to judgmental,
recall was set to 1, the number of columns was set to 4, the number of rows was set to 6, the
number of shared items was set to 6, and the number of unshared items was set to 18. Social
motivation was manipulated to be proself or prosocial, and all remaining inputs (i.e., epistemic
motivation and the number of individual puzzle solutions) were allowed to randomly vary. The
proportion of shared and unshared information items exchanged within the group were used as
the primary dependent variables in the virtual experiment. I simulated 2,000 separate threeperson groups (i.e., 1,000 per condition in the virtual experiment) since this sample size provides
a more precise parameter estimate than the sample size used in Steinel and colleagues (2010) and
substantially increases the statistical power to detect an effect of social motivation if one is
actually produced by the model.
Consistent with results from Experiment 1 in Steinel and colleagues (2010), the results
from the virtual experiment showed groups exchanged more unshared information in the
prosocial condition (M = .84, SD = .31) compared to the proself condition (M = .54, SD = .40).
Steinel and colleagues (2010) found prosocial groups exchanged more unshared information (M
= .79, SD = .29) compared to proself groups (M = .46, SD = .32). However, the present results
suggest prosocial groups (M = .91, SD = .22) also exchanged more shared information compared
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to proself groups (M = .71, SD = .35), which was not consistent with the findings from Steinel
and colleagues (2010). They found prosocial groups exchanged approximately equal rates of
shared information (M = .55, SD = .40) compared to proself groups (M = .64, SD = .31).
However, it seems possible Steinel and colleagues (2010) were underpowered to detect the effect
due to the small sample size (total N = 14) collected, whereas the results from the virtual
experiment do not suffer from this limitation. Taken together, the results from the validation
experiments suggest the influence of social motivation on group discussion processes in the
ABM is comparable to the influence of social motivation on ad-hoc group discussions in
laboratory settings.
Task Type
Lastly, I validated the influence of task type on the discussion processes in the ABM. So,
the final retrospective simulation virtual experiment I conducted was designed to model the
influence of judgmental and intellective tasks specified in a meta-analysis of hidden profile
paradigm by Lu, Yuan, and McLeod (2012).
In the virtual experiment, the group size was set to 4, recall was set to 0.82, the number of
columns was set to 2, the number of rows was set to 11, the number of shared items was set to
10, and the number of unshared items was set to 12. Task type was manipulated to be judgmental
or intellective, and all remaining inputs (i.e., social and epistemic motivations and the number of
individual puzzle solutions) were allowed to randomly vary. The proportion of shared and
unshared information items that were exchanged within the group were used as the primary
dependent variables in the virtual experiment. I simulated 2,000 separate four-person groups
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(i.e., 1,000 per condition in the virtual experiment) since this sample size provides a more precise
parameter estimate than the sample size used in Lu and colleagues (2012) and substantially
increases the statistical power to detect an effect of social motivation if one is actually produced
by the model.
In their meta-analysis of the hidden profile paradigm, Lu and colleagues (2012) find that
shared information is mentioned more frequently than unshared information during discussions,
a finding that has been well-replicated across the virtual experiments thus far. However, Lu and
colleagues (2012) were not able to provide evidence that perceived demonstrability of the task
solution (i.e., task type) moderated this effect. Consistent with findings from Lu and colleagues
(2012), descriptive statistics from this virtual experiment show groups did not exchange more
shared information in the intellective condition (M = .81, SD = .13) compared to the judgmental
condition (M = .79, SD = .17). Moreover, the means for the unshared information items between
the intellective (M = .81, SD = .14) and judgmental conditions (M = .77, SD = .20) did not appear
to differ either. Validation results from Lu and colleagues (2012) are not reported in Table 2
since Lu and colleagues (2012) report results at the meta-analytic level.
Lu and colleagues (2012) also examined the effect of hidden profiles on the final decision
quality of groups and found when information was distributed to groups in a hidden profile,
groups were eight times less likely to choose the correct decision alternative than when
information was distributed to groups in a manifest profile. They also considered the moderating
effect of task type on group decision quality and found groups made even worse decisions when
working on low demonstrability tasks (i.e., judgmental tasks) compared to high demonstrability

111
tasks (i.e., intellective tasks). Consistent with these findings, descriptive statistics from this
virtual experiment show groups made the optimal decision more often in the intellective
condition (M = .76, SD = .43) compared to the judgmental condition (M = .44, SD = .50). Taken
together, these findings suggest the influence of task type on group decision making processes in
the ABM is comparable to that of real task-performing groups.
Prospective Simulation
Following this group discussion validation process, I conducted a prospective simulation
virtual experiment to directly test the hypotheses outlined above. In a prospective simulation, a
researcher can use the results from an ABM to investigate conditions their empirical could then
test. This saves the researcher time and resources by focusing in on the conditions that are likely
to lead to true effects given the theory the model is based on. A prospective simulation also lets
the researcher use sets of parameter estimates that summarize existing theoretical notions and
empirical results can provide evidence supporting or refuting competing ideas or evidence in the
literature.
For example, the results from the retrospective simulations outlined above suggest faceto-face group discussions are not an effective way of discovering hidden profiles by themselves.
Indeed, this common finding in the group decision making literature has led to the current
question of, “What can be done to improve groups’ pooling of unique knowledge?” Increasing
open-minded group cognition (OMGC) seems like a plausible answer to this question, but before
investing the resources to test this idea empirically, I can gauge the potential impact of OMGC
on information sharing and decision quality within groups by simulating the processes involved.
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Therefore, social motivation, epistemic motivation, and task type were varied
systematically as independent variables in the present prospective simulation. The primary
objective of this prospective simulation was to evaluate different assumptions about the nature of
OMGC and group discussion. The design of this prospective simulation study was a 2 (social
motivation: proself vs. prosocial) x 2 (epistemic motivation: low vs. high) x 2 (task type:
judgmental vs. intellective) between-subjects design.
I used G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to conduct a series of priori
power analyses for an ANOVA: Fixed effects, special, main effects and interactions test
comparing the three main outcome variables across these eight conditions. The smallest effect
size of interest included in these the power analyses was assumed to be small based on Cohen
(1988) guidelines. Thus, I used f =.10 to estimate of the true population mean difference for the
smallest effect size of interest. This effect size estimate was entered into the power analysis with
the following parameters: α = .001, power = .95, numerator df = 1, number of groups = 8. The
power analysis result suggested that N = 2,448

( n 1=306 , n2=306 , n3=306 ,n 4=306 ,n 5=306 , n6=306 ,n 7=306 , n8=306 ) are required in this
study to detect a difference between the eight groups with 95% probability.
Measured Variables
Dependent Variables
To measure the amount of information exchanged among agents, two metrics were used:
The proportion of shared information and the proportion of unshared information. The
proportion of shared information was calculated by
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shar ed=

kds
,
ks

where k d s refers to the number of shared information items mentioned during discussion and k s
refers to the number of shared information items in the group. Information items were only
counted once, so the frequency of information item appearances does not factor into this
proportion. A similar approach was used to calculate the proportion of unshared information
discussed:
u n s h a r e d=

k du
,
ku

where k d u refers to the number of unshared information items mentioned during discussion and
k u refers to the number of unshared information items in the group.

Estimates of group performance were also measured. Group performance was measured
in the ABM by first finding the predicted improvement value, P I V , of an unshared information
item being mentioned during the discussion over an individual profile. The P I V was determined
through the following equation:
PI V=

At − A i p
ku

where At refers to the total number of answers/solutions in the task, and Ai p refers to the total
number of answers an individual’s information profile provides. The P I V is then be multiplied
by the number of unshared items mentioned in group discussion, added to the number of answers
an individual profile provides, and then divided by the total number of answer/solutions in the
task to yield a predicted group performance, P G P , metric:
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P G P=

( kd u ∗ P I V )+ A i p
At

Although this measure of group performance differs from measures typically found in the
published literature, it has the advantage of predicting the number of solutions groups will
correctly solve in Study 2. Furthermore, validation tests demonstrated a strong, positive
correlation between P G P and the proportion of optimal decisions made by the group, a
commonly used group decision quality metric in the literature, r =.89 ,t ( 2446 )=97.03 , p<.001.
Mediator Variable
Each member within the group in the ABM has their own individual-level of openminded cognition represented as a value ranging from 0-1, with 0 indicating completely closedminded cognition and 1 indicating completely open-minded cognition. When an agent’s openminded cognition is high, the agent will be more likely to thoroughly search the information it
has available and contribute unmentioned information to the group discussion. However, an
agent’s open-minded cognition is low, the agent will be unlikely to contribute anything new to
the group discussion. When agents are initially created in the virtual environment, their
individual-level of open-minded cognition is set to .5. This value was based on previous research
on individual-level open-minded cognition which showed that even low open-minded contexts,
people still generally scored around the mid-point of the scale (e.g., Calin-Jageman, 2018; Ottati,
Price, Wilson, & Sumaktoyo, 2015; Ottati, Wilson, Osteen, & Distefano, 2018; Ottati, Wilson, &
Price, 2015; Price, Ottati, Wilson, & Kim, 2015; Winget, Tindale, & Ottati, 2019).
In the model, three factors influence an agent’s individual-level of open-minded
cognition: (1) task type, (2) social motivation, and (2) epistemic motivation. Task type indirectly
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influences an agent’s open-minded cognition by specifying which motivations will directly
influence individual-level open-minded cognition. If an intellective task is selected as an input
parameter, the model only allows social motivations to influence individual-level open-minded
cognition (i.e., there is no effect of epistemic motivation during intellective tasks). However, if a
judgmental task is selected as an input parameter, the model will allow both social motivations
and epistemic motivations to influence individual-level open-minded cognition.
Social and epistemic motivations have their effects on individual-level open-minded
cognition by directly increasing the value of an agent’s open-minded cognition. Since the ABM
is modeling an additive effect of social and epistemic motivations, and since agents’ individuallevels of open-minded cognition are initialized at .5, this means the agents’ individual-level
open-minded cognition can increase by a maximum of .5 to reach the upper limit of the measure.
The mediating variable, OMGC, was then measured as the average of each agent’s individuallevel open-minded cognition.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
I used G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to conduct a sensitivity analysis for an ANOVA:
Fixed effects, special, main effects and interactions test comparing the group outcome variables
across these eight conditions. The total sample size collected in this prospective simulation was
2,448. This N was entered into the sensitivity analysis with the following parameters: α = .001,
power = .95, numerator df = 1, number of groups = 8. The sensitivity analysis result suggested
that with the current N, I should be able to detect effects as small as f =.10 with 95% probability.
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I then conducted a second sensitivity analysis with the same inputs, except I lowered power to
the conventional .80 level. Results from this second sensitivity analysis result suggested that with
the current N, I should be able to detect effects as small as f =.08 with 80% probability.
Subsequent analyses and data visualizations were completed using the car (Fox &
Weisberg, 2019, version 3.0.11), easystats (Lüdecke, Makowski, Ben-Shachar, Patil, & Wiernik,
2021, version 0.4.2), emmeans (Lenth, 2021, version 1.6.2.1), fs (Hester & Wickham, 2020, p.
1.5.0), ggdist (M. Kay, 2021, version 3.0.0), ggExtra (Attali & Baker, 2019, version 0.9),
ggsignif (Constantin & Patil, 2021, version 0.6.2), gt (Iannone, Cheng, & Schloerke, 2021,
version 0.3.0), here (Müller, 2020, version 1.5.0), janitor (Firke, 2021, version 2.1.0), lavaan
(Rosseel, 2012, version 0.6.9), psych (Revelle, 2021, version 2.1.6), semPlot (Epskamp, 2019,
version 1.1.2), and tidyverse (Wickham et al., 2019, version 1.3.1) packages in R (R Core Team,
2021, version 4.1.0).
Confirmatory Tests
The first primary analysis tested the main effects of social and epistemic motivations on
OMGC (Hypothesis 1). Since I predict an additive effect of these two motivations, I conducted a
2 (Social motivation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic motivation: high vs. low) x 2 (Task
type: intellective vs. judgmental) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on OMGC. This analysis was
also used to test the moderation effect of task type on OMGC (Hypothesis 4a).
Results showed significant main effects of both social motivation,
F ( 1 , 2440 )=4832.15 , p<.001 , f =1.41, and task, F ( 1 , 2440 )=352.02 , p< .001, f =.38, on

OMGC; however, these main effects were qualified by two different two-way interactions.
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Specifically, there was a two-way interaction between epistemic motivation and task,
F ( 1 , 2440 )=1316.98 , p <.001 , f =.73 , such that OMGC was significantly higher in the high

epistemic conditions (M = .77, SD = .07) compared to low epistemic conditions (M = .65, SD
= .07) during judgmental tasks, b=.12 ,t ( 2440 )=26.70 , p<.001, but mean OMGC did not
significantly differ between high epistemic (M = .83, SD = .09) and low epistemic conditions (M
= .83, SD = .09) for intellective tasks, b=−.00009 , t ( 2440 ) =−.02 , p=1.0. See Figure 2. Taken
together, these results provide support for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 4a.

Figure 2. OMGC as a function of task type and epistemic motivation
There was also a two-way interaction between social motivation and task,
F ( 1 , 2440 )=168.36 , p<.001 , f =.26 , such that OMGC was significantly higher in the prosocial

conditions (M = .77, SD = .07) compared to proself conditions (M = .65, SD = .07) during

118
judgmental tasks, b=−.12 , t ( 2440 )=− 41.83 , p<.001. Mean OMGC significantly differed
between prosocial (M = .92, SD = .03) and proself conditions (M = .75, SD = .03) for intellective
tasks as well, b=−.17 , t ( 2440 )=−56.24 , p<.001. See Figure 3. This suggests that task type may
also be important for social motivation effects. For example, although social motivation should
have an effect regardless of the task type, it seems that social motivation may have a larger effect
during intellective tasks. The three-way interaction between social motivation, epistemic
motivation, and task type remained non-significant.

Figure 3. OMGC as a function of task type and social motivation
The next analysis tested the main effects of social and epistemic motivations on the
proportion of shared information exchanged (Hypotheses 2a and 3a). Since I also predict a twoway interaction between task type and epistemic motivation (Hypothesis 4b), I conducted a 2
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(Social motivation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic motivation: high vs. low) x 2 (Task
type: intellective vs. judgmental) ANOVA on the proportion of shared information exchanged.
Results showed a main effect of social motivation on the proportion of shared
information exchanged, F ( 1 , 2440 )=28.45 , p<.001 , f =.11. See Figure 4. Groups in the
prosocial conditions shared more shared information (M = .95, SD = .18) compared to groups in
the proself conditions (M = .82, SD = .31). There was also a significant two-way interaction
between epistemic motivation and task type on the proportion of shared information exchanged,
F ( 1 , 2440 )=54.53 , p <.001 , f =.15 , such that the mean proportion of shared information

exchanged was significantly higher in the high epistemic conditions (M = .90, SD = .25)
compared to low epistemic conditions (M = .76, SD = .35) during judgmental tasks,
b=.14 , t ( 2440 ) =10.44 , p <.001, but the mean proportion of shared information exchanged did

not significantly differ between high epistemic (M = .94, SD = .19) and low epistemic conditions
(M = .94, SD = .18) for intellective tasks, b=−.002 , t ( 2440 )=− .12 , p=.99. See Figure 5. Taken
together, these results provide support for Hypotheses 2a, 3a, and 4b. All other effects were nonsignificant.
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Figure 4. Shared information exchanged as a function of social motivation
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Figure 5. Shared information exchanged as a function of task type and epistemic motivation
The next analysis tested the main effects of social and epistemic motivations on the
proportion of unshared information exchanged (Hypotheses 2b and 3b). Since I also predict a
two-way interaction between task type and epistemic motivation (Hypothesis 4c), I conducted a
2 (Social motivation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic motivation: high vs. low) x 2 (Task
type: intellective vs. judgmental) ANOVA on the proportion of unshared information exchanged.
Results showed a main effect of social motivation on the proportion of unshared
information exchanged, F ( 1 , 2440 )=67.44 , p<.001 , f =.17. See Figure 6. Groups in the
prosocial conditions shared more unshared information (M = .91, SD = .25) compared to groups
in the proself conditions (M = .68, SD = .39). There was also a significant two-way interaction
between epistemic motivation and task type on the proportion of unshared information
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exchanged, F ( 1 , 2440 )=66.73 , p<.001 , f =.17 , such that the mean proportion of unshared
information exchanged was significantly higher in the high epistemic conditions (M = .81, SD
= .33) compared to low epistemic conditions (M = .59, SD = .40) during judgmental tasks,
b=.22 ,t ( 2440 )=12.73 , p <.001, but the mean proportion of unshared information exchanged did

not significantly differ between high epistemic (M = .89, SD = .28) and low epistemic conditions
(M = .89, SD = .327) for intellective tasks, b=−.001 , t ( 2440 )=.22 , p=.99 . See Figure 7. All
other effects were non-significant. Taken together, these results provide support for Hypotheses
2b, 3b, and 4c.

Figure 6. Unshared information exchanged as a function of social motivation
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Figure 7. Unshared information exchanged as a function of task type and epistemic motivation
The next analysis tested the main effects of social and epistemic motivations on group
performance rates (Hypotheses 2c and 3c). Since I also predict a two-way interaction between
task type and epistemic motivation (Hypothesis 4d), I conducted a 2 (Social motivation:
prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic motivation: high vs. low) x 2 (Task type: intellective
vs. judgmental) ANOVA on group performance rates.
Results showed a main effect of social motivation on group performance,
F ( 1 , 2440 )=67.44 , p<.001 , f =.17. See Figure 8. Groups in the prosocial conditions had a

higher proportion of correct decisions (M = .92, SD = .21) than those in the proself conditions (M
= .74, SD = .33). There was also a significant two-way interaction between epistemic motivation
and task type on group performance, F ( 1 , 2440 )=66.73 , p<.001 , f =.17 , such that mean group
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performance was significantly higher in the high epistemic conditions (M = .84, SD = .28)
compared to low epistemic conditions (M = .66, SD = .34) during judgmental tasks,
b=.19 , t ( 2440 )=12.73 , p<.001, but mean group performance did not significantly differ

between high epistemic (M = .91, SD = .23) and low epistemic conditions (M = .91, SD = .23) for
intellective tasks, b=.19 , t ( 2440 )=− .06 , b=.19 , p=.99 . See Figure 9. All other effects were
non-significant. Taken together, these results provide support for Hypotheses 2c, 3c, and 4d.

Figure 8. Group performance as a function of social motivation
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Figure 9. Group performance as a function of task type and epistemic motivation
Given the support for Hypotheses 1 (effects of motivation on OMGC), 2 (social
motivation effects on group process variables), and 3 (epistemic motivation effects on group
process variables), I followed up with simple mediation models to test if the effects of motivation
on information exchange and group decisions were mediated by OMGC.
I first tested the hypothesis that epistemic motivation will have an indirect effect on the
proportion of shared information exchange through OMGC. The total effect between the
epistemic motivation and the proportion of shared information items exchanged was significant,
b=.07 , t ( 2446 ) =6.97 , p< .001. The effect of the epistemic motivation on the mediator (OMGC)

was also significant, b=.06 , t ( 2446 ) =14.12, p<.001, as was the effect of the mediator (OMGC)
on the proportion of shared information items exchanged after controlling for epistemic
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motivation, b=0.89 , t ( 2445 )=19.24 , p<.001 . Once the mediator (OMGC) was controlled for,
the direct effect of epistemic motivation on the proportion of shared information items
exchanged was not significant, b=.02 ,t ( 2445 )=1.87 , p=.06 . See Figure 10.

Figure 10. Relationship between epistemic motivation and the proportion of shared information
exchanged as mediated by OMGC
I tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the
99% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 0.5th and 99.5th
percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .05, and the 99% confidence
interval ranged from .04 to .07. Since the confidence interval does not include 0, there is a
statistically significant indirect effect, p<.001, providing support for Hypothesis 5a.
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Next, I tested the hypothesis that epistemic motivation will have an indirect effect on the
proportion of unshared information exchange through OMGC. The total effect between the
epistemic motivation and the proportion of unshared information items exchanged was
significant, b=.11 ,t ( 2446 )=8.17 , p<.001. The effect of the epistemic motivation on the
mediator (OMGC) was also significant, b=.06 , t ( 2446 ) =14.10 , p<.001 , as was the effect of the
mediator (OMGC) on the proportion of unshared information items exchanged after controlling
for epistemic motivation, b=1.49 ,t ( 2445 )=28.73 , p<.001. Once the mediator (OMGC) was
controlled for, the direct effect of epistemic motivation on the proportion of unshared
information items exchanged was not significant, b=.02 ,t ( 2445 )=1.69 , p=.09. See Figure 11.

Figure 11. Relationship between epistemic motivation and the proportion of unshared
information exchanged as mediated by OMGC
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I tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the
99% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 0.5th and 99.5th
percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .09, and the 99% confidence
interval ranged from .07 to .11. Thus, the indirect effect was statistically significant, p<.001,
providing support for Hypothesis 5b.
Next, I tested the hypothesis that epistemic motivation will have an indirect effect on
group performance rates through OMGC. The total effect between the epistemic motivation and
group performance was significant, b=.09 , t ( 2446 )=7.99 , p<.001. The effect of the epistemic
motivation on the mediator (OMGC) was also significant, b=.06 , t ( 2446 ) =14.43 , p<.001, as
was the effect of the mediator (OMGC) on group performance after controlling for epistemic
motivation, b=1.24 , t ( 2445 ) =28.05 , p<.001 . Once the mediator (OMGC) was controlled for,
the direct effect of epistemic motivation on group performance was not significant,
b=.02 ,t ( 2445 )=1.66 , p=.10 . See Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Relationship between epistemic motivation and the proportion of correct puzzle
solutions as mediated by OMGC
I tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the
99% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 0.5th and 99.5th
percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .08, and the 99% confidence
interval ranged from .06 to .09. Thus, the indirect effect was statistically significant, p<.001,
providing support for Hypothesis 5c.
Next, I tested the hypothesis that social motivation will have an indirect effect on the
proportion of shared information exchange through OMGC. The total effect between the social
motivation and the proportion of shared information items exchanged was significant,
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b=.13 , t ( 2446 )=12.88 , p<.001. The effect of the social motivation on the mediator (OMGC)

was also significant, b=.15 , t ( 2446 )=41.69 , p< .001, as was the effect of the mediator (OMGC)
on the proportion of shared information items exchanged after controlling for social motivation,
b=.93 , t ( 2445 )=13.29 , p<.001. Once the mediator (OMGC) was controlled for, the direct effect

of social motivation on the proportion of shared information items exchanged was not
significant, b=−.003 , t ( 2445 ) =−.25 , p=.80. See Figure 13.

Figure 13. Relationship between social motivation and the proportion of shared information
exchanged as mediated by OMGC
I tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the
99% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 0.5th and 99.5th
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percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .14, and the 99% confidence
interval ranged from .11 to .16. Thus, the indirect effect was statistically significant, p<.001,
providing support for Hypothesis 5d.
Next, I tested the hypothesis that social motivation will have an indirect effect on the
proportion of unshared information exchange through OMGC. The total effect between the
social motivation and the proportion of unshared information items exchanged was significant,
b=.22 ,t ( 2446 )=17.00 , p<.001. The effect of the social motivation on the mediator (OMGC)

was also significant, b=.15 , t ( 2446 )=42.20 , p< .001, as was the effect of the mediator (OMGC)
on the proportion of unshared information items exchanged after controlling for social
motivation, b=1.50 , t ( 2445 )=18.72 , p <.001. Once the mediator (OMGC) was controlled for,
the direct effect of social motivation on the proportion of unshared information items exchanged
was not significant, b=.007 , t ( 2445 )=.36 , p=.72. See Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Relationship between social motivation and the proportion of unshared information
exchanged as mediated by OMGC
I tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the
99% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 0.5th and 99.5th
percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .22, and the 99% confidence
interval ranged from .18 to .25. Thus, the indirect effect was statistically significant, p<.001,
providing support for Hypothesis 5e.
Next, I tested the hypothesis that social motivation will have an indirect effect on group
performance rates through OMGC. The total effect between the social motivation and group
performance rates was significant, b=.19 , t ( 2446 )=17.00 , p<.001. The effect of the social
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motivation on the mediator (OMGC) was also significant, b=.15 , t ( 2446 )=43.55 , p< .001, as
was the effect of the mediator (OMGC) on group performance rates after controlling for social
motivation, b=1.25 , t ( 2445 )=18.66 , p<.001. Once the mediator (OMGC) was controlled for,
the direct effect of social motivation on group performance rates was not significant,
b=.005 , t ( 2445 )=.36 , p=.72 . See Figure 15.

Figure 15. Relationship between social motivation and the proportion of correct puzzle solutions
as mediated by OMGC
I tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the
99% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 0.5th and 99.5th
percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .18, and the 99% confidence
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interval ranged from .15 to .21. Thus, the indirect effect was statistically significant, p<.001,
providing support for Hypothesis 5f.
Exploratory Tests
To further explore the causal mechanisms of group performance in the model, I tested the
indirect effect of epistemic motivation through OMGC and unshared information on group
performance. The sample covariation matrix for this model was not positive definite. Follow-up
analyses suggested the cause of this was due to the perfect, positive correlation between the
proportion of unshared information exchanged and the group performance variable. Since the
group performance measure uses the number of unshared information items that have been
discussed to compute the final group performance score, this unusually high correlation is not
surprising. Thus, I conducted the same serial mediation analysis using the proportion of optimal
decisions made by the group as the outcome variable, which was shown to highly correlate with
the group performance measure, r =.89 ,t ( 2446 )=97.03 , p<.001.
Results showed epistemic motivation had a significant effect on optimal group decisions,
b=.15 , t ( 2446 )=8.63 , p<.001, such that high epistemic motivation led to making more optimal

decisions. In line with predictions from MIP-G and the situation merit standard hypothesis, but
not predicted a priori, this main effect was serially mediated by OMGC and the proportion of
unshared information discussed within the group. The indirect pathway of the effect of epistemic
motivation on the proportion of optimal decisions via OMGC and the proportion of unshared
information discussed was estimated using bootstrapping procedures. Effects were computed for
each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 99% confidence interval was computed by
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determining the indirect effects at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles. Results showed the indirect
effect was significant, b in d i r ec t =.10 , t ( 2444 ) =12.92 p<.001, and these pathways fully accounted
for the overall impact of epistemic motivation on group performance with the direct effect being
insignificant, b d i r e ct =.008 , t ( 2444 )=.97 , p=.33.
To further explore the causal mechanisms of group performance in the model, I
conducted another serial mediation analysis to test the effects of social motivation through
OMGC and unshared information on group performance. Results showed social motivation had a
significant effect on optimal group decisions, b=.31 ,t ( 2446 )=17.88 , p<.001, such that
prosocial motivation led to making more optimal decisions. In line with predictions from MIP-G
and the situation merit standard hypothesis, but not predicted a priori, this main effect was
serially mediated by OMGC and the proportion of unshared information discussed within the
group. The indirect pathway of the effect of social motivation on the proportion of optimal
decisions via OMGC and the proportion of unshared information discussed was estimated using
bootstrapping procedures. Effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and
the 99% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 0.5th and
99.5th percentiles. Results showed the indirect effect was significant,
b in d i r ec t =.24 , t ( 2444 )=18.28 p<.001, and these pathways fully accounted for the overall impact

of epistemic motivation on group performance with the direct effect being insignificant,
b d i r e ct =−.007 ,t ( 2444 )=− .55 , p=.58.
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Discussion
Previous research on group information processing has found groups often exchange the
information that is shared among its members rather than the unshared information an individual
member may hold. The present study investigated a potential mechanism of this bias, OMGC, by
developing an ABM of OMGC, testing the antecedents and consequences of OMGC, and
investigating the impact of motivation and task type on group decision-making. I specifically
tested if four combinations of social and epistemic motivations influenced OMGC, if OMGC
impacted group decision-making, and if task type moderated these effects.
Both social and epistemic motivations were predicted to influence OMGC. Because
group members are likely to value their own interests over the group’s interests with proself
motivation, they were expected to withhold information from the rest of the group and exchange
less information with other group members. Similarly, because group members should be
unwilling to invest much cognitive effort under conditions of low epistemic motivation, groups
should be less likely to exchange information with other group members in this situations.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1a predicted mean OMGC would be higher in the prosocial conditions
compared to the proself conditions, and Hypothesis 1b predicted mean OMGC would be higher
in the high epistemic conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions. Hypothesis 1c further
predicted the effects of social and epistemic motivations on OMGC were additive, such that
prosocial and high epistemic motivations were predicted to lead to the highest levels of OMGC;
prosocial and low epistemic motivations, as well as proself and high epistemic motivations, were
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predicted to lead to moderate levels of OMGC; and proself and low epistemic motivations were
predicted to lead to the lowest levels of OMGC.
Results showed prosocial groups displayed more OMGC compared to proself groups and
high epistemic groups displayed more OMGC compared to low epistemic groups. The pattern of
results also supported the additive model predicted by Hypothesis 1c. These findings are in line
with the predictions of the MIP-G (de Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008) and work on
individual-level open-minded cognition (e.g., Ottati et al, 2015), suggesting group-level
cognitive styles are influenced by the same factors that influence motivating information
processing within groups. When the group is motivated to be accurate in its decision but also
cares about the preferences of all its members, groups demonstrate the highest levels of OMGC.
When the group is not motivated to be accurate in its decision and does not care about the
preferences of all its members, groups demonstrate the lowest levels of OMGC.
In addition, social motivation was predicted to influence the group outcome variables.
Because group members with prosocial motivation are expected to value their own interests as
well as the interests of other group members, this should increase information exchange
compared to group members with proself motivation. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a predicts the
mean proportion of shared information exchanged should be higher in the prosocial conditions
compared to the proself conditions, Hypothesis 2b predicts the mean proportion of unshared
information exchanged should be higher in the prosocial conditions compared to the proself
conditions, and Hypothesis 2c predicts the mean group performance rate should be higher in the
prosocial conditions compared to the proself conditions.
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Results showed prosocial groups exchanged more shared information, exchanged more
unshared information, and had a higher performance rate compared to proself groups. These
findings are in line with the predictions of the MIP-G model (de Dreu et al., 2008), suggesting
group information processing and performance is influenced by social motivation. When the
group is motivated to care about the preferences of all its members, groups exchange more
information (both shared and unshared) and perform better on the task they are working,
regardless of task type. When the group does not care about the preferences of all its members,
groups demonstrate the lowest rate of information exchange and performance.
Along with social motivation, epistemic motivation was predicted to influence the group
outcome variables. Because group members with high epistemic motivation are expected to
invest a lot of cognitive effort in the task, this should increase information exchange compared to
low epistemic groups. High epistemic groups should also be less concerned with self-censorship
because they are interested in arriving at an accurate conclusion of the task at hand. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3a predicts the mean proportion of shared information exchanged should be higher in
the high epistemic conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions, Hypothesis 3b predicts
the mean proportion of unshared information exchanged should be higher in the high epistemic
conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions, and Hypothesis 3c predicts the mean group
performance rate should be higher in the high epistemic conditions compared to the low
epistemic conditions.
Results showed high epistemic groups exchanged more shared information, exchanged
more unshared information, and had a higher performance rate compared to low epistemic
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groups. These findings are in line with the predictions of the MIP-G model (de Dreu et al.,
2008), suggesting group information processing and performance is influenced by epistemic
motivation. When the group is motivated to be accurate in its decision, groups exchange more
information (both shared and unshared) and perform better on the task they are working on.
When the group does not care about being accurate, groups demonstrate the lowest rate of
information exchange and performance.
However, the type of task moderated all the effects of epistemic motivation. When
working on tasks with high demonstrability (i.e., intellective tasks), people know there is an
objectively correct solution for the task and that they have sufficient information to solve it. This
alone may be enough to increase epistemic motivation, and in these cases, groups may not be
satisfied with their answer until they believe they have found this solution. On the other hand,
when working on tasks with low demonstrability (i.e., judgmental tasks), people do not know
there is an objectively correct solution for the ask or believe they do not have enough
information to solve it. In these cases, groups may simply use their best judgment when trying to
solve the task. Therefore, Hypothesis 4a predicts mean OMGC will be higher in the high
epistemic conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions during judgmental tasks but
OMGC will not differ between high and low epistemic conditions for intellective tasks.
Similarly, the mean proportion of shared information exchanged (Hypothesis 4b), the mean
proportion of unshared information exchanged (Hypothesis 4c), the mean group performance
rate (Hypothesis 4d) should all be higher in the high epistemic conditions compared to low
epistemic conditions during judgmental tasks, but these mean proportions will not significantly
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differ between high epistemic and low epistemic conditions for intellective tasks. Results did
indeed support all these qualifications. Thus, task type seems to be a strong moderating variable
in group decision-making contexts and is one researchers should pay close attention to in future
research.
Since social and epistemic motivations were expected to influence both OMGC and
group outcome variables, I also predicted the causal mechanism of group information-processing
and performance was OMGC. Social and epistemic motivations should influence OMGC (i.e.,
prosocial motivation should increase OMGC compared to proself motivation and high epistemic
motivation should increase OMGC compared to low epistemic motivation), which in turn should
affect the exchange of shared and unshared information as well as group performance (i.e.,
higher levels of OMGC should increase information exchange and performance compared to
lower levels of OMGC). Therefore, I predicted epistemic motivation would have an indirect on
the proportion of shared information exchanged (Hypothesis 5a), the proportion of unshared
information exchanged (Hypothesis 5b), and group performance rates (Hypothesis 5c) through
OMGC. Similarly, I predicted social motivation would have an indirect effect on the proportion
of shared information exchanged (Hypothesis 5d), the proportion of unshared information
exchanged (Hypothesis 5e), and group performance rates (Hypothesis 5f) through OMGC.
Results supported all of these mediation models.

CHAPTER V
STUDY 2
Overview
Results from Study 1 are consistent with the MIP-G model and research on individuallevel open-minded cognition. It also provided initial support for the theory of open-minded group
cognition (OMGC) by providing evidence for all the current hypotheses. However, the question
still remains if actual groups also behave in these predicted ways when working on a task.
Therefore, Study 2 uses an experimental design to further test the results from the ABM Study 1.
I used an interactive online experiment in Study 2 to investigate motivation and task type as
antecedents of OMGC and their effects on information sharing and performance. I follow up
these confirmatory tests with exploratory analyses investigating the remarks participants made
while discussing the information they were given.
Method
Participants
Three hundred fifty eight three-person groups completed the experiment, which was
higher than the pre-registered target sample size of 352 three-person groups. Each participant
was paid $2.40 for their participation in the study. I used G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007) to conduct a sensitivity analysis for an ANOVA: Fixed effects, special, main
effects and interactions test comparing OMGC across the eight conditions in the study. The total
141
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sample size collected was 358. This N was entered into the sensitivity analysis with the following
parameters: α = .05, power = .80, numerator df = 1, number of groups = 8. The sensitivity
analysis result suggested that with the current sample size, I should be able to detect effects as
small as f =.15 with 80% probability.
Participants were adults from the online participant recruitment platform Prolific. Prolific
is similar to the more well-known Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online participant platform
in which people can take part in paid surveys and experiments online. In recent years, MTurk has
been criticized for low quality data and substandard participant compensation rates in part due to
the proliferation of bots (i.e., a software program that completes the task instead of a human) on
the platform. Prolific, on the other hand, has not seen evidence of similar bot-like accounts
(Bradley, 2018). Prolific has extensive quality checks in place to make sure its participants are
trustworthy, attentive, engaged, and where possible, naïve. Furthermore, researchers are asked to
reward participants with a minimum of $6.50 per hour of work, which is not only an ethical
approach, it is one that has been shown to improve data quality as well (e.g., Chambers, Nimon,
& Anthony-McMann, 2016; Horton & Chilton, 2010).
A total of 1,074 adults (Mage = 31.7, SDage = 10.4) were assigned to 358 three-person
groups. Of these 1,074 adults, 589 were men, 442 were women, 6 were non-binary or gendervariant, and 37 did not identify their gender. Eight hundred fourteen were White, 99 were Black,
11 were Native American, 40 were Asian, 68 were Hispanic, three were Pacific Islander, and 40
either chose to self identify (i.e., three) or did not identify their ethnicity (i.e., 36). Political
demographics were also diverse. Concerning ideology, 27.75% were liberal (scored 1 or 2 on a
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scale from 1 = Strong Liberal to 7 Strong Conservative) and 28.77% were conservative (scored 6
or 7 on a scale from 1 = Strong Liberal to 7 Strong Conservative). Most of the participants were
moderates (i.e., 39.66%, scored 3, 4, or 5 on the same scale) and 3.82% did not respond to the
political ideology measure. Concerning political party, 39.76% were Democrats (scored 1 or 2 on
a scale from 1 = Strong Democrat to 7 Strong Republican) and 17.69% were Republicans
(scored 6 or 7 on a scale from 1 = Strong Democrat to 7 Strong Republican). Again, many of the
participants were moderates (i.e., 38.73%) and 3.82% did not respond to the political party
measure.
Design
Study 2 was designed to provide an empirical test of the computational model and core
hypotheses outlined in Chapter III. Study 2 used a 2 (epistemic motivation: high vs. low) x 2
(social motivation: proself vs. prosocial) x 2 (task type: intellective vs. judgmental) betweensubject design. Epistemic motivation was manipulated by including or excluding instructions
about process accountability. In half of the conditions, participants were told they would
individually be asked questions about the information they were given, the decisions they made,
the procedures they followed, and the strategies they used to make their judgments after the
study. Because these participants were expecting to be evaluated by others with unknown views,
this manipulation has been shown to increase information processing (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999)
and serves as the high epistemic conditions. In the low epistemic conditions, participants were
not told anything about being interviewed after the study.
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Epistemic motivation was crossed with social motivation, which was manipulated by
referring to the participant’s interaction members. In the prosocial motivation conditions,
participants were told, “To be successful in this task, think of the other people involved as your
partners, whose interests are important to you,” whereas in the proself motivation conditions,
participants were told, “To be successful in this task, think of the other people involved as your
opponents, whose interests are not important to you.” This manipulation has been shown to
promote prosocial proself motivations in previous research (e.g., Burnham, McCabe, & Smith,
2000). Due to the cooperative nature of group decisions (i.e., members making a joint decision),
participants in the proself conditions received additional instructions stating it is often important
to be the first member to propose a solution because it increases the likelihood others will accept
the proposed answer. Thus, their goal was to outperform the others in the group by getting the
group to endorse their individual solution.
Finally, task type was also crossed with both epistemic and social motivations and was
manipulated through task instructions. Much of the literature on group decision-making has
shown group performance is heavily influenced by the type of task on which they work
(Laughlin, 1980; Steiner, 1972). One common task taxonomy is the judgment-intellective
distinction by Laughlin (1980). Judgmental tasks do not allow group members to actually
demonstrate the accuracy or correctness of their judgments because there is no demonstrable
solution (e.g., movie preference). For intellective tasks, on the other hand, group members
should be able to convince other members their position is correct or most accurate using the
information available to the group because there is a demonstrable solution (e.g., arithmetic
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problem). Participants were told to “Be aware that the information you have been provided is
[sufficient/insufficient] to answer the task question. So, please [use the information to arrive at
the correct answer/use your best judgment when answering].”
Strictly speaking, the task participants worked on is an intellective task because there is a
demonstrably correct solution to the logic puzzle. However, research has shown that
manipulating the perception of the task has comparable results as actually working on different
task types (Stasser & Stewart, 1992). Although the task participants worked on in the current
study has a demonstrably correct solution, participants are likely to view the task as a nondemonstrable when they are told they have insufficient information to solve the puzzle because it
is not an easy puzzle to solve. Therefore, I manipulated task type via the task instructions
participants received. In the intellective task conditions, participants were told they had sufficient
information to answer the task question and to use the information to arrive at the correct answer.
In the judgment task conditions, participants were told they had insufficient information to
answer the task question and to use their best judgment when answering.
Procedure
After signing up to participate in the online experiment, all participants received the same
general introductions and were asked for their informed consent. Participants were told they
would be working in a group with two real people who also agreed to participate in the
experiment. After agreeing to participate, participants were individually presented with the
instructions for the tasks they would be working on. These instructions stated each participant
would receive some task-relevant information, that it is important to read all of the information
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carefully, and they would need to make a decision by themselves and then as a group. After
reading these instructions, participants were then asked to complete a short quiz about the
procedures of the experiment. If participants made too many quiz errors, they were removed
from the experiment. This served as an attention check and reduced the chances participants
were bots or that human participant would make instructional mistakes during the experiment.
Once participants passed the short quiz, they then entered a lobby where they would wait
for two additional members to join their group. Unless two other participants join their group, the
participant had wait in the lobby for a period of at least five minutes. If no other participants
joined the lobby within that period of time, the participant had the option to (1) wait for an
additional two minutes to see if any others joined them or (2) exit the experiment. As soon as
three participants were in the lobby, they were automatically assigned to a group and started the
experiment. At this point, groups were randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental
conditions.
On the next screen, group members were individually shown some information and asked
to make an individual decision based on that information. The information shown was a
deliberately biased distribution of the total amount of information in the study. In total, there are
12 pieces of information groups need to successfully complete the task. Three of those
information items were shown to all three group members (i.e., shared information), but each
participant also had three pieces of unshared information that no other group member had (see
Appendix A for the distribution of information profiles). The shared information among
participants led to a suboptimal solution (i.e., they can only solve less than half of the 12
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probability estimations, rather than the full 12), and groups were only able to correctly solve the
task (i.e., correctly identifying all 12 probability estimations) if they pooled both their shared and
unshared information.
After group members completed their individual decisions, they moved on to the group
portion of the experiment. Here, each group member received the same information they were
individually presented on the previous screen, but they were not able to see the information the
other group members had. After reading the instructions for the task (which contained the
manipulations described above), participants were asked to make the same decision they
individually made. However, this time, they were asked to reach a group decision about the task.
They were told they could use the chat box displayed on the screen to discuss the task and they
could make their decision however they wanted so long as their final solution represented the
entire group.
Once groups completed the group task, they were then presented with an individual-level
measure of SS-OMC for the group discussion situation. Once they completed this measure,
participants were asked to complete a final questionnaire containing manipulation checks,
questions about the group interaction, and demographic information. After completing the final
questionnaire, participants were debriefed and individually compensated $2.40 for their
participation.
Measures
OMGC was measured using a composite group-level score based on the average of each
individual group member’s situation-specific open-minded cognition (SS-OMC) score. Given
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group processes are conceptualized and measured at multiple levels (e.g., individual, group,
organization), Chan (1998) provides a typology to understand how data from a lower level are
used to establish a higher level construct. Although there are five basic forms of group
composition models, the additive composition model is most relevant to the current study.
Additive composition models specify a straightforward functional relationship between
constructs at different levels such that the higher level construct is a summation of the lower
level data (Chan, 1998). Since OMGC was measured as the average of each agents’ individual
level open-minded cognition, the additive composition model seems the most correspondent to
this earlier operational definition from Study 1.
SS-OMC was measured using a six-item self-report scale. The scale asks participants to
rate the extent to which they agree or disagree (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) with
with six statements: “In this situation, I was open to considering the viewpoints expressed by the
group members,” “In this situation, I ‘tuned out’ messages by the group members I disagreed
with,” “In this situation, I thought it was a waste of time to pay attention to some of the ideas by
the group members,” “I tried to reserve judgment until I had a chance to hear all of the opinions
and reasons provided by the group members in this situation,” “In this situation, I had no
patience for arguments by the group members I disagreed with,” and “I seriously considered all
of the opinions expressed by the group members in this situation.” Three items were reversed
scored (“In this situation, I ‘tuned out’ messages by the group members I disagreed with”; “In
this situation, I thought it was a waste of time to pay attention to some of the ideas by the group
members”; and “In this situation, I had no patience for arguments by the group members I

149
disagreed with”) and then all six items were averaged to provide an individual’s SS-OMC score,
where higher scores indicate higher individual-level open-minded cognition. These three
individual group member SS-OMC scores were then averaged to compute the group’s overall
level of OMGC.
Two metrics were used to measure the amount of information exchanged among group
members: (1) the proportion of shared information and (2) the proportion of unshared
information. In total, there were 12 pieces of information to solve the task. Of these 12, three
pieces were shared and nine were unshared (each group member had three unique pieces of
unshared information). To calculate the proportion of shared information items exchanged in
discussion for any given group, I first coded the group discussion transcript for the appearance of
each piece of shared information mentioned (i.e., presence vs. absence). A second coder also
coded the group discussion transcript for the appearance of each piece of shared information
mentioned, and interrater reliability was assessed. Results showed near perfect interrater
reliability between the two independent judges, κ u n w ei g ht e d=.97 . Therefore, I used the
frequencies I coded for the shared information items present in the discussion and divided these
values by three (i.e., the total amount of shared information) to compute the proportion of shared
information mentioned during the group discussion.
The same procedure was used to compute the proportion of unshared information
mentioned in the discussion. Interrater reliability was again very high between the two
independent judges for unshared information items mentioned, κ u n w ei g ht e d=.91. Therefore, I used
the frequencies I coded for the unshared information items present in the discussion and divided
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these values by nine (i.e., the total amount of unshared information) to compute the proportion of
unshared information mentioned during the group discussion.
Puzzle solve rates were used to measure the group’s performance on the task. To
complete the task, participants must estimate the probability four separate suspects committed
three different crimes (adapted from Ohtsubo, 2005). Ohtsubo (2005) asked groups to determine
the grades of four hypothetical students and given clues to do so. The puzzle states the students
each received either an A, B, or C across three different subjects (i.e., English, math, and
history). When groups combine their information in the task, the pooled information identifies a
single solution of grades. In other words, only one logic puzzle matrix of grades is correct and
satisfies all clues given to the group. The structure and solution of this logic puzzle remained
intact in the current study; only the content of the puzzle has been altered. For example, instead
of there being four students receiving grades across three courses, the current logic puzzle
outlines four criminals receiving a probability of committing a crime across three crimes.
Additionally, changes to features in the puzzle were made consistently throughout the puzzle.
For example, the subject “English” was changed to the crime “fraud”. Thus, any mention of the
subject English in the task was changed to fraud, and only fraud, throughout the entire task.
Furthermore, based on initial pilot testing, participants demonstrated average solve rates
of the individual information profiles of .45 (SD = .01), and these rates did not differ based on
the information profile presented. Further pilot data revealed that a small sample (N = 6) of high
epistemic prosocial groups demonstrated average solve rates of .71 (SD = .17). Taken together,
these pilot data suggest the individual information profiles do lead to suboptimal outcomes in
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that participants cannot solve the puzzle based on their individually presented information and
that groups have the potential to correctly solve the task by pooling their individually presented
information.
Results
All analyses and data visualizations were completed using the car (Fox & Weisberg,
2019, version 3.0.11), easystats (Lüdecke, Makowski, Ben-Shachar, Patil, & Wiernik, 2021,
version 0.4.2), emmeans (Lenth, 2021, version 1.6.2.1), ggdist (M. Kay, 2021, version 3.0.0),
ggExtra (Attali & Baker, 2019, version 0.9), ggsignif (Constantin & Patil, 2021, version 0.6.2),
gt (Iannone, Cheng, & Schloerke, 2021, version 0.3.0), gtsummary (Sjoberg et al., 2021, version
1.4.1), here (Müller, 2020, version 1.5.0), janitor (Firke, 2021, version 2.1.0), lavaan (Rosseel,
2012, version 0.6.9), psych (Revelle, 2021, version 2.1.6), tidytext (Silge & Robinson, 2016,
version 0.3.1), semPlot (Epskamp, 2019, version 1.1.2), and tidyverse (Wickham et al., 2019,
version 1.3.1) packages in R (R Core Team, 2021, version 4.1.0).
Confirmatory Tests
Manipulation Checks
To determine whether my epistemic motivation instructions successfully induced the
desired motivation, I created a composite epistemic motivation scale from three manipulation
check items. The items asked participants to respond to the following items using a 1 (Strongly
disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) scale: “During the task, I was concerned with getting the correct
solutions,” “During the task, I did not care about solving as many of the probabilities as
possible” (reverse coded), and “During the task, I was careful to consider all of the information
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shared in the discussion.” Cronbach’s alpha of these three items suggested internal consistency
was approaching an adequate level, α =.65, but failed to reach the conventional level of
acceptance used in most social science research, α =.70 .
Next, I conducted a t-test to see if participants’ composite epistemic motivation scores
differed by the epistemic condition they were randomly assigned to. Results from a Welch two
sample t-test did not show a significant difference in their epistemic motivation composite scores
between the epistemic conditions t ( 1072 ) =−.42 , p=.67 , g=−.03 (Hedges’ g estimated using
unpooled standard deviation; see Delacre, Lakens, Ley, Liu, & Leys, 2021). Participants’
composite epistemic scores were slightly lower in the high epistemic conditions (M = 5.58, SD =
1.16) compared to the low epistemic conditions (M = 5.61, SD = 1.15), but again, this difference
was not statistically significant. When analyzed separately, none of the individual epistemic
manipulation check items differed by the epistemic manipulation check either.
There are three potential explanations for these non-significant effects. First, all of the
items ask the participant to reflect on their motivation during the task but only one specifies the
group task. The epistemic motivation manipulation only appears in the group task, so it is
possible some participants were reflecting on the individual task when answering these items.
Second, there is little correspondence between the epistemic manipulation check items and the
actual epistemic manipulation. In the study, epistemic motivation was manipulated by telling
participants they would be individually interviewed about their decision processes after the study
(i.e., process accountability). Although this manipulation has been shown to increase epistemic
motivation in previous studies, the epistemic manipulation check items ask more direct questions
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about epistemic motivation than was used in the manipulation. Thus, it is possible that a process
accountability manipulation manipulates something resembling epistemic motivation and that
has similar effects on group processes but is not actually epistemic motivation. Although this
seems unlikely, it cannot be ruled out based on the available data. The remaining explanation is
that I simply failed to manipulate epistemic motivation in the current study.
To determine whether my social motivation instructions successfully induced the desired
motivation, I created a composite social motivation scale from three manipulation check items.
The items asked participants to respond to the following items using a 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7
(Strongly agree) scale: “During the task, I was cooperating with the others in my group,”
“During the task, I was trying to get more answers than the others in my group” (reverse coded),
and “During the task, I cared more about my performance than my group’s performance”
(reverse coded). Cronbach’s alpha of these three items suggested bad internal consistency,
α =.46 ; therefore, I dropped some items from the composite measure to try to increase the

internal consistency. After dropping the item, “During the task, I was cooperating with the others
in my group,” internal consistency began to approach an adequate level, α =.64 , but still failed to
reach the conventional level of acceptance used in most social science research, α =.70.
Next, I conducted a t-test to see if participants’ composite social motivation scores
differed by the social condition they were randomly assigned to. Results from a Welch two
sample t-test did not show a significant difference between their social motivation composite
scores between the social conditions t ( 1071.8 )=1.18 , p=.24 , g=.07 (Hedges’ g estimated using
unpooled standard deviation; see Delacre et al., 2021). Participants’ composite social scores were

154
slightly higher in the proself conditions (M = 3.69, SD = 1.69) compared to the prosocial
conditions (M = 3.57, SD = 1.70), but again, this difference was not statistically significant.
When analyzed separately, none of the individual social manipulation check items differed by
the social manipulation check either.
These failed manipulation checks are more difficult to interpret compared to the failed
epistemic motivation manipulation checks. Unlike the epistemic manipulation check items, the
social motivation manipulation check items all refer to the other members within the group.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume participants were reflecting on the group task rather than
the individual task. However, there could still be some correspondence issues between the social
motivation manipulation check items and the actual social motivation manipulation used. In the
study, the social motivation manipulation asked participants to think of other group members as
either partners (opponents) whose interests should (should not) be important to them. However,
the social manipulation check items measure more of the proself and prosocial goals participants
should experience under the respective social motivation. But as with the epistemic manipulation
checks, it is possible I failed to manipulate social motivation in this study given these results.
To determine whether my task instructions successfully induced the desired task
perception, I created a composite task type scale from three manipulation check items. The items
asked participants to respond to the following items using a 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly
agree) scale: “During the task, I was careful to consider all of the information shared in the
discussion,” “We did not have enough information to do well on the task” (reverse coded), and
“It was obvious when a proposed solution was wrong” (reverse coded). Cronbach’s alpha of
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these three items suggested terrible internal consistency, α =− .09, since one item was negatively
correlated with the total scale. After dropping the item, “We did not have enough information to
do well on the task,” internal consistency began to approach an adequate level, α =.65, but still
failed to reach the conventional level of acceptance used in most social science research, α =.70 .
Next, I conducted a t-test to see if participants’ composite task type scores differed by the
task condition they were randomly assigned to. Results from a Welch two sample t-test showed a
significant difference between their task type composite scores between the task conditions
t ( 1069.1 )=2.33 , p<.05 , g=.14 (Hedges’ g estimated using unpooled standard deviation; see

Delacre et al., 2021). Participants composite task type scores were significantly higher in the
intellective conditions (M = 4.22, SD = 1.75) compared to the judgmental conditions (M = 3.97,
SD = 1.74). This suggests participants were more likely to agree they had enough information to
do well on the task and that their group members recognized the correct answers when working
on intellective tasks compared to judgmental tasks, providing evidence the task type
manipulation was successful.
Primary Analyses
The first primary analysis tested the main effects of social and epistemic motivations on
OMGC (Hypothesis 1). Since I predict an additive effect of these two motivations, I
preregistered a 2 (Social motivation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic motivation: high
vs. low) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on OMGC. However, since the ABM of OMGC
reported in Study 1 predicts a two-way interaction between epistemic motivation and task type
on OMGC, I also conducted a 2 (Social motivation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic

156
motivation: high vs. low) x 2 (Task type: intellective vs. judgmental) ANOVA on OMGC since
Hypothesis 4a predicts this moderation effect.
Results of the 2 x 2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect of epistemic motivation on
OMGC, F ( 1 , 354 )=5.50 , p<.05 , f =.12. See Figure 16. Groups in the high epistemic conditions
had higher levels of OMGC (M = 5.42, SD = .81) compared to groups in the low epistemic
conditions (M = 5.27, SD = .86). There was also a main effect of social motivation on OMGC,
F ( 1 , 354 )=9.11 , p<.01 , f =.16. See Figure 17. Groups in the proself conditions were more open

minded (M = 5.46, SD = .79) compared to groups in the prosocial conditions (M = 5.23, SD
= .87). Further, the interaction between epistemic and social motivation on OMGC was not
significant, F ( 1 , 354 )=2.79 , p=.096 , f =.09 . Taken together, these results provide support for
Hypotheses 1b and 1c. However, there is no support for Hypothesis 1a. Both epistemic and
social motivations did additively influence OMGC such that high epistemic motivation led to
higher OMGC. However, these results suggest proself motivation leads to higher OMGC
compared to proself OMGC, which was contrary to the predictions for social motivation.
I then conducted the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to test the moderation effects of task type on
epistemic motivation as described above. Once task type was entered into the analyses, there
were no significant main effects or interactions on OMGC. Nevertheless, the pattern of means
suggests a possible two-way interaction between task type and epistemic motivation, such that
low epistemic motivation on judgmental tasks led to the lowest levels of OMGC whereas the
other conditions showed comparable levels of OMGC. See Figure 18. However, if this
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interaction does indeed exist, it is likely too small of an effect to be detected with the current
sample size.

Figure 16. OMGC as a function of epistemic motivation
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Figure 17. OMGC as a function of social motivation
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Figure 18. OMGC as a function of task type and epistemic motivation
The next analysis tested the main effects of social and epistemic motivations on the
proportion of shared information exchanged (Hypotheses 2a and 3a). Since I also predict a twoway interaction between task type and epistemic motivation (Hypothesis 4b), I conducted a 2
(Social motivation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic motivation: high vs. low) x 2 (Task
type: intellective vs. judgmental) ANOVA on the proportion of shared information exchanged.
Results showed did not show significant effects of social motivation,
F ( 1 , 350 )=1.26 , p=.26 , f =.06 , or epistemic motivation, F ( 1 , 350 )=.14 , p=.70 , f =.02, on the

proportion of shared information exchanged during the group discussion. There was also no
significant interaction between epistemic motivation and task type on the proportion of shared
information exchanged, F ( 1 , 350 )=1.28 , p=.26 , f =.06. Nevertheless, the pattern of means
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suggests a possible two-way interaction between task type and epistemic motivation, such that
low epistemic motivation on judgmental tasks led to the least amount of shared information
exchanged within groups whereas the other conditions showed comparable levels of shared
information exchange. See Figure 19. However, if this interaction does indeed exist, it is likely
too small of an effect to be detected with the current sample size.

Figure 19. Shared information exchanged as a function of task type and epistemic motivation
The next analysis tested the main effects of social and epistemic motivations on the
proportion of unshared information exchanged (Hypotheses 2b and 3b). Since I also predict a
two-way interaction between task type and epistemic motivation (Hypothesis 4c), I conducted a
2 (Social motivation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic motivation: high vs. low) x 2 (Task
type: intellective vs. judgmental) ANOVA on the proportion of unshared information exchanged.
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Results did not show a main effect of social motivation on the proportion of unshared
information exchanged, F ( 1 , 350 )=.001 , p=.97 , f =.002. However, there was a significant
interaction between epistemic motivation and task type on the proportion of unshared
information exchanged, F ( 1 , 350 )=4.58 , p<.05 , f =.11. More unshared information was
exchanged when groups were working on intellective tasks (M = .44, SD = .27) compared to
judgmental tasks (M = .28, SD = .29) when epistemic motivation was low,
b=.17 , t ( 350 )=3.97 , p<.001 ; however, the proportion of unshared information did not differ

between intellective (M = .36, SD = .27) and judgmental tasks (M = .33, SD = .28) when
epistemic motivation was high b=.03 , t ( 350 )=.65 , p=.92. This provides evidence for
Hypothesis 4c. See Figure 20.

Figure 20. Unshared information exchanged as a function of task type and epistemic motivation
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The next analysis tested the main effects of social and epistemic motivations on group
performance rates (Hypotheses 2c and 3c). Since I also predict a two-way interaction between
task type and epistemic motivation (Hypothesis 4d), I conducted a 2 (Social motivation:
prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic motivation: high vs. low) x 2 (Task type: intellective
vs. judgmental) ANOVA on group performance rates.
Results showed a main effect of social motivation on group performance,
F ( 1 , 350 )=21.00 , p<.001 , f =.24 . However, this main effect was qualified by an interaction

between social and epistemic motivations, F ( 1 , 350 )=6.32 , p <.05 , f =.13 . Groups in the proself
conditions performed better (M = .65, SD = .22) compared to groups in the prosocial conditions
(M = .49, SD = .21) when they had high epistemic motivation, b=.16 , t ( 350 )=4.89 , p< .001.
However, proself (M = .56, SD = .24) and prosocial (M = .55, SD = .22) groups performed about
equally well when they had low epistemic motivation, b=.02 ,t ( 350 )=.46 , p=.97 . See Figure
21. No other effects were significant.
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Figure 21. Correct puzzle solutions as a function of social and epistemic motivations
Given the significant effects of both social and epistemic motivations on these grouplevel measures (i.e., OMGC, the proportion of unshared information exchanged, and group
performance), I followed up with simple mediation models to test if the effects were mediated by
OMGC.
I first tested the hypothesis that epistemic motivation will have an indirect effect on the
proportion of shared information exchange through OMGC. The total effect between the
epistemic motivation and the proportion of shared information items exchanged was not
significant, b=.03 , t ( 356 )=.67 , p=.50. However, it is possible to demonstrate mediation despite
a nonsignificant total effect (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). Thus, I tested the
significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures. Unstandardized indirect
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effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval
was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The
bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .04, and the 95% confidence interval ranged
from -.006 to .083. Thus, the indirect effect was not statistically significant, p=.10 , providing no
support for Hypothesis 5a.
Next, I tested the hypothesis that epistemic motivation will have an indirect effect on the
proportion of unshared information exchange through OMGC. The total effect between the
epistemic motivation and the proportion of unshared information items exchanged was not
significant, b=−.01 , t ( 356 ) =−.42 , p=.67. However, it is possible to demonstrate mediation
despite a nonsignificant total effect (MacKinnon et al., 2007). Thus, I tested the significance of
this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures. Unstandardized indirect effects were
computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval was
computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The
bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .02, and the 95% confidence interval ranged
from -.002 to .054. Thus, the indirect effect was not statistically significant, p=.09 , providing no
support for Hypothesis 5b.
Next, I tested the hypothesis that epistemic motivation will have an indirect effect on
group performance rates through OMGC. The total effect between the epistemic motivation and
group performance was not significant, b=.02 ,t ( 356 )=.67 , p=.50 . However, it is possible to
demonstrate mediation despite a nonsignificant total effect (MacKinnon et al., 2007). Thus, I
tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures. Unstandardized
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indirect effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence
interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The
bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .02, and the 95% confidence interval ranged
from -.003 to .042. Thus, the indirect effect was not statistically significant, p=.10 , providing no
support for Hypothesis 5c.
Next, I tested the hypothesis that social motivation will have an indirect effect on the
proportion of shared information exchange through OMGC. The total effect between the social
motivation and the proportion of shared information items exchanged was significant,
b=−.09 , t ( 356 )=−2.07 , p<.05. The effect of the social motivation on the mediator (OMGC)

was also significant, b=−.23 , t ( 356 )=−2.62 , p <.01, as was the effect of the mediator (OMGC)
on the proportion of shared information items exchanged after controlling for social motivation,
b=.25 , t ( 355 )=12.11 , p <.001. Once the mediator (OMGC) was controlled for, the direct effect

of social motivation on the proportion of shared information items exchanged was not
significant, b=−.04 ,t ( 355 )=−.90 , p=.37 . See Figure 22.
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Figure 22. Relationship between social motivation and the proportion of shared information
exchanged as mediated by OMGC
I tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the
95% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was -.06, and the 95% confidence
interval ranged from -.13 to -.02.Thus, the indirect effect was statistically significant, p=.011 ,
providing support for Hypothesis 5d.
Next, I tested the hypothesis that social motivation will have an indirect effect on the
proportion of unshared information exchange through OMGC. The total effect between the
social motivation and the proportion of unshared information items exchanged was not
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significant, b=−.02 , t ( 356 ) =−.53 , p=.59. However, it is possible to demonstrate mediation
despite a nonsignificant total effect (MacKinnon et al., 2007). Thus, I tested the significance of
this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures. Unstandardized indirect effects were
computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval was
computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The
bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was -.04, and the 95% confidence interval ranged
from -.067 to -.008. Thus, the indirect effect was statistically significant, p=.011 , providing
support for Hypothesis 5e. See Figure 23.

Figure 23. Relationship between social motivation and the proportion of unshared information
exchanged as mediated by OMGC
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In this case, it appears there may be evidence of what MacKinnon and colleagues (2007)
call inconsistent mediation. The direct effect between social motivation and the proportion of
unshared information exchanged within the group is positive, b=.02 ,t ( 355 )=.82 , p=.42, such
that prosocial motivation led to more unshared information exchange. However, the effect of
social motivation on OMGC is negative, b=−.23 , t ( 356 )=−2.62 , p <.01, such that prosocial
motivation led to lower OMGC, while the effect of OMGC on unshared information exchange
was positive, b=.17 , t ( 355 )=11.59, p<.001. This makes the indirect effect negative while the
direct effect is positive. Therefore, the likely reason the total effect of social motivation on the
proportion of unshared information exchanged was nonsignificant is because the direct and
indirect effects are canceling each other out.
Next, I tested the hypothesis that social motivation will have an indirect effect on group
performance rates through OMGC. The total effect between the social motivation and group
performance rates was significant, b=−.09 , t ( 356 )=−3.78 , p<.001. The effect of the social
motivation on the mediator (OMGC) was also significant, b=−.23 , t ( 356 )=−2.65 , p<.01, as
was the effect of the mediator (OMGC) on group performance rates after controlling for social
motivation, b=.13 , t ( 356 )=10.81 , p<.001. Once the mediator (OMGC) was controlled for, the
direct effect of social motivation on group performance rates was reduced but remained
significant, b=−.06 , t ( 355 )=−2.84 , p=.005. See Figure 24.
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Figure 24. Relationship between social motivation and the proportion of correct puzzle solutions
as mediated by OMGC
I tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 1,000 bootstrapped samples, and the
95% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was -.03, and the 95% confidence
interval ranged from -.051 to -.008. Thus, the indirect effect was statistically significant, p=.01,
providing support for Hypothesis 5f.
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Exploratory Tests
OMGC as Predictor
Given some of the above hypotheses were supported while others were not, I wanted to
further assess the relationship between OMGC and group performance. I first began by testing
the significance of the correlation between OMGC and group performance. Results showed a
significantly moderate, positive correlation between OMGC and the logic puzzle solve rates,
r =.49 ,t (356 )=10.61 , p< .001. See Figure 25.

Figure 25. Relationship between OMGC and group performance
Given the evidence for this effect, I also wanted to see how well OMGC predicted group
performance. Therefore, I regressed the logic puzzle solve rates onto OMGC, epistemic
motivation, social motivation, and task type. As shown in Table 3, OMGC was the only term to

171
retain significance below the .05 level in the model, b=.11 ,t ( 342 )=2.39 , p=.018. Since this is
an exploratory analysis, caution should be used when interpreting evidence based on p-values.
However, in combination with the results from the primary analyses, these data seem to suggest
that OMGC is a good predictor of group performance.
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Table 3. Solve rate regression table
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Term Frequency
I expected OMGC to be related to groups’ conversation remarks. Therefore, I conducted
a series of exploratory analyses using quantitative text analysis (i.e., inverse document
frequency, word correlations, and sentiment analysis) to analyze the transcripts of the group
discussions. I first began by looking at the frequencies of the words that were used in the group
discussions. Since open-minded cognitive styles are expected to involve more information
exchange within the group, certain words or phrases may be more likely in some situations
compared to others. For example, results showed that groups tended to have higher OMGC in
high epistemic conditions. In these situations, group members might be more likely to say things
like “Yeah, that’s right” compared to low epistemic conditions. Word frequencies (often called
term frequencies) like these are a good way of determining which words are most commonly
used in a body of text (e.g., transcript of a group discussion; Silge & Robinson, 2017).
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Figure 26. Most frequently used words
Figure 26 shows the most frequent words used center around the information given
participants to solve the task. The two most common words, both used over 3,000 times, were
“probability” and “suspect,” which makes sense given the decision groups had to make was the
probability a given suspect committed a particular crime. The next most common words mention
during the discussions included words such as low, medium, assault, fraud, shoplifting, crimes,
and committing. The numbers 4, 2, 1, and 3 also appeared quite frequently. Since the suspects
were referred to as Suspect 1, Suspect 2, Suspect 3, and Suspect 4, it is not surprising the
numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 frequently appear in the group discussions. Nor it is surprising that groups
often mention probabilities such as “low” or “medium” about “committing” the three “crimes”
that are specified in the task: assault, fraud, and shoplifting. Taken together, the most frequently
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used terms across the groups suggests group are indeed talking about the main features of the
task at hand.

Figure 27. Most frequently used words as a function of OMGC
However, it would be more informative to see how these term frequencies differ by
OMGC. I first began by looking at tf grouped by the independent variables in the study (i.e.,
epistemic motivation, social motivation, and task type). Although some differences emerged for
task type, the general patterns were consistent across the conditions. Therefore, I used a median
split procedure to create a dummy variable quantifying high OMGC groups (i.e., groups that
scored higher than the median OMGC across all groups) and low OMGC groups (i.e., groups
that scored equal to or lower than the median OMGC across all groups). I then looked at the tf in
the group discussions grouped by this dummy variable.
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As shown in Figure 27, the most frequent words used by high OMGC groups all involve
information about the task at hand. Although low OMGC groups use some of the same words,
they mention these words much less often than high OMGC groups and do not use some of the
same words at all. These differences are not explained by the sample sizes of high verses low
OMGC groups since they are of comparable sizes (178 and 180, respectively). Taken together,
this suggests that high OMGC groups do indeed discuss more features of the task at hand and to
a greater extend compared to low OMGC groups, something the measures of shared and
unshared information exchange failed to capture in the primary analyses.
Sentiment Analysis
In addition to the specific words people use to express themselves, they often convey
emotional intent when exchanging information with other people. For example, when reading
information from another group member through a text-based communication medium (e.g.,
online chat box), they might use their understanding of the emotional intent of words to infer
whether a message is generally positive, negative, or more nuanced emotion (e.g., disgust).
Therefore, I assessed the emotional content of the group discussion transcripts using sentiment
analysis (Silge & Robinson, 2017). One way to analyze the sentiment of a body of text is to
consider the text as a combination of its individual words and the sentiment content of the whole
text as the sum of the sentiment content of the individual words (Silge & Robinson, 2017). This
is not the only way to approach sentiment analysis, but it is an often-used approach. Using this
approach, I analyze the group discussion transcripts for positive and negative sentiments.
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Figure 28. Positive vs. negative emotional intent
As shown in Figure 28, these results suggest groups overwhelmingly displayed negative
sentiment during their discussions across all three of the most commonly used sentiment analysis
algorithms (i.e., AFINN, Bing et al., and NRC). Interestingly, high OMGC groups displayed
more negative sentiment than low OMGC groups. To further explore this relationship, I
examined the most common words that led to each sentiment.
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Figure 29. Positive vs. negative emotional intent as a function of OMGC
Words like suspect, assault, fraud, crime, and wrong contributed the most to the overall
negative sentiments expressed. See Figure 29. This helps explain why high OMGC groups are
showing more negative sentiment compared to low OMGC groups. The words that contribute the
most the the negative sentiments expressed are words that describe the major features of the task
groups are working on. Since high OMGC groups appear to discuss more features of the task
compared to low OMGC group as shown in the tf analyses, it is these features of the task that
contribute to the negative sentiments rather than the unique remarks mentioned by the group
members themselves. However, it is interesting to high OMGC groups they also mentioned the
word “wrong,” which may suggest that they are more willing to correct incorrect decisions
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compared to low OMGC groups, but this finding should be interpreted with caution based on the
low frequency counts for this term.
Words like “correct” and “nice” contributed the most to the overall positive sentiments
being expressed across both high and low OMGC groups. However, groups did not mention
nearly as many words with positive sentiment, likely due to the task topic (i.e., solving crimes),
so it is difficult to conclude much from the positive sentiment analysis results.
Discussion
Taken together, the results from Study 2 show broad support for the ABM of OMGC and
partial support for the present hypotheses. Previous research on group information processing
has found groups often exchange the information that is shared among its members rather than
the unshared information an individual member may hold. The present study investigated a
potential mechanism of this bias: OMGC. Specifically, I tested the antecedents and consequences
of OMGC while also investigating the impact of motivation and task type on group decisionmaking.
Both social and epistemic motivations were predicted to influence OMGC. Because
group members are likely to value their own interests over the group’s interests with proself
motivation, they were expected to withhold information from the rest of the group and exchange
less information with other group members. Similarly, because group members should be
unwilling to invest much cognitive effort under conditions of low epistemic motivation, groups
should be less likely to exchange information with other group members in this situations.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1a predicted mean OMGC would be higher in the prosocial conditions
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compared to the proself conditions, and Hypothesis 1b predicted mean OMGC would be higher
in the high epistemic conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions. Hypothesis 1c further
predicted the effects of social and epistemic motivations on OMGC were additive, such that
prosocial and high epistemic motivations were predicted to lead to the highest levels of OMGC;
prosocial and low epistemic motivations, as well as proself and high epistemic motivations, were
predicted to lead to moderate levels of OMGC, and proself and low epistemic motivations were
predicted to lead to the lowest levels of OMGC.
Results showed proself groups displayed higher OMGC compared to prosocial groups
and high epistemic groups displayed more OMGC compared to low epistemic groups (although
this later effect was non-significant when accounting for task type variance). The pattern of
results also supported the additive model predicted by Hypothesis 1c. These findings are in line
with the predictions of the MIP-G (de Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008) and work on
individual-level open-minded cognition (e.g., Ottati, Wilson, & Price, 2015), suggesting grouplevel cognitive styles are influenced by the same factors that influence motivating information
processing within groups.
In addition, social motivation was predicted to influence the group outcome variables.
Because group members with prosocial motivation are expected to value their own interests as
well as the interests of other group members, this should increase information exchange
compared to group members with proself motivation. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a predicts the
mean proportion of shared information exchanged should be higher in the prosocial conditions
compared to the proself conditions, Hypothesis 2b predicts the mean proportion of unshared
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information exchanged should be higher in the prosocial conditions compared to the proself
conditions, and Hypothesis 2c predicts the mean group performance rate should be higher in the
prosocial conditions compared to the proself conditions.
Results did not show that prosocial groups exchanged more shared information,
exchanged more unshared information, and had a higher performance rate compared to proself
groups. However, there was a main effect of social motivation on the logic puzzle solve rates
such that proself groups performed better than the prosocial groups. These findings are
somewhat in line with the predictions of the MIP-G model (de Dreu et al., 2008), suggesting
group information processing and performance are influenced by social motivation. However,
the present findings produce the opposite pattern of results suggested by the MIP-G model.
When groups were motivated to care about the preferences of all its members, they performed
worse on the task they were working, regardless of task type. When groups cared about the
preferences of all its members, they demonstrated the lowest performance.
Along with social motivation, epistemic motivation was predicted to influence the group
outcome variables. Because group members with high epistemic motivation are expected to
invest a lot of cognitive effort in the task, this should increase information exchange compared to
low epistemic groups. High epistemic groups should also be less concerned with self-censorship
because they are interested in arriving at an accurate conclusion of the task at hand. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3a predicts the mean proportion of shared information exchanged should be higher in
the high epistemic conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions, Hypothesis 3b predicts
the mean proportion of unshared information exchanged should be higher in the high epistemic
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conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions, and Hypothesis 3c predicts the mean group
performance rate should be higher in the high epistemic conditions compared to the low
epistemic conditions.
Results did not show that high epistemic groups exchanged more shared information
compared to low epistemic groups. However, results did show that high epistemic groups
exchanged more unshared information and had a higher performance rates compared to low
epistemic groups. These findings are in line with the predictions of the MIP-G model (de Dreu et
al., 2008). This suggests group information processing and performance is influenced by
epistemic motivation. When the group is motivated to be accurate in its decision, groups
exchange more unshared information and perform better on the task they are working on. When
the group does not care about being accurate, groups demonstrate the lowest rate of information
exchange and performance.
However, the type of task groups worked on moderated some of the effects of epistemic
motivation. When working on tasks with high demonstrability (i.e., intellective tasks), people
know there is an objectively correct solution for the task and that they have sufficient
information to solve it. This alone may be enough to increase epistemic motivation, and in these
cases, groups may not be satisfied with their answer until they believe they have found this
solution. On the other hand, when working on tasks with low demonstrability (i.e., judgmental
tasks), people do not know there is an objectively correct solution for the ask or believe they do
not have enough information to solve it. In these cases, groups may simply use their best
judgment when trying to solve the task. Therefore, Hypothesis 4a predicts mean OMGC will be
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higher in the high epistemic conditions compared to the low epistemic conditions during
judgmental tasks but OMGC will not differ between high and low epistemic conditions for
intellective tasks. Similarly, the mean proportion of shared information exchanged (Hypothesis
4b), the mean proportion of unshared information exchanged (Hypothesis 4c), the mean group
performance rate (Hypothesis 4d) should all be higher in the high epistemic conditions compared
to low epistemic conditions during judgmental tasks, but these mean proportions will not
significantly differ between high epistemic and low epistemic conditions for intellective tasks.
Results only supported these qualifications for the proportion of unshared information exchanged
within the groups. However, the patterns of means observed for these other non-significant
qualifications were in the predicted directions. Thus, it could be that task type is indeed a
moderating variable of epistemic motivation in group decision-making contexts but the effect is
simply too small to detect with the current research design.
Since social and epistemic motivations were expected to influence both OMGC and
group outcome variables, I also predicted the causal mechanism of group information-processing
and performance was OMGC. Social and epistemic motivations should influence OMGC (i.e.,
prosocial motivation should increase OMGC compared to proself motivation and high epistemic
motivation should increase OMGC compared to low epistemic motivation), which in turn should
affect the exchange of shared and unshared information as well as group performance (i.e.,
higher levels of OMGC should increase information exchange and performance compared to
lower levels of OMGC).
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Therefore, I predicted epistemic motivation would have an indirect on the proportion of
shared information exchanged (Hypothesis 5a), the proportion of unshared information
exchanged (Hypothesis 5b), and group performance rates (Hypothesis 5c) through OMGC.
Similarly, I predicted social motivation would have an indirect effect on the proportion of shared
information exchanged (Hypothesis 5d), the proportion of unshared information exchanged
(Hypothesis 5e), and group performance rates (Hypothesis 5f) through OMGC. Results only
supported the mediation models for Hypotheses 5d and 5f. However, further exploratory
analyses suggest that OMGC is indeed a strong predictor of group performance. Additionally,
texts analyses showed that high OMGC groups discussed more features of the task and to a
larger extent than low OMGC groups.

CHAPTER VI
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous research on group decision-making has found groups often exchange more
shared information held by all members of the group compared to unshared information held by
individual members. Although much research has examined the various cognitive and social
factors that may impact sharing, the MIP-G model (de Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008)
suggest social and epistemic motivations may at least partially account for this bias. Members
may selectively choose what information to exchange with others depending on the dominant
motivations within the group. Studies have shown the type of task groups work on can also
influence group information processing. For example, groups tend to pool information more
thoroughly and make higher quality decisions when working on intellective tasks compared to
judgmental ones (e.g., Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stewart &
Stasser, 1998). Although there are many proposed explanations for this effect (e.g., negotiation
bias, evaluation bias, discussion bias; Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007),
little research has investigated the role of open-minded cognitive styles in this context.
The current project investigated the antecedents and consequences of open-minded group
cognition (OMGC) in interacting groups. Across three hypotheses, social and epistemic
motivations were predicted to influence OMGC additively such that proself low epistemic
groups were expected to have the lowest levels of OMGC and prosocial high epistemic groups
185
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were expected to have the highest levels of OMGC. Across Studies 1 and 2, results provided
mixed support for these hypotheses. Support for the additive effects of epistemic and social
motivation on OMGC was only received in Study 1. In both Studies 1 and 2, results supported
the claim that high epistemic groups were more open-minded than low epistemic groups. Studies
1 and 2 provided evidence for the effect of social motivation on OMGC; however, in Study 1,
prosocial motivation led to higher OMGC whereas proself motivation led to higher OMGC in
Study 2. One possible explanation for these contradictory results involves the features of the task
groups worked on in Study 2.
Much of the research supportive of the MIP-G model has used tasks that fall in the
generate quadrant (e.g., creativity tasks) or the negotiate quadrant (e.g, negotiation tasks) of
McGrath’s (1984) circumplex task model. The task in Study 2 more closely resembled tasks that
fall in the choose quadrant of the model. Although the original hidden profile tasks (e.g.,
candidate profiles, murder mystery) are tasks from the choose quadrant, they are tasks designed
to produce homogeneous pre-discussion preferences. The current task does not ensure this
homogeneity among prediscussion responses. In fact, since individual information profiles only
allowed individual members to solve two of the 12 puzzle responses, there was likely a great
deal of heterogeneity among prediscussion answer solutions in Study 2. According to Brodbeck
and colleagues (2007), prediscussion preference heterogeneity attenuates the traditional common
information bias found in the dissemination of shared vs. unshared information. Also, since the
proself manipulation asks participants to get other members to accept their answer, it is possible
the reversed social motivation pattern is due to the fact that more heterogeneous answers were
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introduced during discussion, yielding higher OMGC, more information exchange, and higher
group performance. These heterogeneity effects would also be consistent with findings from
Scholten, van Knippenberg, Nijstad, and de Dreu (2007) who found prediscussion preference
heterogeneity stimulated information-driven interactions within group discussions and led to
higher quality decisions.
The present project also examined the impact of social motivation on other group process
variables. Prosocial groups were expected to exchange more shared information, exchange more
unshared information, and provide more correct puzzle solutions compared to proself groups.
Across Studies 1 and 2, results provided mixed support for these hypotheses. In Study 1, results
demonstrated prosocial groups did indeed exchange more shared and unshared information and
provided more correct puzzle solutions compared to proself groups. However, these effects were
among the smallest effects detected across all analyses in Study 1. In Study 2, results did not
support for the claim prosocial groups exchanged more shared and unshared information
compared to proself groups, but results did support the claim social motivation influenced group
performance. However, it was the proself groups that solved more correct solutions compared to
prosocial groups. This contradicted the results from Study 1, which showed prosocial groups
made more correct decisions than did proself groups. However, since proself groups also scored
higher on OMGC in Study 2, it does follow these groups would also perform better given the
evidence across both studies that OMGC improves group decision-making quality.
I also tested the influence of epistemic motivation on these same group process variables.
High epistemic were expected to exchange more shared information, exchange more unshared
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information, and provide more correct puzzle solutions compared to low epistemic groups.
Across Studies 1 and 2, results provided mixed support for these hypotheses. In Study 1, results
demonstrated high epistemic groups did indeed exchange more shared and unshared information
and provided more correct puzzle solutions compared to low epistemic groups. In Study 2,
results did not show high epistemic groups exchanged more shared information during
discussion, but it did show high epistemic groups exchanged more unshared information and
identified more correct puzzle solutions than low epistemic groups. These results were consistent
with findings from Study 1 and previous research. Scholten and colleagues (2007) found groups
high in process accountability (i.e., the manipulation of epistemic motivation also used in Study
2) sought out more information, repeated more unshared information, and chose the correct
decision alternative more often compared to groups low in process accountability.
Although the effects of social and epistemic motivation did not consistently influence the
extent to which groups exchanged shared or unshared information within the group in Study 2 as
predicted, they did influence the group’s performance and the extent to which groups exhibited
OMGC. However, it was theorized OMGC would improve group decision quality by reducing
biased information processing within groups (i.e., by exchanging more information with group
members, particularly unshared information). Since the antecedents of OMGC were not shown to
influence information exchange within the group, this may appear to be disconfirming evidence
of the theory. However, the proportion of information exchanged within the group (both shared
and unshared) was measured by indicating the presence or absence of the information item
within the group discussion. It is, therefore, possible that in some cases, groups may have
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mentioned the items but not used them when forming their decisions. So this disconfirming
evidence may be due to the measure rather than the actual processes occurring within the group.
Evidence in support of this latter idea comes from the exploratory text analyses in Study 2.
Results consistently showed high OMGC groups discussed more features of the task and to a
greater extent than low OMGC groups, which is what likely led them to identify more correct
puzzle answers.
The present project also investigated the moderating role of task type on the effects
outlined above. I predicted OMGC would be higher in the high epistemic conditions compared to
the low epistemic conditions during judgmental tasks but that it would not differ between high
and low epistemic conditions for intellective tasks. Similarly, the proportion of shared
information exchanged, the proportion of unshared information exchanged, and group
performance were all expected to be higher in the high epistemic conditions compared to low
epistemic conditions during judgmental tasks, but they were expected not to differ between high
epistemic and low epistemic conditions for intellective tasks. Across Studies 1 and 2, results
provided mixed support for these hypotheses. In Study 1, results provided clear support for all
hypotheses. However, in Study 2, results did not support of epistemic by task moderation for
OMGC, the proportion of shared information exchanged, or the proportion of correct puzzle
solutions identified. However, results from Study 2 did provide evidence for the moderation of
epistemic motivation by task type on the proportion of unshared information exchanged during
discussion.
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An examination of the epistemic by task type effect sizes suggests the current study is
inadequately powered to detect many of these moderation effects if they are indeed present.
Given funding limitations, I was only able to recruit a total sample size of 358 groups in Study 2.
This sample size, in combination with the other sensitivity analysis inputs described in Chapter
VI, suggested effect sizes as small as f =.15 could be detected with 80% probability. However,
the effect size for the interaction between epistemic motivation and task type on OMGC was
f =.06 , on the amount of shared information exchanged was f =.06, and on group performance

was f =.002. It is possible that some of these interactions do not exist. However, it seems likely
Study 2 suffered from statistical power limitations given the pattern of means for these
interactions found in Study 2, the significant interaction results from Study 1, and the significant
moderation of epistemic motivation by task type on unshared information exchange result in
Study 2.
The lack of moderation results in Study 2 could also be due to the task groups worked on
as well. Task features are a powerful moderator of the group’s behavior, and nearly any claim
about group behavior must take into account the nature of the group’s task (Kerr, 2009). The task
in Study 2 was chosen because it provided a hidden profile paradigm that could easily be
manipulated in an online environment while still allowing the researcher to manipulate the task
demonstrability. Many hidden profile paradigms ask groups to decided on the best candidate
(e.g., new employee, student government leader, etc.) from application materials or to help solve
a murder mystery (e.g., Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stasser & Titus, 1985). These tasks pose some
unique challenges for the sample that was to be collected in Study 2. First, it would be difficult to
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manipulate the demonstrability of the candidate profile task. Presumably, participants are already
viewing the task as an intellective one: That there is an objectively best candidate for the position
To try to change the demonstrability of the task to lead participants to believe there was not an
objectively best candidate for the position could compromise the believability of the task.
Indeed, if there is no best candidate for the position, group members may begin to wonder why
they are tasked with trying to identify one. Second, implementing a murder mystery task in an
online environment proved to be a unique challenge. In the murder mystery hidden profile tasks,
there are many pieces of evidence members must consider to solve the crime (e.g., map,
handwritten note, news articles, police interview transcripts, etc.). Creating and distributing these
items in a laboratory-based experiment is challenging in its own right, but creating them for an
online environment proved to be difficult as well. Therefore, I chose to use a logic puzzle task,
which is a common task groups have worked on in the problem-solving literature (Laughlin,
2011; Steiner, 1972).
In creating the task for Study 2, I preserved the structure of a logic puzzle task used by
Ohtsubo (2005) by changing the content of the puzzle to resemble the task topic used by Stasser
and Stewart (1992). In the modified task, participants were asked to determine a “low,”
“medium,” or “high” probability that four separate suspects committed three separate crimes.
This, however, produces a notable difference between the task used in Study 2 and hidden profile
tasks in previous research. A common feature of hidden profile paradigms is that group member
prediscussion preferences are generally homogeneous in that they all tend to prefer a (incorrect)
choice preference. Research has shown when prediscussion homogeneity decreases and group
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members tend to have more diverse prediscussion preferences, the common information bias
tends to fade (e.g., Brodbeck et al., 2007; Stasser & Titus, 1985). Given virtually all groups
displayed high heterogenic prediscussion preferences, this difference between the task used in
Study 2 and previous tasks could have weakened the task type effect in Study 2.
Furthermore, the social motivation manipulation used in Study 2 could have exacerbated
the prediscussion heterogeneity effect. A crucial aspect of the group’s task is what the group’s
goal is (Kerr, 2017). For example, a group’s approach to completing a task will be different if its
goal is to be accurate or quick. In Study 2, the instructions in the proself conditions asked group
members to view the others in their groups as opponents and to be the first in the group to
propose a solution with the goal of getting others to accept that solution. If every group member
is simultaneously trying to get their answers into the discussion first, this will lead to more
answers entering the discussion overall compared to the prosocial conditions which just asked
group members to view the others in their groups as partners whose interests were important to
them. Many of these answers may be incorrect, but some may also be correct. Additionally,
despite manipulating the perception of task demonstrability in the study, the task that was used is
ultimately an intellective one: There is a demonstrably correct solution to the logic puzzle. Thus,
the chances of group members identifying a correct solution when one is mention in the
discussion increases in the proself conditions because more answers are likely to enter the
discussion in these contexts. And because prediscussion preferences are mostly heterogeneous,
meaning group members likely do not have a strong preference or intuition about the solutions,
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there is likely less conflict or disagreement when correct answers are proposed than if
prediscussion preferences were mostly homogeneous.
If this explanation holds, I would expect to see a two-way interaction between social and
epistemic motivations such that proself high epistemic groups would have the highest OMGC,
exchange the most amount of information, and display the highest performance compared to the
other three motivation conditions. In the MIP-G model, social motivation influences information
sharing by influencing the direction of information processes and epistemic motivation
influences the depth of information processing (de Dreu et al., 2008). These motivations have an
additive effect such that information processing becomes less biased as prosocial and epistemic
motivations increase. However, given the nature of the task in Study 2, proself motivation should
actually decrease biased information processing due to the fact that more puzzle solutions are
being proposed during discussion compared to prosocial conditions, which would increase the
chances of identifying the correct answer.
There is some evidence to support this notion. Results from a 2 (Social motivation:
prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (Epistemic motivation: high vs. low) ANOVA confirmatory analysis on
OMGC, F ( 1 , 354 )=2.79 , p=.10 , f =.09 , show proself high epistemic groups had the highest
levels of OMGC whereas the remaining conditions had comparable levels of OMGC. Although
this finding was non-significant, the pattern of results is similar to what I would expect given the
features of the task used in Study 2. Results from a 2 (Social motivation: prosocial vs. proself) x
2 (Epistemic motivation: high vs. low) ANOVA exploratory analysis on group performance
provide more direct support for this idea with a significant two-way interaction,
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F ( 1 , 354 )=9.77 , p< .01, f =.17 . Proself high epistemic groups correctly solved the most logic

puzzle solutions whereas the remaining conditions correctly solved the puzzles at approximately
the same rate. Taken together, it seems the features of task used in Study 2 may explain both the
lack of evidence for epistemic motivation by task type as well as the reversal pattern for proself
motivation conditions.
Future research could directly test this explanation in a couple of ways. One approach
would be to use roughly the same design as Study 2 but add a condition that manipulates the
heterogeneity of prediscussion choice preferences. In the high heterogeneity conditions,
researchers could keep the individual information profiles much like they are in Study 2. The
important feature of this condition would be that individuals are only able to solve a small
number of the logic puzzle solutions (e.g., 2 out of 12). This would require members to pool their
unshared information to solve the whole puzzle while also leading more variability in the
solutions proposed in the discussion. In the low heterogeneity conditions, researchers could
manipulate the information profiles such that an individual information profile allows everyone
to correctly solve a majority of the logic puzzle solutions (e.g., 9 out 12) and also bias them
towards the incorrect solutions for the remaining responses. These conditions would require
members to pool their unshared information to solve the whole puzzle while also leading less
variability in the solutions proposed in the discussion. A second approach would be to use a
similar design as Study 2, but to switch to a more traditional hidden profile task (e.g., candidate
selection). Since the ABM in Study 1 was validated using these more traditional tasks, using
such a task in Study 2’s design should lead to similar findings found in Study 1. By using a
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candidate profile task, researchers could also manipulate prediscussion heterogeneity in much the
same way as Stasser and Titus (1985). However, researchers would also need to consider the
believability of the task if they were to also manipulate the perception of task demonstrability.
For example, if they are asked to hire an employee, they may not find it believable or meaningful
task if they are also told there is no objectively best candidate among the profiles they are
considering.
Since social and epistemic motivations were expected to influence both OMGC and
group outcome variables, the current project also investigated OMGC as a causal mechanism of
group information processing and final decisions. Social and epistemic motivations were
predicted to influence OMGC, which in turn should affect the exchange of shared and unshared
information as well as group performance. Therefore, I predicted epistemic motivation would
have an indirect effect on the proportion of shared information exchanged, proportion of
unshared information exchanged, and number of correct logic puzzle solutions solved through
OMGC. I also predicted social motivation would have an indirect effect on the proportion of
shared information exchanged, proportion of unshared information exchanged, and number of
correct logic puzzle solutions solved through OMGC. Results provided mixed support for these
hypotheses across Studies 1 and 2. In Study 1, results provided clear support for all the
hypotheses. However, results from Study 2 only provided support for OMGC as a causal
mechanism of group information processing and performance for social motivation. In other
words, Study 2 provided evidence that only social motivation had an indirect effect on the

196
proportion of shared information exchanged, proportion of unshared information exchanged, and
group performance through OMGC.
However, when testing the indirect effect of social motivation on group performance
through OMGC in Study 2, the direct effect of social motivation on group performance remained
significant after controlling for OMGC, b=−.06 , t ( 355 )=−2.84 , p=.005. This suggests there
may be another mediator that explains the effect of social motivation on group performance. For
example, if people do not feel like they are in a comfortable environment or if they fail to take
the perspective of other group members, then they may not participate in the group discussion
(e.g., by mentioning their own unique information) as much even if they are open-minded to
other group members’ information, perspectives, and ideas. Therefore, the environment groups
are working in, the atmosphere of the group discussion, and perspective taking by individual
group members could be additional mediators that explain why the direct effect of social
motivation on group performance remained significant in Study 2. Nevertheless, further
exploratory analyses showed OMGC remained a significant predictor of group performance after
controlling for the variance from epistemic motivation, social motivation, and task type.
Taken together, the mediation results from Studies 1 and 2 both provide evidence for
OMGC as a causal mechanism for the effects of social motivation on group information
processing and performance. This is consistent with the model of MIP-G (de Dreu et al., 2008)
as well as the conceptual definitions of open-minded cognition at the individual level (Price,
Ottati, Wilson, & Kim, 2015) and OMGC outlined in Chapter II. According to the model of
MIP-G, social motivation primarily influences group information processing by directionally
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biasing the type of information searched, encoded, retrieved, and shared (de Dreu et al., 2008).
Similarly, Price and colleagues (2015) argue that open-minded cognition at the individual level is
distinguished from other cognitive styles due to its focus on directional bias in cognitive
processing, and I argue in the current project this is also a central feature of OMGC. It therefore
follows that OMGC would present as a strong causal mechanism for the effects of social (versus
epistemic) motivation on group information processing and performance. However, the effect of
social motivation on group outcome variables presented contradictory patterns of evidence
between Study 1 and Study 2 such that prosocial motivation led to higher OMGC in Study 1
whereas proself motivation led to higher OMGC in Study 2. As discussed above, the task used in
Study 2 may explain this divergent pattern of results.
The mediation results from Studies 1 and 2 are less clear for OMGC as a causal
mechanism for the effects of epistemic motivation on group information processing and
performance. Despite demonstrating this pattern in Study 1 and providing evidence that having
higher epistemic motivation increases OMGC in Study 2, none of the mediation analyses
provided evidence of OMGC as a causal mechanism of epistemic motivation effect on group
outcomes. One possible explanation for this comes from the MIP-G model, which argues
epistemic motivation influences group information processing by biasing the depth of
information searched, encoded, retrieved, and shared (de Dreu et al., 2008). Since open-minded
cognition at both the individual- and group-level is conceptualized a directional bias rather than a
depth bias, it could be that OMGC is not the causal mechanism of epistemic motivation’s effects
on group information processing and performance.
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Another explanation, however, seems to be suggested by the data. In Study 2, many
effects of epistemic motivation on the group outcome variables were moderated by task type or
seemed to suggest that such a pattern could be present. If this is true, the indirect effects of
epistemic motivation on group information processing and performance through OMGC may be
moderated by features of the task. Similarly, it could be that task type, rather than epistemic
motivation, has an effect on group information processing and performance through OMGC.
Since the lower limits of the confidence intervals for these mediation results were close to
excluding 0, the present project does not provide enough evidence to place confidence in one
explanation over another. Nevertheless, it is clear across both studies that higher epistemic
motivation increases OMGC and OMGC is a significant predictor of group performance.
Implications
The results from the current project have implications for the ABM of OMGC. First, the
ABM currently holds the distribution of prediscussion choice preferences constant such that
prediscussion preferences are homogeneous. A future version of the model will contain a
prediscussion preference heterogeneity parameter, which will allow the model to test for the
social motivation results observed in Study 2. Second, the ABM currently assumes each agent
treats the information items in the same way, but research shows group members may value the
same piece of information differently than others in the group (Stasser, 1988). Thus, a future
version of the ABM will include a valence variability parameter that influences the extent who
which members weight the same information item. Third, the current ABM mainly treats OMGC
as the extent to which information is shared within the group, but open-minded cognition can
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influence many other stages of information processing. For example, after a piece of information
is shared with the group, group members must determine if the item is credible. If they deem the
information as unreliable, they may be closed minded towards it even though it was shared
during the group discussion. One way to incorporate this idea in future versions of the model
would be to include a truth value parameter that influences the extent to which agents are
skeptical towards information items. This truth value could then be multiplied by the probability
of the information item being mentioned in discussion to ultimately influence OMGC. Fourth,
results from Study 2 suggest social (versus epistemic) motivation has a larger effect on OMGC
and social motivation has an indirect effect on group information processing and performance
through OMGC. This suggests that epistemic motivation may not play as large of a role in
OMGC as the ABM currently models, but more work is needed to verify this claim. Lastly,
although the general pattern of findings in Study 1 tended to emerge in Study 2 (with some
exceptions), some effect size estimates in Study 1 were larger than those observed in Study 2,
particularly for OMGC. Therefore, future versions of the ABM will try to more accurately
estimate the effect sizes found in Study 2, perhaps by including some of the parameters discussed
above or by reducing the influence current parameters have in the model.
The results from the current project also have implications for the group decision
literature. First, and most importantly, OMGC was shown to be a consistent predictor of group
performance across both studies. This offers a promising area of investigation into reducing the
common knowledge effect often found in group decision-making contexts. This is also consistent
with Gürçay, Mellers, and Baron’s (2015) results, which showed members’ openness to

200
changing one’s mind during group discussion predicted group performance in a forecasting task.
Previous research on open-minded cognition in inter-group contexts has shown that individuals
tend to use their group’s norm to guide their level of open-mindedness (Winget, Tindale, &
Ottati, 2019). However, group norms can be difficult to change. From a social identity
perspective, norms outline what is and is not part of the group and establish social identities, and
they help form a cognitive group representation (e.g., a group prototype) that prescribes identitydefining behavior (Hogg, 2006). Thus, the work that has been done looking at open-minded
cognitive styles within group contexts may not immediately lend itself to a practical intervention
to increase information exchange within groups. This previous work also suffers from the
limitation that open-minded cognition was measured at the individual-level rather than the group
level. The present findings, however, suggest motivation and task type are important factors that
influence open-minded cognition at the group level and may offer more practical information
exchange interventions within group contexts.
A second implication for the group decision-making literature based on the current
project is that task type should be addressed more in our theories of group decision-making. In
reviewing the literature to develop the ABM of OMGC in Study 1, many studies and theories did
not conduct an analysis of what task features led to the findings within the study. They also did
not offer a clear explanation of how task features would change group behavior in other contexts.
To be clear, there is certainly published work that demonstrates and acknowledges the
moderating role of task type; however, many of these discussions are limited to the often-used
intellective-judgmental distinction outlined in the present project. As demonstrated in the current
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project, this task type distinction does not appear to capture the complexity of this moderator.
But even this observation is not a new idea in the group decision making literature. McGrath
(1984) pointed this problem out nearly three decades ago, and judging by Kerr’s (2017) recent
call for more work addressing the moderating effects of the group task, not much as changed.
However, the present results underscore the importance for considering this neglected moderator.
It is possible features of the task can potentially wipe out well-established effects in some cases
and even reverse them in others.
In addition to theoretical development, the findings presented here have practical
applications as well. For example, many teams within organizations must decide on both
intellective and judgmental tasks. Committees are often formed to decide which potential
candidate should receive an offer for employment. Since these teams are trying to identify the
best employee from a pool of candidates, they likely view the task as an intellective one. Other
committees may be formed to decide which insurance packages to offer the organization’s
employees. These teams may have to decide between packages that cost the company more
versus others that provide maximum benefits for their employees. However, there may not be a
demonstrably correct decision to be made in these cases. Results from the present study suggest
epistemic motivation may only be beneficial for the latter task, so teams may benefit the most
from social motivation. However, the optimal type of social motivation (i.e., prosocial or proself)
for these teams may depend on the team’s specific prediscussion choice heterogeneity.
Juries are faced with similar challenges of deciding on intellective and judgmental tasks
as well. In criminal trials, juries are often presented two forms of evidence: (1) direct and (2)
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circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that does not require an inference to establish the fact
it is alleging. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is evidence that indirectly establishes
the fact in question. For example, testimony that a person was seen walking in the rain is direct
evidence the person walked in the rain. However, testimony that a person was seen indoors with
wet clothing while it was raining is circumstantial evidence the person walked in the rain. Juries
may view tasks as intellective while deciding on direct evidence, but they may view the task as
more judgmental while decision on circumstantial evidence. In many trails, it seems reasonable
juries would already have high epistemic motivation to deliver as accurate of a verdict as
possible. Juries may do well by trying to foster social motivation during the deliberation process,
but again, the optimal type of social motivation (i.e., prosocial or proself) may depend on the
group’s specific prediscussion choice heterogeneity. These results may have important
implications for reducing political gridlock and fostering more diverse and unbiased classroom
discussions as well.
Conclusions
Given the widespread use of groups to solve problems, understanding the factors that
influence how they process information to make collective decisions is paramount. Previous
research has found groups tend to suffer from a common knowledge effect in which they tend to
exchange and discuss shared information held by all members rather than unique information
held by individual members. The current study investigated a potential mechanism of this bias:
OMGC. Consistent with previous research, the present project showed OMGC was influenced by
the same factors that generally influence group processes and that it was a significant predictor
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of group performance. Thus, OMGC provides a fruitful avenue for future research on group
information processing and performance.
This paper opened by posing a broad question that does not appear to have a clear
answer: What should be done when the interests of the individual conflict with the interests of
the group. Results from this project, like many before it, can only offer partial answers. The
results from Study 1 appear to support Thomas Paine’s idea that selfish motivations by the
individual can undermine the larger group’s interests. However, results from Study 2 are more in
line with Adam Smith’s argument of the invisible hand. While group members were working
towards their individual goals, the groups ended up performing better than when they were
concerned with the interests of their other group members. It seems, as with most topics related
to human behavior, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Perhaps instead of focusing on the
individual-group dichotomy, we would benefit from paying more attention to the specifics of the
situation. The motivations we hold are adaptive and likely tuned to help us get along with other
people, particularly in group context. By focusing on the features of the situation or task, we
might be in a better position to align these motivations in ways to improve outcomes for all those
involved.

APPENDIX A
STUDY 2 MATERIALS
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Welcome screen
Welcome! During this study, you will be working in a group together with two real people who
also accepted to participate in this study. All three of you will be working on tasks at the same
time. Therefore, it is important that you complete the tasks in this study without distractions or
interruptions. Including the time for reading these instructions, the study will take
approximately 20 minutes to complete. During the study, please do not close this window or
leave any web pages in any other way. If you do close your browser or leave the task, you will
not be able to re-enter and we will not be able to pay you! In this study, you will participate in a
series of tasks with the same people. At the end of the study, you will be compensated for your
time. You will receive a code to collect your payment via Prolific upon completion.
General instructions
After you are matched with two other people, you each will be presented with some information
relevant to the task you will be working on. It is important you carefully read the information
you are provided before working on the task. Although there will be some overlapping
information among the people in your group, there may be some information that does not
overlap among the people in your group. After you read through the information you are
provided, you will be asked to make an individual decision. Once you’ve made your decision,
you will have the opportunity to discuss the information you have with the other people in your
group and asked to make another decision, but as a group this time. After finishing the group
task, a brief questionnaire will conclude the study. Please, click the link below if you understood
these instructions. Before the study officially begins, a brief quiz will check whether you
understand what is expected in this study.
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Control questions
Please answer all control questions. These serve as a test for your understanding of the study.





Before starting on the task, which of the following must you do?
1. Introduce yourself to the other people in your group
2. Carefully read the information you have been provided
3. Make an individual decision
4. Discuss the information you have been provided

2.

How many other people will you be working on these tasks with?
1. Open-ended response: __________ (correct answer: 2)

3.

The people you will be working with are real people.

True

False

I’m not sure

What is the correct sequence of events for this study?

Make an individual decision, read provided information, complete short
questionnaires, discuss task with group, make a group decision

Complete short questionnaires, discuss task with group, make a group decision,
make an individual decision, read provided information

Make an individual decision, make a group decision, discuss task with group, read
information, complete short questionnaires

Read provided information, make an individual decision, discuss task with
group, make a group decision, complete short questionnaires
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Individual decision task
In the following task, your goal is to determine the probability that a suspect has committed three
different crimes. You will receive information to help you determine these probabilities. As is
common in these situations, the information you first receive may not be sufficient to determine
the likelihood a suspect has committed every crime. Therefore, after indicating your initial
solutions, you will have the opportunity to exchange information with other individuals and then
to update your solution.
Your initial information is presented below. Also, to better simulate real world conditions, you
will receive some information that is given to everyone and some information given only to you.
Please carefully read the information you’ve been presented, as it will help you complete the
task. After indicating your initial solutions, you will have the opportunity to exchange
information with others. It is up to you to decide how much information you wish to share,
withhold, or distort. Here is your task:
Recently, a series of crimes has been committed in an otherwise quiet town. Detectives have
narrowed down their list of suspects responsible for the crimes to four individuals, but they need
your help to figure out who is the most likely perpetrator of the crimes. Each of the four suspects
has a low, medium, or high probability of being the perpetrator. Your goal is to use the available
information to figure out each of their probabilities in the table below. Note, you must fill in
each of the missing probabilities, even if it is simply a guess.
(Individual is then presented with one of the information profiles outlined on next page.)
Fraud
Suspect 1
Suspect 2
Suspect 3
Suspect 4

Assault

Shoplifting
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Information profiles
Shared information italicized
Person 1:
 Suspect 4 has a high probability of committing an assault
 Only one suspect has exactly one high probability, one medium probability, and one low
probability within the three crimes
 For each of the crimes, there are only two suspects with a high probability of being the
perpetrator
 Suspect 1 has a low probability of shoplifting
 Suspect 4 has the same probability for fraud as Suspect 1 has for assault
 None of the suspects have a medium probability of shoplifting
Person 2:
 Suspect 4 has a high probability of committing an assault
 Only one suspect has exactly one high probability, one medium probability, and one low
probability within the three crimes
 For each of the crimes, there are only two suspects with a high probability of being the
perpetrator
 Suspect 4’s lowest probability was for fraud
 Suspect 3 has a medium probability of committing fraud
 Suspect 2 and Suspect 4 have the same probability for shoplifting
Person 3:
 Suspect 4 has a high probability of committing an assault
 Only one suspect has exactly one high probability, one medium probability, and one low
probability within the three crimes
 For each of the crimes, there are only two suspects with a high probability of being the
perpetrator
 Suspect 2 has a high probability of committing an assault
 Only one suspect has a high probability of committing all three crimes
 Suspect 3 has a low probability of committing exactly one of the three crimes
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Group decision task
You now have the opportunity to exchange information with the other participants in the study.
As in any discussion, it is up to you to decide how much information you wish to share,
withhold, or distort. To be successful in this task, think of the other people involved as your
(partners/opponents), whose interests (are/are not) important to you. (In proself conditions, the
following sentences are added: “Although members generally make a joint decision in group
decision situations, it is often important to be the first in the group to propose a solution. So, your
goal is to get your opponents to go with your solution for the group decision.”) Also, be aware
that the information you have been provided is (sufficient/insufficient) to answer the task
question. So, please (use the information to arrive to the correct answer/use your best judgment
when answering).
Please try to keep in mind the information you have as well as what happens during the
discussion. After the study is completed, you will be individually asked questions relating to
these topics (e.g., the decisions you individually made, the decisions the others made, the
procedures, the strategies you used to make your judgments, etc.). (This paragraph will not be
presented in the low epistemic motivation conditions)
Recently, a series of crimes has been committed in an otherwise quiet town. Detectives have
narrowed down their list of suspects responsible for the crimes to four individuals, but they need
your help to figure out who is the most likely perpetrator of the crimes. Each of the four suspects
has a low, medium, or high probability of being the perpetrator. Your goal is to use the available
information to figure out each of their probabilities in the table below. Note, you must fill in
each of the missing probabilities, even if it is simply a guess.
(Each individual is presented with the same information profile they were previously shown, and
they can only view their own information profile. However, there is also a chat box on this
screen in which members can interact and exchange information.)
Fraud
Suspect 1
Suspect 2
Suspect 3
Suspect 4

Assault

Shoplifting
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Correct solution
All pieces of information:

Suspect 4 has a high probability of committing an assault

Only one suspect has exactly one high probability, one medium probability, and one low
probability within the three crimes

For each of the crimes, there are only two suspects with a high probability of being the
perpetrator

Suspect 1 has a low probability of shoplifting

Suspect 4’s lowest probability was for fraud

Suspect 2 has a high probability of committing an assault

Suspect 2 and Suspect 4 received the same probability for shoplifting

Suspect 4 received the same probability for fraud as Suspect 1 received for assault

None of the suspects have a medium probability of shoplifting

Only one suspect has a high probability of committing all three crimes

Suspect 3 has a medium probability of committing fraud

Suspect 3 has a low probability of committing exactly one of the three crimes
Fraud

Assault

Shoplifting

Suspect 1

High

Medium

Low

Suspect 2

High

High

High

Suspect 3

Medium

Medium

Low

Suspect 4

Medium

High

High
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Manipulation checks
During the task, I was cooperating with the others in my group.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

During the task, I was trying to get more answers than the others in my group.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

During the task, I cared more about my performance than my group’s performance.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

6

7
Strongly
agree

During the task, I was concerned with getting the correct solutions.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5

During the task, I did not care about solving as many of the probabilities as possible.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

212
During the task, I was careful to consider all of the information shared in the discussion.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

6

7
Strongly
agree

We did not have enough information to do well on the task.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

It was obvious when a proposed solution was wrong.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

People in my group did not recognize or accept the best answers.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
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Final questionnaire
What is your age? _________
Where would you place yourself on this political spectrum?
1
Strong
Liberal

2

3

4
Moderate

5

6

7
Strong
Conservative

If you had to choose, where would you place yourself on this political spectrum?
1
Strong
Democrat

2

3

4
Moderate

What is your gender?
____ Man
____ Woman
____ Non-binary or gender variant
____ Prefer not to say
____ Prefer to self identify (please specify): ______________
What is your ethnicity?
____ White
____ Black
____ Native American
____ Hispanic
____ Pacific Islander
____ Prefer to self identify (please specify): ______________

5

6

7
Strong
Republican
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